The influence of market structure, collaboration and price competition on supply network disruptions in open and closed markets by Greening, Philip
  
 
 
 
CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
Philip Greening 
 
 
 
 
The influence of market structure, collaboration and price 
competition on supply network disruptions in open and closed 
markets 
 
 
 
 
School of Management 
 
 
 
 
PhD 
Academic Year: 2006 - 2013 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr Janet Godsell 
  
 
 
  
 
 
CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
School of Management 
 
 
PhD 
 
 
Academic Year 2006 - 2013 
 
 
Philip Greening 
 
 
 
The influence of market structure, collaboration and price 
competition on supply network disruptions in open and closed 
markets 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr Janet Godsell 
 
 
 
© Cranfield University 2013. All rights reserved. No part of this 
publication may be reproduced without the written permission of the 
copyright owner. 
 i 
ABSTRACT 
The relaxation of international boundaries has enabled the globalisation of 
markets making available an ever increasing number of specialised suppliers 
and markets.  Inevitably this results in supply chains sharing suppliers and 
customers reflected in a network of relationships.  
Within this context firms buyers configure their supply relationships based on 
their perception of supply risk. Risk is managed by either increasing trust or 
commitment or by increasing the number of suppliers. Increasing trust and 
commitment facilitates collaboration and reduces the propensity for a supplier to 
exit the relationship. Conversely, increasing the number of suppliers reduces 
dependency and increases the ease of making alternative supply 
arrangements. 
The emergent network of relationships is dynamic and complex, and due in no 
small part to the influence of inventory management practices, tightly coupled. 
This critical organization of the network describes a system that contrary to 
existing supply chain conceptualisation exists far from equilibrium, requiring a 
different more appropriate theoretical lens through which to view them.  
This thesis adopts a Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) perspective to position 
supply networks as tightly coupled complex systems which according to Normal 
Accident Theory (NAT) are vulnerable to disruptions as a consequence of 
normal operations. The consequential boundless and emergent nature of supply 
networks makes them difficult to research using traditional empirical methods, 
instead this research builds a generalised supply network agent based 
computer model, allowing network constituents (agents) to take autonomous 
parallel action reflecting the true emergent nature of supply networks. 
This thesis uses the results from a series of carefully designed computer 
experiments to elucidate how supply networks respond to a variety of market 
structures and permitted agent behaviours. Market structures define the vertical 
(between tier) and horizontal (within tier) levels of price differentiation. Within 
each structure agents are permitted to autonomously modify their prices 
 ii 
(constrained by market structure) and collaborate by sharing demand 
information.  
By examining how supply networks respond to different permitted agent 
behaviours in a range of market structures this thesis makes 4 contributions. 
Firstly, it extends NAT by incorporating the adaptive nature of supply network 
constituents. Secondly it extends supply chain management by specifying 
supply networks as dynamic not static phenomena. Thirdly it extends supply 
chain risk management through developing an understanding of the impact 
different permitted behaviour combinations on the networks vulnerability to 
disruptions in the context of normal operations. Finally by developing the 
understanding how normal operations impact a supply networks vulnerability to 
disruptions it informs the practice of supply chain risk management.  
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 1 
1 Introduction 
Forethought we may have, undoubtedly, but not foresight. 
- Napoleon Bonaparte 
This chapter commences by setting out the motivation for this research through 
various illustrations of connectivity between supply chains and how this 
influences the propagation of disruptions across a supply network. The chapter 
then formalises the purpose of the research via a problem statement before 
concluding by outlining the structure of the remaining thesis. 
1.1 The Unpredictable World 
The world is an unpredictable place and globalisation with its relaxation of 
international boundaries has only served to emphasise the vulnerability of 
extended supply chains (Barry, 2004a; Peck, 2005; Sheffi, 2005).  
The consequences of a small thunderstorm in Albuquerque in 2000 have been 
widely reported (Sheffi, 2005; Norrman and Jansson, 2004). This resulted in a 
lightning strike at the Philips production facility, and although the resultant fire 
was small, it contaminated a batch of computer chips being manufactured for a 
new generation of mobile phones. Principally, this production batch was 
destined for Nokia and Ericsson. 
Both Nokia and Ericsson had diligently considered such a risk and both felt that 
they had developed an appropriate relationship with Philips to ensure they 
would be notified of any disruption to supply immediately. Philips did indeed 
inform both organisations of the fire; however, their responses were noticeably 
different. 
Ericsson was content to manage the disruption from their headquarters in 
Sweden, whilst in contrast, Nokia dispatched a team of engineers and 
specialists to verify the significance of the fire and provide recovery assistance 
to Philips. It quickly became apparent to the Nokia team that the fire had also 
contaminated the clean room and as a result presented a much bigger risk of 
disruption in supply than had initially been realised. Through their quick 
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response Nokia were able to secure capacity at other Philips sites and establish 
alternative supplies from other organisations. Through such a resilient design 
process Nokia were able to substitute the Philips chips with suitable 
alternatives. 
Ericsson however, did not realise the significance of the fire until much later and 
were not able to secure alternative supplies, partly because these had already 
been secured by Nokia and partly because their design could not accept 
alternatives.  
The consequence of the different responses to this disruption was that Nokia 
increased their market share by 3%, whilst Ericsson suffered significant losses 
($430M -$570M) and a year later merged with Sony (Sheffi, 2005, pp.8-9). 
Although well-rehearsed in the literature, the Philips Nokia Ericsson case is far 
from isolated. Sheffi (2005) also reported the consequences of Hurricane Mitch 
in 2001, which decimated banana plantations in the Bahamas. Both Dole and 
Chiquita had plantations that were badly affected. The fortunes of these two 
organisations can be differentiated on the basis of the supply chain strategy 
each adopted. In the case of Chiquita, the strategy to have multiple plantations 
in different geographical territories meant that their supply chain was robust. In 
contrast, Dole had designed their supply chain to maximise efficiency and relied 
on a single geographical source of supply, thereby rendering their supply chain 
efficient but vulnerable. 
The disruptions described above illuminate two important aspects of supply 
networks; the first case shows how changes in one supply chain can affect other 
supply chains that share customers or suppliers, and the second case illustrates 
how the impact of disruptions can be dissipated through diversity. 
High impact supply chain disruptions are not merely restricted to exogenous 
events such as natural disasters. Many organisations have been forced to 
announce reduced revenues, increased costs and decreasing profits as a 
consequence of endogenous operational difficulties. 
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The extant research uses these and other case studies to characterise 
disturbances and disruption of sources as either endogenous or exogenous to a 
particular supply chain as defined by a focal firm. This has resulted in widely 
accepted risk mitigation frameworks which neglect the interdependencies 
between supply chains (Anna et al., 2005; Arnold et al., 2010b; Chopra and 
Sodhi, 2004; 2004; Schipmann and Qaim, 2011; Zsidisin et al., 2004). 
Endogenous disturbances are framed by inventory management and capacity 
planning strategies that are designed to contain the disruption within a supply 
chain (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Zsidisin et al., 2008), whilst exogenous 
disruption descriptions lack detailed consideration of the pathways along which 
the generated disturbances can flow (Craighead et al., 2007b; Greening and 
Rutherford, 2011; 2011b; Bode et al., 2011; Hallikas and Virolainen, 2004). 
1.2 Disturbances and Disruptions 
Throughout this thesis the terms ‘disturbances’ and ‘disruptions’ are used to 
describe specific circumstances; therefore for the purposes of clarity, definitions 
for these two terms are provided below: 
Disturbances refer to changes in flows or relationships where the consequences 
require no structural changes to the network of relationships that describe a 
supply network. In other words, a disturbance is contained by existing strategies 
or processes. 
Disruptions are unanticipated changes in flow or relationships that require the 
re-organisation of flows and relationships beyond those anticipated or designed. 
In other words, the changes have a structural impact beyond any design or 
intent. 
These definitions find broad support in the literature on normal accident theory 
(NAT) and complex adaptive systems (CASs), and these are considered in 
Chapter 2. However, the purpose of illustration, the definitions provided above 
can alternatively be developed from these two theoretical perspectives. 
NAT takes a technological perspective to position failures and their impact on 
four levels, failures that relate to: 1) an individual part; 2) a unit consisting of 
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parts; 3) a subsystem; or 4) the system itself. In supply network terms: a part 
equates to a firm, a unit to a dyad, a subsystem to a supply chain and a system 
to a supply network. NAT expressly dismisses failures at levels 1 and 2 unless 
they result in failures at levels 3 and 4 (Perrow, 1999, pp.64-65). 
Similarly, CAS theory posits that emergence is a consequence of the 
interactions that occur constantly between organisations but occasionally 
structures undergo re-organisation when small and normally contained 
disturbances combine with other disturbances to overwhelm the extant structure 
of relationships and consequently redefine the network (Varga et al., 2009; 
Pathak et al., 2007a; Choi et al., 2001a). 
These theoretical perspectives are discussed in much more detail in Chapter 2. 
1.3 Problem Statement and Contributions 
Much of supply chain management theory and practice balances process risk 
with performance by trading inventory for shared information anchored in 
collaborative relationships (Wilding and Humphries, 2006; Tsai et al., 2012; 
Juettner and Maklan, 2011; Wagner et al., 2011; Visser, 2010; Datta and 
Christopher, 2011a). Inventory can be minimised in a supply chain by sharing 
demand information, thereby reducing the uncertainty parameter that is key in 
determining the levels of inventory buffers. However, this framing neglects the 
low probability of disturbances in supply chains propagating beyond the 
assumed boundaries. 
The network perspective exposes the risk associated with the connectedness of 
the supply chains. It can be argued that inventory minimisation practices 
increases the coupling of a network, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
disturbances propagating across supply chains that share suppliers and 
customers, an argument framed by NAT (Perrow, 1999).  
The NAT perspective frames systems, a generalised description, such that 
normal process disturbances can propagate along dependency pathways to 
become coincident. In supply chain terms this presents the possibility of 
breaching a particular firm’s inventory and capacity mitigation strategies, which 
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results in disruptions that can only be accommodated through the structural re-
organisation of buyer/supplier relationships.  
Despite this argument that process risk mitigation strategies may combine with 
inventory management strategies to develop network risk, there is surprisingly 
little literature that extends the supply chain concept to a supply network. This 
may be because theory development regarding supply networks faces 
significant barriers: the boundaries to networks are difficult to establish, the 
phenomena of interest is dynamic, and access to real world data is difficult 
(Choi et al., 2001a; Harland et al., 2001; Knight et al., 2005; Richard Lamming, 
Thomas Johnsen,Jurong Zheng and Christine Harland, 2000; Choi and Wu, 
2009).  
Whilst the case for considering how disturbances can migrate across supply 
chain boundaries through shared connections has been made, the role of 
competitive action in disturbing the patterns of supply and demand cannot be 
neglected. Particular demand for a product can be distributed across a set of 
potential suppliers according to the attractiveness of the suppliers to the buyers.  
An inevitable consequence of this is the reaction of those less attractive 
suppliers to their situation, as  they may then act in ways to increase their 
attractiveness (Marshall , 1930). 
The interaction between structure and individual firm action can be broadly 
parameterised as the supply strategy, in which suppliers are preferenced and 
many suppliers are selected, and a competitive strategy. The combined effect of 
these strategies defines the supply network structure and the flow of resources 
(material and cash) across it. 
Supplier attractiveness has been the subject of extensive research since the 
1960s and can be broadly categorised according to five supplier attributes: 
delivery, quality, price, flexibility and stability (Weber et al., 1991; Dempsey, 
1978).  
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In view of the extant knowledge and its reliance on the essentially static 
structures of a supply chain defined by a focal firm, the purpose of this research 
is to address the following central question: 
What is the impact of network structures and behaviours (price 
competition and collaboration) on a network’s vulnerability to 
disruptions resulting from normal supply chain operations in both 
open and closed markets? 
The research sets out to make two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, 
the research addresses the disruptive impact of normal operations as a result of 
network complexity and the coupling induced by normal supply chain practice. 
In practical terms this enriched understanding should allow managers to better 
quantify the potential for supply chain disruptions and to use this to inform 
improved tactical and strategic decisions framed by purchasing, horizontal 
collaboration, and relationship management. 
Secondly, the research examines the interactions between collaborative and 
competitive forces across a network structure. In particular, the research seeks 
to understand how individual firm’s actions are informed by their context, and 
how these actions combine with other firm’s actions to generate new contexts. 
In practical terms this will deepen an organisation's understanding of how 
behaviours designed to secure the mitigation of supply risk may or may not, 
depending on context, achieve their desired outcomes. By understanding why 
risk mitigation strategies and tactics underperform it may then be possible for 
managers to design more robust risk mitigation approaches that more 
accurately reflect network dynamics. 
 
 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as shown in Figure 1—1. 
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Figure 1—1: Schematic of the thesis structure 
Chapter 1 introduces the problem addressed by the thesis and the core 
concepts used in defining the problem before concluding with a clear problem 
statement, research question and statement of intended contributions to 
knowledge and practice. 
Chapter 2 critically reviews the underpinning literature that frames the problem 
statement and uses the analysis to identify gaps in the extant knowledge before 
developing a theoretical framework in which to anchor the research. 
Chapter 3 critically considers the extant literature which describes the 
operationalisation of the supply chain and how organisations behave within this 
context. 
Chapter 4 describes my philosophical position in relation to the research into 
similar phenomena conducted by other academics, before using this to develop 
rational arguments in support of the selected methodology in light of the various 
alternatives. 
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Chapter 5 describes the agent based modelling (ABM) developed to address 
the research question and to be reflective of my philosophical position. 
Chapter 6 describes the logical and systematic development of the experiments 
applied to the ABM simulation. 
Chapter 7 describes the procedures for analysing the results of the experiments 
and reports the results in the context of the research question with the intention 
of developing the arguments linking the constructs to develop new theory 
relating to NAT, supported by the evidence of the experiments. 
Chapter 8 concludes the research and places the findings in the context of the 
existing theory, identifying the contributions of this work to theory and practice, 
before developing arguments in support of further work. 
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2 Underpinning Theory 
The previous chapter, in constructing the problem statement, highlighted how the 
autonomous decisions of buyers and sellers determines the structure of a network 
comprised of adjacent supply chains connected through shared suppliers and 
customers.  
The foundation of the supply chain conceptualisation is the focal firm which forms 
dyadic relationships with other firms. Dyads can then be connected to develop 
pathways of material flow from raw materials to consumption. It is the perspective of 
the focal firm that differentiates dyads and supply chains from supply networks which 
have no focal firms but describe a higher level system of embedded supply chains 
connected by shared customers and suppliers. 
The selection of dyadic partners by buying organisations is an autonomous process, 
with contextually preferenced selection criteria intended to advantageously position 
the focal firm. The aggregation of multitudinous firms acting autonomously describes 
a CAS that defines a network structure providing pathways along which both 
intended flows of material and unintended disturbances travel. Generally, these 
structures provide the means by which disturbances are dissipated, but they can also 
permit pathways to develop coincidences of concentrated disturbances. 
The following sections will consider in particular the extant knowledge relating to the 
negative consequences of coincidental events (NAT and high reliability theory, HRT), 
and the agency aspects of firm relationships (CAS) with the purpose of developing a 
theoretical framework that accommodates the connectivity of supply chains and their 
adaptive constituents. 
2.1 Normal Accident Theory  
Charles Perrow (1999)  is generally considered to be the architect of NAT which was 
developed through the examination of the causes of accidents in complex systems. 
Perrow defined accidents as: 
“….an accident is a failure in a subsystem or the system as a whole that 
damages more than one unit and in doing so disrupts the ongoing or future 
output of the system”  (Perrow, 1999, p.66)  
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Perrow also provided clarity regarding what constitutes a system, which he defined 
on four levels: parts, units, subsystems and systems. A part is the smallest part of a 
subsystem that can be identified when analysing an accident; a component is a 
collection of parts that are interrelated; a subsystem is a complexion of units; and a 
system is comprised of subsystems units and parts (Perrow, 1999). It is not difficult 
to draw from this definition that Perrow was largely interested in technical logical 
systems, although implicit in his analysis is the interaction between humans and 
technology.  
In supply network terms, and in the particular context of this thesis, a part is a firm, a 
unit is an alliance or dyad, a subsystem is a supply chain of connected dyads, and 
the system is a collection of connected supply chains. 
Perrow’s (1999) theory was developed following analysis of the circumstances that 
surrounded the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster. The chain of events that led to a 
partial nuclear meltdown on 28th March 1979 was comprised of a series of failures of 
small parts, which caused a number of interrelated unit failures and resulted in the 
failure of subsystems and ultimately the system. However, the significance of this 
chain of events is anchored in the analysis of events taking place in other nuclear 
power stations. Perrow (1999, pp.32-59) found that almost all the power stations 
examined experienced similar failings of parts and units, leading him to conclude that 
had these failures occurred in a different sequence then they would have generated 
different dependency related failings at the system and subsystem levels. It is this 
analysis that defines a normal accident as one which will have high impact, low 
specific probability but very high general probability. In other words, the disaster of 
Three Mile Island was an inevitable and unavoidable consequence of small failures 
that triggered other failures resulting in a collapse of subsystem and system 
performance. 
Perrow’s work exposed two physical dimensions that relate to a system’s 
vulnerability to these normal accidents: complexity and tight coupling (Perrow, 1999, 
pp.72-100). Perrow developed his conceptualisation of complexity from an 
engineering perspective, drawing upon an engineering definition of common-mode 
function which highlights the context whereby a part or unit serves more than one 
other part or unit; the implication being that if the focal part or unit fails then it will 
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impact the operation of more than one other unit. If a system comprising many such 
connections traceability cannot be guaranteed, and in the event of operations or 
functions that transgress expected levels of performance, then the system takes on 
new characteristics not previously defined and not easily understandable to the 
operator. Formally, Perrow defined complex interactions as: 
“Interactions…… Of unfamiliar sequences or unplanned and unexpected 
sequences and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible.” 
      (Perrow, 1999, p.78)  
The following sections consider the related dimensions of complexity and coupling 
within the framework of NAT. 
2.1.1 Complexity 
From a supply chain perspective, firms that share suppliers and customers represent 
nodes in a network where changes will impact on more than one organisation. 
Perrow refers to these as common modes (Perrow, 1999, pp.7273), and their 
significance can be found when comparing supply networks with supply chains.  
The number of shared suppliers and customers (common modes) within a supply 
chain is limited by the perspective of the focal company. In particular, the supply 
chain is defined by a singularity or point of concentration, and in contrast, no such 
constraint exists within a supply network. As a consequence, a network has a much 
wider range of possible configurations compared to a network. Within a network firms 
react to their context, with their actions designed to create advantages for them and 
disadvantage for their competitors. Furthermore, as will be discussed in later 
chapters, it is generally accepted that firms operate under conditions of bounded 
rationality, in other words they are limited in their access to complete information. 
This inevitably limits their contextual awareness and results in imperfect decisions 
and perpetual adjustment. 
Table 2-1is taken from (Perrow, 1999) and provides a basis on which complex and 
linear systems can be differentiated, thereby providing a definition of complexity as 
perceived by NAT. 
Table 2-1: Differences between complex and linear systems 
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Complex systems Linear Systems 
Tight spacing of equipment Equipment spread out 
Proximate production steps Segregated production steps 
Many common mode connections of 
components not in  production sequence 
Common mode connections limited to 
power supply and environment 
Limited isolation failed components Easy isolation failed components 
Personnel specialisation limits 
awareness of interdependencies 
Less personnel specialisation 
Limited substitution supplies and 
materials 
Extensive substitution supplies and 
materials 
Unfamiliar or contended feedback loops Few unfamiliar or unintended feedback 
loops 
Many control parameters within potential 
interactions 
Control parameters view, direct, and 
segregated 
Indirect or inferential information sources Direct online information sources 
Limited understanding of some 
processes 
Extensive understanding of all processes 
Source: (Perrow, 1999) 
Within this definition of complexity it is easy to position supply networks as being 
complex based on: their many common-mode connections describing shared 
suppliers and customers; limited isolation of failed parts of the network; specialisation 
combining with bounded rationality to limit awareness of context; specialisation 
limiting substitution of suppliers; and supply/demand and collaboration processes 
developing feedback loops.  
However, complexity is only one of the dimensions that define a system as being 
vulnerable to normal accidents; therefore, the next section will consider how coupling 
is defined in the context of supply networks.  
2.1.2 Coupling 
Tight coupling assumes a general definition that is widely understood, inferring little 
or no slack together with the absence of buffers between parts, units or in the case of 
supply chains, supply firms. (Perrow, 1999) is particularly concerned with the impact 
of tight coupling on a system’s ability to recover from failure, and suggested that in 
loosely coupled systems  alternative arrangements and interventions can be more 
easily implemented than in tightly coupled systems, which must be designed with 
some anticipation of disturbances that are likely to occur. In supply chain terms it is 
commonplace to anticipate supply disturbances in supply/demand fluctuations, and 
these are used to define inventory buffers yielding some flexibility in what would 
otherwise be an extremely tightly coupled system of inter-firm relationships. 
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Table 2-2 is taken from (Perrow, 1999) and is useful in positioning supply networks 
as tightly coupled. 
Table 2-2: Differences between tight and loose coupling of supply networks 
Tight coupling Loose coupling 
Delays in processing not possible Processing delays possible 
Invariant sequences Order of sequences can be changed 
Only one method to achieve goals Alternative methods available 
Little slack possible in supplies, equipment 
and personnel 
Slacking resources possible 
Buffers and redundancies are designed in Buffers and redundancies fortuitously 
available 
Substitution of supplies equipment and 
personnel limited, and designed in 
Substitutions fortuitously available 
Source: (Perrow, 1999)  
This consideration of coupling demands a deeper analysis of the degree to which 
supply networks are tightly coupled. If supply networks have no inventory or 
production capacity buffers it would not be difficult to argue that a supply network is 
indeed tightly coupled, particularly as supplier switching would not be a possibility, 
either by design or imperative. However, much of supply chain management is aimed 
at the design of appropriate buffers to manage uncertainty in either supply or 
demand.   
The supply chain concept embeds supply uncertainty in the unpredictability of the 
production processes and customer demand. It explicitly excludes the possibility of 
disturbances being created in adjacent supply chains and migrating across supply 
chain boundaries into adjacent supply chains through shared suppliers and 
customers. Logically, the incomplete conceptualisation of the supply chain may well 
result in designs that result in networks that are in fact more tightly coupled than 
originally intended and this results in ambiguity regarding how tightly coupled a 
supply network that emerges from disparate supply chain designs actually is.  
The classification of supply networks as tightly coupled is further complicated by their 
constituents possessing adaptive capabilities (Hopkins, 2001) suggesting that the 
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degree of coupling can flex although it is clearly the intention of every firm to 
minimise their inventory as much as possible without sacrificing competitiveness.  
Table 2-3 maps (Perrow, 1999) definitions of complexity and coupling against the 
supply chain context in order to illustrate that supply chains are tightly coupled 
complex systems. 
Table 2-3: Definitions of complexity and coupling within the supply chain context  
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NAT 
construct 
NAT Characteristic Supply Network Context 
C
o
m
p
le
x
it
y
 
Limited isolation failed 
components 
Specialisation, dependency and 
investment in transaction specific 
assets combines with supply economic 
imperative to restrict ability to isolate 
suppliers 
Personnel specialisation limits 
awareness of 
interdependencies 
Specialisation of the firm and risk 
sharing principles means that 
organisations supply to multiple 
markets restricting visibility of 
interdependencies 
Limited substitution supplies 
and materials 
In anything other than the perfect 
market substitution is limited 
Unfamiliar or contended 
feedback loops 
Collaboration feeds dependency; 
supply feeds demand 
Many control parameters 
within potential interactions 
Relationship management, asset 
specific investments, product 
development, strategic intent etc. 
C
o
u
p
lin
g
 
Delays in processing not 
possible 
Upstream and downstream processes 
highly dependent on each other 
Invariant sequences Sequences follow hard designs 
Little slack possible in 
supplies, equipment and 
personnel 
Slack in form of redundancy is 
expensive (capacity and do the trick) 
Buffers and redundancies are 
designed in 
Inventory management principles 
Substitution of supplies 
equipment and personnel 
limited, and designed in 
Dependencies established through 
collaboration and strategic alliances 
 
2.1.3 National Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory  
As previously mentioned, Perrow’s (1999) seminal work draws mainly on failures 
within technological systems, in other words systems that have no inherent 
adaptation and in the absence of any part or unit failure perform predictably. The 
constructs used to define NAT have a broader application, and complexity has found 
tenancy in organisational theory (Morel and Ramanujam, 1999) and the social 
sciences (Bonabeau, 2007; Burgelman and Grove, 2007b; Li et al., 2010; Prigogine, 
1997), whilst the definition of coupling clearly has relevance to the inventory 
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management aspect of supply chain management (Skilton and Robinson, 2009; 
Speier et al.; Yang and Yang, 2010b). Organisations and supply chains are 
constructed from parts and units that have adaptive capabilities, in other words they 
can autonomously redefine their purpose, and role within the broader system. 
Furthermore, as subsequent chapters will highlight, their imperfect vision of what 
comprises a system results in adaptation focused on local efficiencies, which are not 
necessarily aligned to system efficiencies or system operation.  
In keeping with the adaptive nature of organisations, HRT is generally positioned as 
complementary to NAT and not necessarily as an alternative (La Porte and Rochlin, 
1994; Leveson et al., 2009; Rijpma, 1997; Shrivastava et al., 2009b). The premise of 
HRT is that given an expectation that failures in the form of Perrow’s normal accident 
will occur, these can be mitigated by mindfulness and preparedness. Weick (2007) 
describes mindfulness in terms of five principles: 1) preoccupation with failure; 2) 
reluctance to simplify; 3) sensitivity in operations; 4) commitment to resilience; and 5) 
deference to expertise. However, Rijpma (1997) has highlighted that these principles 
can present a tension with NAT in the context of adaptive organisations:  
“On the one hand, redundancy increases the amount of information 
generated; the anticipation of a higher number of complex interactions is 
improved when conceptual slack is maintained; and learning may reduce 
the level of complexity. On the other hand, redundancy increases the level 
of complexity by inducing ambiguity, opaqueness and the occurrence of 
simultaneous failures; conceptual slack may create confusion; and, finally, 
decision premises increase the level of tight-coupling.” (Rijpma, 1997) 
This seems to suggest that perhaps the greatest mitigating attribute of a high 
reliability organisation (HRO) is the ability to contextually and perpetually balance the 
mitigating actions with their potentially negative impact on vulnerability to normal 
accidents. Others have pointed out that HROs adopt different stances in different 
contexts, thereby allowing complexity and coupling to develop where necessary but 
moving swiftly to re-organise when faced with a ‘normal accident’. 
Although much is shared between the two theoretical positions discussion in recent 
years has become somewhat polarised, with normal accident theorists accusing high 
reliability theorists of selecting the underpinning of their theory with data collected 
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from organisations that do not experience normal accidents (Hopkins, 2001). 
Employing this argument normal accident theorists position such companies as not 
existing in complex tightly coupled circumstances.  The converse argument clearly 
has equal tenancy and consequently this discussion is far from resolved. 
2.1.4 Summary 
Perhaps because of Perrow’s emphasis on technological systems, or maybe 
because of the immaturity of supply network theory, or even due to a combination of 
both these factors, there has been surprisingly little literature generated relating 
supply networks to NAT (Skilton and Robinson, 2009; Speier et al.; Yang and Yang, 
2010b; Wagner and Neshat, 2012). This is despite the evidence that supply chains 
are indeed interconnected with adjacent supply chains through shared suppliers and 
customers, thereby developing a complex tightly coupled network. 
The underpinning assumption of this thesis in the application of NAT to supply 
networks is that routine processes combine with processes designed to ensure 
competitiveness are articulated by focal firms and connected organisations in ways 
that maintain the possibility of disturbances coinciding, and which periodically 
overpower the firms when such a coincident occurs.  
The normal process of adaptation, some of which anticipates disturbances, routinely 
executed by firms within a network can logically attenuate or amplify a system’s 
vulnerability to coincident disturbances. Firms that consistently know how to respond 
appropriately to a network risk context could alternatively be framed as high reliability 
organisations. 
The theoretical foundation of NAT and the behaviour described above is found in 
CAS theory which is the main focus of the next section.  
2.2 Complex Adaptive Systems and Supply Networks 
The differentiation between networks and chains centres on whether or not any focal 
firm is identified or used to define an inter-firm organisational structure. The initial 
conceptualisation of supply networks was developed from the supply chain and 
described the serial linking of dyadic relationships where each node in the chain 
linked to a downstream and upstream partnering node. Each node had one 
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connection providing the flow of materials in and one providing the flow of materials 
out (Harland et al., 2001; Harland et al., 2004). This concept was extended so that 
each node could be connected to more than one node, thus reflecting the flow of 
materials into a focal node defined by the production of a product or group of 
products which required multiple flows in and potentially out (Harland et al., 2001; 
Harland et al., 2004). However, this conceptualisation still had a focal firm at its 
centre. 
Adopting the focal firm perspective proved useful in that it allowed the 
deterministic/stochastic description of relationships. The simplicity, and to some 
extent clarity, provided by this approach is gained by assuming a static relationship 
formulation. The limitations of adopting such linear deterministic perspectives to 
explain supply chain behaviour over the medium to long term have been identified by 
a number of authors (Choi et al., 2001a; Bechtel and Jayaram, 1997). The essence 
of these limitations are the constrained choice embedded in a supply chain 
conceptualisation and that firms cannot create new relationships with firms that are 
outside the extant supply chain without re-defining the chain, thereby limiting the 
incorporation of competitive responses and actions designed to secure supply at 
times of crisis.  
More recently researchers have accepted that this represents a simplistic and static 
description of a supply network, (Harland, 1996)  and have drawn upon the work of 
the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group which described networks in a 
broader context of connected supply chains not defined by the focal firm (Gadde and 
Hakansson, 1993; Hakansson, 1980; Anderson et al., 1994; Ford and Håkansson, 
2006) 
(Gadde and Hakansson, 1993; Hakansson, 1980; Anderson et al., 1994; Ford and 
Håkansson, 2006) 
. The evolution of the supply network is summarised in Figure 2—1. 
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Figure 2—1: Evolution of the supply network 
The contemporaneous description of supply networks is generally accepted as:  
Supply networks are nested within wider interorganization networks and 
consist of interconnected identities whose primary purpose is the 
procurement, use and transformation of resources to provide packages 
of goods and services. Supply networks therefore essentially consist of 
a set of interconnected supply chains, encompassing both upstream 
and downstream relationships.  (Harland et al., 2004) 
Harland (2001) and others (Cantu et al., 2012; Tuominen et al., 2004) have used the 
above conceptualisation to build a description of competencies and roles within 
networks.  These reflect the dynamism of the network and often refer to participant 
firms positioning within, and managing their context. Conditions of bonded rationality 
result in an absence of synchronicity across the network perpetuating dynamic 
behaviour, which in turn redefines the macro level description thereby driving the 
constituents at the firm level to adapt. 
Choi (2001a) conceptualised supply networks as CASs, arguing that adaptation 
plays an essential role in defining the structure of a network. If firms can, and do, 
select/deselect the firms with whom they trade then the supply chains can be 
redefined through the exclusion or inclusion of new trading partners, if this process 
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is, as argued by Choi (2001a), an essential characteristic of how firms behave then 
the static supply network form  cannot persist in time as it does not include 
participants not already connected to the focal company. The supply network as 
described by Choi (2001a) incorporates the micro-level coordination described by 
Harland (2001), but extends the consequences of this into the emergent network.  
The network form resists formal coordination, instead it is an emergent consequence 
of the dyadic/supply chain coordination of its participants, a phenomenon described 
as co-evolution (Choi et al., 2001a; Kim et al., 2011) .  
Morel (1999) laid the foundation for viewing organisations through the lens of 
complex system theory (CST) by using fundamental constructs to explain 
phenomena such as dynamic change, adaptation, and evolution (Stacey, 1995; 
Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998).  
At a high level, complex systems can be defined by large numbers of interacting 
elements linked by feedback and feed forward mechanisms whose activity results in 
emergent characteristics that defy linear deterministic descriptions. Importantly, 
these emergent patterns are independently observable and therefore verifiable. 
2.2.1 Self-Organisation  
The basic and perhaps most controversial elemental behaviour of complex systems 
is self-organisation. This describes a process where devoid of any grand 
design/designer, a system evolves to become more organised. This has been 
positioned by some as a breach of the second law of thermodynamics, which states 
that a system will tend to become more disorganised, or at least more dissipative, in 
its journey towards equilibrium. The tendency of a system to gravitate towards 
maximum entropy is supported by physics, and seemingly contradicted by social 
systems. However, it remains unclear as to why a law describing physical systems 
with no conscious adaptive capability should be appropriate to systems whose 
components can adapt to sate self-interest. 
Within the complex systems paradigm, self-organisation is not limited simply to social 
systems, as it can be observed in physical systems. Bak (1999) illustrated one such 
physical system by describing grains of sand falling through an hour glass to form a 
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solid cone, although if observed carefully, this cone experiences periodic re-
organisation, what Bak called avalanches. 
These observations expose two more fundamental characteristics of complex 
systems: punctuated equilibrium and self-organising criticality. 
2.2.2 Self-Organising Criticality  
Per Bak (1999) defines self-organised criticality as: 
….. a state way out of balance where minor disturbances may lead to 
events, called avalanches, of all sizes. Most of the changes take place 
through catastrophic events rather than by following a smooth gradual 
path. The evolution to this very delicate state occurs without design from 
any outside agent. The state is established solely because of the dynamic 
interactions among individual elements of the system.  (Bak, 1999) 
Others have drawn on the second law of thermodynamics as a means of 
differentiating complex systems from linear systems, in that the former is susceptible 
to self-organising criticality and emergence. Essentially, the second law states that 
close systems will tend towards a state of equilibrium which is described by 
maximum entropy. In other words, closed systems will always reach a state of 
equilibrium, whilst open systems can exist in far from equilibrium states which are 
maintained by energy/resource inputs and outputs. If the system is sufficiently 
complex, i.e. populated with numerous interactions between the constituents of the 
system, then an open system will tend to self-organise criticality as opposed to 
moving towards the equilibrium (Prigogine, 1997). 
Furthermore, whilst the supply chain conceptualisation is essentially a closed system 
(new firms are not permitted to join nor can any existing firm exit), network 
conceptualisation is of an open system, a justification given by some for its tendency 
towards self-organised criticality (Choi et al., 2001a; Burgelman and Grove, 2007b; 
Miller and Page, 2007; Surana et al., 2005), as opposed to an equilibrium of 
maximum entropy. This same phenomenon is used by Barabasi (2003) to explain the 
scale invariant formation of small worlds. By adopting a network description of the 
flow of materials from their raw state through to consumption, many more dynamics 
can be incorporated into the system, thereby allowing the constituent parts to 
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dynamically organise in a number of different configurations. In addition, networks 
can be configured to allow new organisations to enter the system and challenge the 
incumbent organisations in terms of efficiencies (Prigogine, 1997). Thus it can be 
argued that a supply network is a much more open system conceptualisation, 
incorporating dynamics of organisation and permitting the entry and exit of 
organisational resources. These conditions define supply networks as complex 
systems existing far from their equilibriums (Prigogine, 1997) . 
Per Bak’s (1999) observation of the sand pile is an experiment that has been 
repeated by many and the avalanches of observed as grains of sand are added to 
the pile follow a distribution described by a power law: 
Equation 2-1: 
𝑵(𝒔) = 𝑺−𝝉 
Where 𝑁(𝑠) represent the number of events of characteristic 𝑆 and 𝜏 is an exponent 
value. In the case of supply network disruptions, the equation could be used to 
describe the number of disruptions greater than a specified magnitude. 
Self-organising criticality and the patterns of behaviour observed in such systems 
define complexity and differentiate complex systems from linear deterministic 
systems through the characteristics of openness, distance from equilibrium, and 
critical organisation. 
2.2.3 Punctuated Equilibrium 
Bak’s (1999) sand pile metaphor can be extended through the observation that the 
avalanches interrupt periods of stasis, thereby highlighting the importance of 
criticality in determining the behaviour of complex systems. It is not possible to 
observe continuous changes in the sand pile structure, but the structure changes as 
a consequence of small or large avalanches, significant events that are 
discontinuous in their nature, as Bak observes: 
punctuated equilibrium is the idea that evolution occurs in spurts instead of 
following slow but steady path suggested by Darwin. Long periods of 
stasis with little activity in terms of extinctions or emergence of new 
species are interrupted by intermittent bursts of activity.  (Bak, 1999)  
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Punctuated equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2—2 and has been observed in many 
systems, including economics (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) , nature (Bak, 1999)  
and even supply chains (Choi et al., 2001a; Friedl and Wagner, 2012). Significantly 
punctuated equilibrium can also been mapped using a power law distribution: the 
time interval between events that exceeds a given magnitude follows a power law 
distribution with the interval between larger events being greater than the interval 
between smaller events. However, it is important to highlight that this does not mean 
that a system having just experienced a large change will not experience a similar 
magnitude of change for a long period of time, just that the probability of a large 
change following the last change is smaller.  
 
Figure 2—2: An example of punctuated equilibrium 
Source:  
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2.2.4 Challenges to Complex System Theory 
The major criticism of CST is that it is used mainly as an explanatory framework that 
yields little, if any, predictive power.  Eric Bonabeau (2003) extolled the benefit of the 
CST perspective framed by significant constraints:  
“The more complex the situation, more misleading intuition becomes. In a 
truly chaotic environment – where cause and effect no longer have a 
linear relationship - the last thing you want to do is try to apply pattems to 
it.” (Bonabeau, 2003) 
Systems that are irreducible are also complicated and critically organised, which 
results in emergence; non-linear outcomes whose specificity denies determinism and 
as such provides no conveniently traceable sequence of events.  
Furthermore, it is undeniable that complexity lacks a robust definition (Bak, 1999); it 
is not easy to differentiate simple from complex and consequently identify the 
contexts in which the CST perspective offers greater insights than alternative 
approaches. To be specific, one of the more robust tests of complexity, the power 
law distribution of events, requires many observations to be made of a system under 
different initial conditions, which for many complex systems rules out the collection of 
real world data with which to validate theoretical frameworks (Bonabeau, 2003; 
Bonabeau and Krebs, 2002). 
Emergence, by its very nature, defies traceability as causes are often disguised by 
complexity (Skilton and Robinson, 2009). Without the formal descriptions of cause 
and effect understanding is constrained simply to observations, which can only 
become robust when repeated over many initial conditions. The sensitivity of a 
complex system to its own unique history, which defines its initial conditions, 
precludes exact predictions. Instead we are driven towards identifying broad patterns 
that persist in a wide range of specific contexts. 
In essence, the CST perspective requires placing aside the highly specific as simply 
one possibility amongst many and instead explores the space defined many possible 
outcomes from many similar initial conditions in order to identify patterns that can be 
generalised. 
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2.2.5 Complexity Summarised 
Bak’s (1999) interest in complexity was triggered by the simple observation that a 
few simple rules can create complex and beautiful structures, although Bak was not 
the only one to make this observation. 
Mandelbrot (Mandelbrot, 1963) studied the price variations of several commodities 
and found that if the probability of a price variation of a specified magnitude was 
regressed on the price variation, then in every case the resultant relationship could 
be described by a power law.  
Power laws describing the distribution of events and punctuated equilibrium are a 
direct consequence of critical organisation, which positions them as a fundamental 
property of complex systems. It is a characteristic of a power law that within obvious 
boundaries the established relationships are scale invariant (Barabasi and 
Bonabeau, 2003), that is to say that the relationship is maintained for all values of the 
dependent and independent variables considered. 
The systems described by Bak (1999) are largely, but not exclusively, physical 
systems devoid of social interactions. The incorporation of system constituents that 
can adapt or change their nature creates a special category of complex systems, 
which has assumed the mantel of CASs. 
Whilst the conceptualisation of complex systems is useful in the description of 
criticality, itself a description of the systems adaptation to its context, it is incomplete 
in contexts whereby the systems constituents can also adapt to the environment 
defined by the system. Firm adaptation in response to changing patterns of risk, 
demand and supply, is a vital behavioural characteristic of supply networks. The next 
section will therefore consider the specific category of CASs in relation to supply 
networks. 
2.2.6 Complex Adaptive Systems 
Social systems theory can be described in in three waves: 1) structural functionalism; 
2) general systems theory; and 3) CASs. 
Structural functionalism assumes that entities cooperate to build stability through the 
establishment of macro norms. Entities assume goals related to their position, 
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without agency, and seek cohesion without conflict.  General systems theory 
emphasises that roles could represent systems within systems, and developed 
cybernetic principles to incorporate feedback and feed forward mechanisms into the 
system. Whilst not precluding autonomous actions of the system components, the 
system remained the level of analysis. CASs embraces general systems theory but 
permits autonomous behaviours cached in terms of bounded rationality which co-
evolve with the environment they create. 
In broad terms, the structure of a CAS develops complexity through its population of 
constituents, who interact according to local rules thereby denying any global control 
or design but permitting the autonomous re-specification of rules in order to achieve 
improved fitness for individuals within the system (Stacey, 2001; Pascale, 1999, p. 
84). As such, a CAS incorporates all of the phenomena and constructs found in 
complex systems but permits adaptation.  
Morel (1999) highlights a perceived weakness of the CAS paradigm:  
“One weakness of CAS as a paradigm for understanding self-organisation 
is that the adaptive behaviour of the agents is an input, and the physics of 
the self-organisation is buried in the assumptions. Seen from the 
perspective of physics, self-organisation requires a mix of conditions like 
being out of equilibrium (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977), and the dynamic 
possibility of building new stable dynamic units made from the aggregation 
of several components. The adaptive nature of the agent is what a 
physicist would like to ‘explain’, not assume.”  (Morel and 
Ramanujam, 1999)   
The CAS perspective means that small disturbances to the system have 
unpredictable consequences because they are contingent on the state of all other 
constituent elements, which are determined by their unique history and the 
interactions that are destined to take place. That is not to say such systems are 
devoid of structure or patterns, simply that the patterns relate to the probability of 
new patterns emerging, patterns which defy specific definition, for example detailed 
descriptions of connections, but accept generalised descriptions such as levels of 
system connectivity. In this sense the application of CASs provides a useful lens 
through which to view organisational phenomena and has consequently gained 
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traction in many of the organisational theory disciplines (Li et al., 2010; DeLaurentis 
and Ayyalasomayajula, 2009; Li et al., 2009; Nair et al., 2009; Burgelman and Grove, 
2007a). In particular, some academics have adopted this perspective to examine the 
dynamic phenomena of supply networks, which are difficult to explain using the more 
traditional linear and deterministic supply chain conceptualisations.  
The following section will explore the extant literature which uses the CAS 
perspective as a means through which to view supply networks and associated 
phenomena. 
2.2.7 Supply Networks as Complex Adaptive Systems 
Choi (2001a) presents the argument that a supply network should be considered 
from a CAS perspective because it is possible to identify self-organisation, co-
evolution and emergent properties. Specifically, the emergent supply network is not 
designed by any organisation; rather it is a consequence of the many relationships 
that are formed across multiple supply chains,  inevitability resulting in some supply 
chains sharing customers and suppliers. In an attempt to better their position within 
the network, focal organisations adapt to their environment with the sole purpose of 
changing it and in turn, these changes require other participants to respond to the 
changing environment. This perpetual cycle of adaptation perfectly describes co-
evolution. The combination of self-organisation and co-evolution results in supply 
networks exhibiting emergent properties (Varga et al., 2009; Pathak et al., 2007a; 
Choi et al., 2001a; Li et al., 2009; Nair et al., 2009; Alawamleh and Popplewell, 2011; 
Kim, 2009). 
Choi (2001a) provides a conceptual framework for a CAS which illustrates the 
interactions between firm (agent) behaviour, the environment created by these 
interactions, and emergent characteristics of the system (Figure 2—3).  
 28 
 
Figure 2—3: Supply chains as CASs  
Source: (Dooley et al, xxxx) 
Although Choi (2001a) does not have a particular scenario in mind, they posit that 
the connectivity of a supply network develops pathways through which disparate 
supply chains compete for resources. The level of competition and the availability of 
such resources clearly determine the degree to which the network relationships are 
susceptible to re-organisation. 
The rules that govern agent behaviour, the resultant self-organisation, and high 
levels of connectivity, render the supply network difficult to control. Despite this, the 
attractiveness of imposing a level of predictability on a highly unpredictable system 
has resulted in organisations cooperating to develop common standards. This form 
of governance represents a coordinated attempt to reduce the 
dimensionality/degrees of freedom that exist within a supply network, although the 
ultimate goal of control remains elusive (Choi and Eboch, 1998). 
The autonomous actions of firms are designed to achieve local optimisation, and 
often neglect the interdependencies between organisations, which may represent a 
more powerful driver of performance. For instance, the bullwhip effect (Forrester, 
1961) can be interpreted as a consequence of autonomous locally optimised 
behaviour by supply chain participants. This was surely a major driver in the 
conceptualisation of supply chains and the subsequent trajectory of extending 
coordination beyond the constraints of a focal firm.  
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The combination of autonomous agent behaviour interacting with an environment 
defined by network participant behaviour results in co-evolution which is emergent 
and non-linear, yet not random (Bak, 1999; Miller and Page, 2007). In other words, 
the CAS perspective posits that despite the non-linearity the emergent dynamic 
supply network is likely to exhibit some patterns of structure. 
This perspective is not dissimilar to that proposed by the IMP Group who, whilst not 
formalising their concepts with quite the same structure, argue that buyer supplier 
relationships are relational and incorporate reciprocity (Anderson et al., 1994; Ford et 
al., 1986; Hakansson and Persson, 2004). That is to say the actions of a buyer affect 
the actions of a supplier, which in turn affects the actions of the buyer. When this 
principle is extended to cover multiple connected dyads it is a small step to then 
recognise it as self-organisation, the consequences of which is the co-evolution of 
buyers and sellers. The IMP Group perspective is therefore closely aligned to the 
CAS perspective presented by Choi (2001a). 
Both the CAS and IMP Group perspectives present a managerial challenge: the 
networks within which a firm exists cannot be designed or managed, yet they are a 
key determinant of a firm’s action and its fortunes. 
Moving beyond the conceptualisations of complexity theory has proved difficult, 
particularly in the social sciences as they must include adaptation (Morel and 
Ramanujam, 1999; Uzzi, 1997), and this is as true of supply networks as it is of other 
organisational forms. 
The phase changes described by punctual equilibrium may explain how supply 
networks come to be re-organised: the adaptation of each agent to manageable 
disturbances determines how well a particular firm will be positioned to absorb the 
next wave of routine disturbance, which in themselves will have been shaped by the 
adaptive processes. Occasionally, a firm will find it necessary to redefine its 
relationships, and inevitably this will trigger a percolation of adaptations, some of 
which may also create disruptions/disturbances. 
There is an inevitable logic that if the phenomenon of interest is the interaction of 
supply chains then the focal firm perspective, despite its useful insights into its 
operation in neo-equilibrium conditions, is inadequate (Li et al., 2010; DeLaurentis 
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and Ayyalasomayajula, 2009; Li et al., 2009; Nair et al., 2009; Burgelman and Grove, 
2007a). Conversely, the conceptualisation of overlapping supply chains as a network 
is difficult to anchor in empirical data due to the difficulty in defining the network and 
the collection of data across many organisations, often incorporating competitive 
dimensions. Notwithstanding the difficulty of collecting empirical data across 
networks, the conceptualisation of a supply network as a CAS remains attractive as it 
incorporates critical events requiring re-organisation of the system which the focal 
firm perspective cannot. Autonomous decisions taken in conditions of bounded 
rationality create context to which the participants respond. This perpetual cycle of 
adaptation results in self-organisation and co-evolution, and is framed by supply 
chain processes such as supplier selection (Dempsey; Dyer et al., 1998; Ellram, 
1990; Monczka et al., 1998), design of supply strategy (Godsell et al., 2011; Krause 
and Ellram, 1997; Kraljic, 1983), inventory management (Emery and Marques, 2011; 
Nair and Vidal, 2011; Fawcett et al., 2010; Waters, 2003), supplier switching (Friedl 
and Wagner, 2012; Geiger et al., 2012; Wilson, 2012; Thomas Pfeiffer, 2010; 
Wagner and Friedl, 2007), risk analysis (Barry, 2004b; Blackhurst et al., 2008; 
Chopra and Sodhi, 2004a; Craighead et al., 2007a; Juttner, 2005; Khan and Burnes, 
2007), and pricing (Marshall , 1930; Narasimhan et al., 2009; Williamson, 2003; 
Williamson, 1998; Williamson, 1992). 
Much of the literature supporting the application of a complex systems theoretical 
lens to supply chains/networks is justified by the multitudinous connections between 
many supply chain member organisations (Choi and Krause, 2006). If supply chains 
do indeed behave as complex systems then it would be expected to find evidence of 
emergence and self-organisation (Choi et al., 2001a), particularly in the context of 
disruption which acts as a catalyst for re-organisation. 
There is some evidence to suggest that supply networks do indeed operate as 
complex systems and are sufficiently tightly coupled for disruptive events to have 
extended reach within the network. The fuel protest of September 2000 (summarised 
by McKinnon (2006) in the UK resulted in approximately half the nation's petrol 
stations running out of fuel within two days of the protest starting (Marsden and 
Beecroft, 2002). Although the protest only lasted five days, it was estimated ‘that 10% 
of national output was lost during each of the last four days of the protest’ and this 
was despite the fact that road freight traffic was only reduced by between 10 and 
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12% (Hathaway, 2000). If this analysis is true then it suggests that the UK freight 
system, and by inference the supply chains contained therein, is much more tightly 
coupled than may first be imagined. The analysis of the UK fuel protests is very 
similar to the analysis of the events surrounding September 11, 2001 and Sheffi 
(2001) described the speed with which global supply chains began to collapse 
following the terrorist attack. Increased border controls meant that trucks were 
delayed at both the Canadian and Mexican borders. The closing of airspace to 
inbound traffic resulted in vital components not reaching production lines, an effect 
most acutely felt in the just-in-time environment of the automotive industry. Both 
these cases highlight the vulnerability of supply networks to disruptive events 
extraneous to the network itself; nevertheless, the impact of these disruptions can 
only propagate through a system at the observed speeds if that system contains 
many pathways and is tightly coupled. 
It therefore appears that there is some evidence to suggest supply networks are 
indeed CASs, meaning they are, at least in the context of disruption, irreducible, 
emergent, and self-organising. Consequently, it can be argued that any approach to 
studying the phenomenon of disruptions in supply networks has to assume a network 
level of analysis and a CAS perspective. 
The adoption of the CAS perspective as a lens through which network risk can be 
viewed clearly requires an understanding of agent (firm) behaviour, as this provides 
the mechanism by which networks are created, the consequential environment, and 
the interaction of an agent with the environment. The description of supply networks 
as CASs is summarised in Figure 2—4. 
 
 32 
 
Figure 2—4: The processes of self-organisation and co-evolution 
Source: 
Supply networks can therefore be defined as a complex web of inter-firm 
relationships, the nature of which is to minimise costs through tight coupling. These 
are the very conditions that NAT associates with a system’s vulnerability to 
catastrophe. 
2.3 Summary and theoretical framework 
The previous sections in this chapter show that there is an extant body of literature 
that frames supply networks as a CAS. The inherent complexity of a CAS is one of 
two cornerstones in normal accident theory, the other being the degree to which the 
supply network may be coupled.  
The main contributions considered in this chapter are summarised in Table 2-4: 
Summary of constructs and concepts 
Table 2-4: Summary of constructs and concepts 
Construct Concept Contribution Contributors 
Complexity Normal accident theory Negative events 
occur as a 
consequence of 
complexity and 
coupling 
(Norrman and 
Jansson, 2004; 
Perrow, 1999; 
Skilton and 
Robinson, 2009; 
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Yang and Yang, 
2010a) 
Criticality Self-organisation 
– systems 
organise to a 
state whereby the 
re-organisation can 
be described by a 
thick tailed 
distribution of 
events 
(Bak, 1999; 
Barabasi and 
Bonabeau, 2003) 
Punctuated 
equilibrium - 
periods  of stasis 
followed by periods 
of change 
(Bak, 1999; Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 
1997) 
Far from equilibrium Complex systems 
tend to organised 
states – not states 
of maximum 
entropy 
(Prigogine, 1997) 
Coupling Normal accident theory Coupling 
combines with 
complexity to 
create an 
environment 
susceptible to 
disturbances 
becoming 
coincident  
(Norrman and 
Jansson, 2004; 
Perrow, 1999; 
Skilton and 
Robinson, 2009; 
Yang and Yang, 
2010a) 
Adaptation High reliability 
organisations 
Anticipation of 
possible 
disturbances 
results in 
organisational 
responsiveness to 
disruptions 
(Leveson et al., 
2009; Rijpma, 1997; 
Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007; Shrivastava 
et al., 2009a) 
 
Normal accident theory in its existing form relies heavily on evidence drawn from 
technical logical systems that incorporate some form of human interaction. However 
supply networks have been shown to be complex systems with emergent properties 
that due to economic imperatives are inevitably tightly coupled. In this sense supply 
networks fit normal accident theory models. However there is a paucity of published 
material that incorporates adaptation in normal accident theory. 
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By incorporating adaptation as a variable within the framework of normal accident 
theory this thesis as its first contribution seeks to make clear the relationship 
between levels of disruption experienced by supply networks and the levels of 
adaptive capability of the network constituent’s. 
The literature describing supply networks as CAS generally supports the NAT 
perspective and argues that the complexity of supply networks combines with the 
supply chain management objectives of minimal inventory to develop a tightly 
coupled CAS. This leads to the formulation of the following research question: 
Do supply networks comprising multiple connected supply chains 
experience periods of disruption as a consequence of normal operations? 
Figure X summarises the theoretical framework developed in this chapter and which 
will provide the lens through which the phenomena of supply network disruptions will 
be examined. 
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Whilst this chapter has built a theoretical framework for the conceptualisation of 
adaptive agents in supply networks using a synthesis of NAT, CAS, and HRO 
theories to build a skeleton of normal operations and behaviour. However this 
framework falls short of specifying how such a network can be operationalized. The 
next chapter will address directly the theory pertaining to the operationalization of 
supply networks in the context of complex adaptive systems with the purpose of 
providing the foundation for the specification of theoretically underpinned 
operationalisable conceptualisation of the supply chain. 
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3 Operationalising Supply Networks 
The previous chapter established the theoretical underpinning of supply 
networks, thereby providing the lens through which to view supply networks, 
and in particular, this thesis’s phenomenon of interest: disruptions caused by 
disturbances generated by normal operations. 
This chapter will build on the previous chapter to examine the literature 
relevant to the operationalisation of supply networks with the purpose of 
conceptualising the factors relevant to, and the process of, organising buyer-
supplier relationships. 
This chapter is organised as follows: 
1. Market Organisation – theory relating to the organisation of economic 
activity which provides the contextual foundation for a firm’s buying 
behaviours (transaction cost economics, TCE) 
2. Supply strategy – structural and relational organisation of buyer seller 
relationships within the market context present in the literature 
describing market organisation (TCE and social exchange theory, 
SET) 
3. Supplier selection criterion – how buying firms articulate their supply 
strategy through the specification of selection criteria and the 
operation of supplier selection processes. 
4. Normal operations and normal adaptation – how buyer supplier 
relationships are managed in terms of transactions, relationship 
management and supplier switching decisions  
The output of this  chapter will be the theoretical anchor used in this thesis 
for operationalising and conceptualising supply networks. 
3.1 Market Organisation 
There are two dominant perspectives on the economic organisation of industrial 
activity: classical economics and neoclassical economics.  
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Classical economics is underpinned by a number of assumptions regarding the 
activity of a firm. The first of these relates to perfect knowledge and the ability of an 
organisation to make completely rational choices (Skinner, 1979). The second 
assumption relates to the mechanisms by which supply and demand are co-
ordinated: classical economics assumes that this is achieved through the price 
mechanism and through price adjustments a Pareto efficiency of production is 
established. 
Neoclassical economics challenges the assumption of perfect knowledge and posits 
that firms make imperfect decisions based on incomplete knowledge and imperfect 
processing of information (Marshall , 1930). This conceptualisation of bounded 
rationality infers that some organisations will have a greater capability to process 
more information more meaningfully, yielding a position of advantage in the pursuit of 
self-interest (Williamson, 1992; Simon, 1991; Williamson, 1996). The pursuit of self-
interest is an important consideration in neoclassical economics as it requires 
organisations to consider the propensity of organisations with which they trade to 
behave opportunistically (otherwise known as moral hazard), and where appropriate, 
to mitigate against such behaviour through structural arrangements and contractual 
safeguards. 
The neoclassical perspective has assumed dominance in the supply chain literature 
because it embraces the practical limitations experienced at the micro level of 
interactions between firms whilst not discounting the role of the price mechanism in 
buyer supplier arrangements. This thesis, in keeping with the vast majority of supply 
chain literature, will adopt the neoclassical perspective and the following sections will 
consider its theoretical foundation, robustness, and alternative/complementary 
theories. 
3.1.1 Transaction Costs and Market Organisation 
Williamson (1992; 1996; 1993a; 1993b) defines transaction costs as the costs 
incurred by a buying organisation to safeguard against moral hazard. These 
mitigation costs have been generally categorised into three themes: search, 
governance, and policing. Williamson’s original logic that these costs are a function 
of asset specificity and uncertainty, has been generally supported by empirical 
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studies (Emery and Marques, 2011; David and Han, 2004; Maia et al., 2010; 
Shervani et al., 2007; Ke and Wei, 2007). 
Williamson uses asset specificity as a measure of how easy or not it is to transfer 
transaction specific investments to other alternative transactions. High specificity 
denotes assets that cannot easily be deployed in alternative arrangements, thereby 
suggesting that their ownership is of strategic significance. Alternatively, low 
specificity describes assets that can easily be redeployed and therefore assume a 
low strategic significance. For the purposes of clarity assets are generally considered 
to refer to investments and assume a general description which includes human and 
physical assets. 
Williamson’s consideration of uncertainty generally refers to environmental 
uncertainty, the constituents of which have been distilled to market conditions, 
technology and behaviours. If any of these uncertainty dimensions are sufficiently 
dynamic such to defy prediction buying, then organisations mitigate by imposing 
contracts which are designed (often imperfectly) to dampen volatility.  
The conceptualisation of transaction costs as a function of asset specificity and 
uncertainty allows researchers to use transaction costs as a predictor of inter-firm 
organisation. A situation where the buyer’s and supplier’s understanding of the 
transaction is complete describes a context of low moral hazard in which rationality 
dominates. In such a context uncertainty and transaction specific investments are 
negligible, and as a consequence, transaction costs are minimal as there is no 
required safeguard against moral hazard. This is what has been described as the 
perfect market.  
Coase’s (1990; 1937) conceptualisation of bounded rationality suggests that perfect 
markets rarely exist, and empirical work (e.g. (Ghoshal and Moran, 1995)) tends to a 
view that industrial transactional environments nearly always include degrees of 
uncertainty and transaction specific investments.  
If either transaction asset specificity or transaction uncertainty is/are sufficiently high 
to ensure that a buying organisation cannot secure adequate protection against 
moral hazard at an economically viable cost, the resolution of how to organise 
economic activity is drawn towards the vertical integration of the transaction into the 
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buying organisation. In such circumstances transaction costs have been minimised 
by eliminating or at worst internalising the moral hazard and Williamson described 
this form of economic organisation as hierarchical (Williamson, 1992). 
However, many industrial supply relationships involve degrees of asset specificity 
and uncertainty that can be reasonably mitigated through economically viable 
organisation/safeguarding, such as contracting or shared investments. The resultant 
relationship between the buying and selling organisations is a hybrid of Williamson’s 
market and hierarchical forms retaining the trade between legal separate identities 
but incorporating inter-firm structures supported by some form of governance. This 
organisational form is fundamental to the supply chain concept and the bedrock upon 
which much of the supply chain management theory has been developed (Emery 
and Marques, 2011; Ke and Wei, 2007; Kevin Burgess et al., 2006; Wever et al., 
2012; Williamson, 2008). Figure 3—1 summarises the transaction cost framework 
described above. 
 
Figure 3—1: The transaction cost framework 
The next section considers in more detail the form of opportunistic behaviour in order 
that mitigation strategies can be contextualised. 
3.1.2 Transaction Cost Econommics and Opportunism 
Williamson’s original definition of opportunism as ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ 
does not meet with complete agreement, as Williamson himself accepts: 
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Although there is growing agreement that bounded rationality is the 
appropriate cognitive assumption for describing economic 
organisation, there is less agreement on how the self-interestedness 
of economic actors should be described. Transaction cost economics 
has proposed that economic agents be described as opportunistic 
where this contemplates self-interest seeking with guile. That has 
turned out to be a controversial formulation.  (Williamson, 1993b)  
More recently, opportunism has been rephrased to reflect the propensity of 
organisations to act in their own self-interest (Williamson, 1993b; Ke and Wei, 2007; 
Free, 2008; Bunduchi, 2008; Nooteboom, 1996; Ireland and Webb, 2007; Joshi and 
Stump, 1999b), a behaviour that was originally conceptualised by Adam Smith 
(Skinner, 1979): 
“By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, [he] 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his 
own gain.” 
The crucial difference between these two definitions is that in the one case deceptive  
intent (i.e. violation of agreement) is implied, yet in the other, legitimacy can be found 
in classical economic reasoning which posits that the price mechanism is essential to 
establish equilibrium between supply and demand, as summarised by Marshall 
(1930). 
Marshall’s conceptualisation of supply, demand and the role of the price mechanism 
is captured by the classic supply curve formulation which is summarised in Figure 
3—2. 
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Figure 3—2: Marshall’s classic supply and demand curve 
The price P of a product is determined by a balance between production at each 
price (supply S) and the desires of those with purchasing power at each price 
(demand D). The diagram shows a positive shift in demand from D1 to D2, resulting in 
an increase in price (P) and quantity sold (Q) of the product. 
Source: (Marshall , 1930) 
Within this model increases in demand will result in increased prices. In a sense what 
Marshall proposes is that firms will always act in their own self-interest, for instance 
by increasing prices based on a perceived increase in demand that challenges the 
existing supply. The revised definition of opportunism therefore finds some support in 
classical economics; however, the price mechanism is not the only manifestation of 
opportunism. 
Wathne and Heide (2000) provide evidence that opportunism persists in various 
forms, such as exaggeration, violation and misrepresentation, all of which are 
designed to increase revenue for the opportunistic firm at the expense of the 
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exchange partner. Wathne and Heide (2000) use this evidence to locate 
opportunistic behaviour along two categorical dimensions: behaviour (passive or 
active) and circumstance (existing or new). The resultant forms of opportunism are 
described as evasion, refusal to adapt, violation and forced renegotiation, and are 
summarised in Figure 3—3. 
 
Figure 3—3: Forms of opportunism and possible outcomes 
Source: (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
Examination of this model identifies the critical role of cost and revenue in defining 
opportunism and highlights its non-strategic nature through its prediction of long-term 
negative relational effects. In other words, opportunism does not entertain any long 
term considerations, or at least not within the relationship in which it is exercised. 
This description of opportunism is congruent with that of Porter’s (1980) competitive 
strategy model, which positions the power of either a buyer or supplier as one of two 
dimensions that define the competitive context of a firm.  Porter suggests that it is the 
objective of the firm to exploit any favourable position of power in order to create an 
advantage and to continually seek positions that offer such opportunities (see also 
(Dickson, 1966).  
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The crucial point is that just as firms are fundamentally motivated to act with self-
interest, bounded knowledge ensures the decisions supporting self-interest are not 
always perfect. Wathne and Heide’s (2000) passive behaviour represents legitimate 
(but not necessarily intended to be so) actions within an agreed framework, which 
may be formed just as easily from misunderstandings as they could be from design. 
This contrasts with active behaviours which conform to Williamson’s original 
definition of opportunism.  
Whilst Williamson’s original conceptualisation of opportunism may not be widely 
accepted, the concepts of bounded rationality and motivations of self-interest have 
secured widespread acceptance in the literature and are now commonly accepted to 
refer to opportunism. This allows the formulation of economic organisation which is 
summarised in Figure 3—4. 
 
Figure 3—4: Economic organisation 
Regardless of intent, firms must act to protect themselves from the consequences of 
self-interest, whether executed legitimately or with guile. The design of mitigation 
draws the discussion to a consideration of the antecedents to opportunism, which 
within the literature have generally been framed as: dependence, formalisation, 
relational norms and uncertainty (e.g. (Hawkins et al., 2008).  
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Dependence reveals asymmetric transaction benefits and lends power to either a 
buyer or supplier depending on who has the greatest dependency on the other 
(Ireland and Webb, 2007; Macneil, 1980). In situations where the supplier has less 
dependency on the relationship with the buyer than the buyer has on the supplier, 
then the supplier is considered to have more power and is more likely to participate 
in hostage taking strategies, such as threatening to form new relationships or 
prioritising more important relationships.  
In the hybrid form of economic organisation, activity asset specificity and in particular 
asset specific investments have been identified as a measure of relational power and 
dependence (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Achrol and Gundlach, 1999; Joshi and 
Stump, 1999a; Provan and Skinner, 1989). Asymmetric investment in transaction 
assets results in asymmetric dependency and provides a context within which the 
least dependent partner is more likely to act opportunistically by adopting a strategy 
of hostage taking framed as a threat to exit the relationship or to continue to 
participate in it under conditions of extended privilege (Gundlach et al., 1995). 
However, it would be wrong to consider dependency in isolation, as it is conditioned 
by social norms which Joshi (1997a) found to be the deciding factor in whether or not 
firms behave opportunistically. 
Heide (1992, p.34) described relational norms as expectations about behaviour that 
are shared by a group of decision-makers and that have been shown to govern 
individual exchange relationships between firms. These norms incorporate many 
factors including mutual benefit and trust, conflict resolution, and flexibility (Gundlach et 
al., 1995).  
Others have found that relational norms in and of themselves have little influence 
over opportunistic behaviour. Instead they found relational exchanges (within which 
norms are embedded) to be a more effective mitigation of the propensity for firms to 
act opportunistically. Relational exchanges place value in non-economic exchange 
rules, for instance the exchange of trust for cooperation whereby a buyer may trust a 
seller based on previous experience and in return a seller will cooperate with a buyer 
based on mutual trust. 
To a large extent relational norms and relational exchanges represent means by 
which the impact of uncertainty is dampened, as due to the exchange participating 
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organisations are assured that in the event of uncertainty the relational development 
of trust secures degrees of flexibility and cooperation. However, in the absence of 
relational norms and exchanges uncertain outcomes generate a landscape within 
which possibilities for opportunistic behaviour thrive. It is not surprising therefore, that 
in the absence of relational norms uncertainty is generally found to positively relate to 
the propensity for firms to act opportunistically. 
Uncertainty therefore creates contexts whereby actors are more likely to behave 
opportunistically. This has been shown to be particularly true of what has been 
termed environmental uncertainty, which includes performance uncertainty. 
Performance uncertainty isn’t necessarily constrained to focal relationships as it can 
reflect the broader context of performance, such as those located in the network. 
Performance uncertainty refers to whether or not a buyer or seller can be relied upon 
to meet their transactional obligations. If contractual performance is unsated then the 
context presents an opportunity for renegotiation favouring the most powerful actor 
(Joshi and Arnold, 1997b; Sako and Helper, 1998; Schilling and Steensma, 2002).   
The relationship between formalisation and opportunism is probably more surprising 
as it has been shown that the greater the level of formalisation, which includes 
contracts (Cavusgil et al., 2004; Dahlstrom et al., 2000; Deeds and Hill, 1999), the 
greater the propensity for firms to behave opportunistically (Provan and Skinner, 
1989; Dahlstrom and Boyle, 1994; Gilliland and Manning, 2002; George, 1984) by 
violating or renegotiating the contract in keeping with  Wathne and Heide’s (2000) 
active opportunism. This contrasts with research findings into the relationships 
between social norms and opportunism, which generally support the argument that 
nurtured social norms found in trusting committed relationships mitigate opportunism 
(Hunt and Morgan, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
The influence of uncertainty, relational norms, and dependency on opportunism can 
of course be framed as common sense. However, the findings relating to the role of 
formalisation as an antecedent of opportunism are somewhat counterintuitive and 
potentially polarised.  
A number of researchers have found that formalisation relates positively with 
opportunism, and this sits in stark contrast with the position taken by neoclassical 
economists who propose formalisation as a means of contracting to protect 
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organisations against the dangers of moral hazard (Joshi and Arnold, 1997b; Sako 
and Helper, 1998; Schilling and Steensma, 2002).  
Some explanation for why contracts can summon opportunistic behaviours is found 
in the detailed process of contracting, which involves collapsing the future into the 
present. MacNeil (1980) highlights the difficulty of this process in terms of how a 
contract can release unilateral power to both participants: sellers through a contract 
can enforce buyers’ commitment to buy goods, and similarly buyers can enforce 
sellers’ commitment to supply. When this phenomenon is combined with bounded 
rationality, formalising creates an environment within which both buyers and sellers 
can act opportunistically in the enforcement and interpretation of incomplete 
definitions of the transaction (e.g. (George, 1984). 
Further insights into the tensions between the economic perspective and the social 
perspective regarding formalisation can be developed through the consideration of 
the different types of opportunism specified by Wathne and Heide (2000). Active 
opportunism represents some form of redefining previously defined boundaries of 
behaviour embedded in, or imposed upon, the transaction between a buyer and 
seller. Properly designed formal contracts can undoubtedly and logically do, provide 
some protection against opportunistic actions, and as Williamson himself accepts, 
opportunistic behaviour of this nature is not necessarily common or widespread. In 
contrast to active opportunism, passive opportunism is primarily concerned with the 
actions of self-interest constrained by the contract (typically incomplete due to 
bounded rationality) framing a transaction. The arguments supporting the positive 
relationship between formalisation and opportunistic behaviour are evidenced by 
actions that Wathne and Heide (2000) would categorise as passive, in other words 
they do not breach the formal contracting however they test the intent of the contract 
to its limit. Parkhe (1993)  identifies a potential pitfall for formal contracting which 
may go some way to explaining why relational contracting has attracted so much 
attention within the supply chain literature:  
“Faced with high costs of court adjudication, firms are reluctant to resort to 
courts or other third-party policing mechanisms and rely instead on private 
ordering.”  (Parkhe, 1993)  
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It therefore follows that a combination of formal contracting and informal contracting 
is likely to produce better levels of relationship performance than either achieves in 
isolation. Moreover, formal contracting sets out boundaries within which informal or 
social contracting can be applied in order to avoid passive opportunism. 
This thesis will take as its focus normal operations and therefore exclude active 
opportunism in the form of violation or renegotiation of contract frameworks. 
However, it will accept opportunistic behaviour within the terms of a contract that has 
already been agreed. That is to say, if a contract fixes the price for a short period of 
time then a supplier will conform to this requirement for the duration of the contract. 
When the contract expires, then the supplier is at liberty to modify the price at which 
they sell their product regardless of what effect this would have on the buyer. With 
this in mind the following section considers in more detail informal contracting, its 
application to mitigating passive opportunism, and its implications on inertia. 
3.1.3 Social Exchange Theory (SET) 
SET accounts for valued exchanges between organisations other than economic. 
The key difference between transaction economics and social exchange is that social 
exchange anticipates a relationship which persists in time, which results in social 
exchanges having value in driving future behaviours of partners ((Dwyer et al., 1987, 
p.13). 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) proposed a model whereby trust and commitment are 
deemed to be the currency of social exchange between trading organisations (Figure 
3—5). 
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Figure 3—5: Trust and commitment as the currency of social exchange between 
trading organisations 
Source: Morgan and Hunt (1994) 
SET defines relational commitment as the belief that the continuation of a 
relationship is of paramount importance (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Ko et al., 2001) 
Given this definition it is not hard to agree with the logical argument presented by 
Morgan and Hunt that trust is an antecedent of relationship commitment. Again there 
is general acceptance that the definition of trust is centred on a firm’s confidence that 
its trading partner is reliable and possesses high levels of integrity (Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994; Ko et al., 2001).  
The value of this currency is found in the consequences of organisations developing 
trust and commitment, these are: partner acquiescence, reduced propensity to leave 
the relationship, increased cooperation, increased functional conflict, and decreased 
uncertainty, and are summarised in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1: The consequences of trust and commitment 
Outcome Source Benefit 
Acquiescence and 
propensity to leave 
(Kumar et al., 1992) Provides stability but 
reduces transaction costs 
Cooperation 
 
 (Achrol and Stern, 1988; 
Anderson and Narus, 1990, 
p.45)  
Coordination and shared 
goals – shared self interest 
Functional Conflict (Dwyer et al., 1987) 
 
Creative challenge improves 
performance 
Decision Uncertainty (Achrol and Stern, 1988) 
Decreases because 
decisions are shaped by 
mutual interests and shared 
understanding 
 
Analysis of these outcomes suggest that they all serve some purpose in developing 
shared objectives and therefore secure stability through aligned self-interest. If self-
interest is aligned then dyads become coordinated resulting in hybrid forms of 
organization with governance 
The goal of the firm must therefore be to seek circumstances that foster trust and 
commitment described by the antecedents to trust found in Morgan and ’Hunt’s 
model 
Termination costs are the costs incurred by an organisation when it exits a 
relationship. By inference these may include searching for a new trading partner, and 
the transfer of relational assets from the terminated relationship to some new 
relationship or ultimately liquidation. Termination costs therefore represent a factor in 
the consideration of alternative trading arrangements, not unlike the consideration 
given to asset specificity in TCE: the higher the termination costs of the existing 
relationship to lower the propensity of the organisation to exit. In short, high 
termination costs introduce a greater commitment to the existing relationship. 
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In a similar vein, relationship benefits whilst also an antecedent to trust and 
commitment are a key consideration of self-interest. Firms are obliged to monitor 
alternative relationships and to constantly appraise the relative attractiveness of 
engaging new partners compared to existing relationships. If relational benefits in 
alternative arrangements are greater than those in the existing relationship, 
motivations of self-interest will direct a focal organisation towards (after careful 
consideration of termination costs) exiting the current arrangements to establish 
more beneficial alternatives. TCE requires acts of self-interest of this form to be 
mitigated through formal contracting, whereas SET suggests that by ensuring that 
the relational benefits outweigh alternatives, existing relationships can be made 
enduring. 
The motivation for organisations to seek partnerships with similar like-minded 
organisations is in part anchored in the belief that shared values decrease the 
propensity of partnering firms to act opportunistically. The evidence which provides 
weight to this assumption is found within the literature relating to the way in which 
firms identify themselves and internalise identification in the form of culture. Morgan 
and Hunt (1994) found empirical support of shared values and a positive relationship 
with both commitment and trust, and this is therefore a very important factor in the 
development of ensuring inter-firm relationships. 
Firms that share information do so to deliver relational benefits, and in consequence 
subtly increase termination costs whilst at the same time reinforcing any shared 
values through reciprocal arrangements. Communication therefore develops trust, 
and trust as already established, increases relational commitment. 
Widespread support for the Morgan and Hunt model of trust and commitment can be 
found in the literature relating to supply chain management (Chen et al., 2011; Chen 
et al., 2007; Madlberger, 2009), strategic alliances, and most significantly in the 
literature that links TCE and SET in a unifying framework for the mitigation of moral 
hazard. 
The central tenant in supply chain management is the coordination of activity related 
to the flow of materials, cash and information across organisational boundaries. 
Given this it is not surprising to find that TCE and SET are often quoted as being the 
theoretical foundations for theories for the development of supply chain management 
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constructs. In particular, the supply chain literature focuses on the role of inter-firm 
relationships in developing a clean demand signal across multiple organisational 
boundaries. This can only be achieved through communication designed to deliver 
relational benefits in the form of reduced inventory and supply chain responsiveness. 
In engendering communication as a beneficial relational attribute, organisations 
anticipate an enduring relationship that requires specific investments, thereby 
increasing termination costs. In anticipation of beneficial relationships buying 
organisations seek to identify suppliers with durable attractiveness (i.e. those that 
share similar values). Furthermore, the negative impacts of opportunism are avoided 
through the development of shared goals.  
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that information sharing and consequential 
collaboration are key components in the development of aligned processes (Wilding 
and Humphries, 2006; Monczka et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2011; Madlberger, 2009; 
Kwon and Suh, 2005; Nyaga et al., 2010). As such it should be possible to map 
supply chain literature against TCE and SET basic principles. 
There are a number of supply chain frameworks that have been broadly synthesised 
by Cooper and Lambert (2000). Table 3-2 summarises the supply chain literature 
and its alignment to the SET conceptualisation of trust and commitment. 
Table 3-2: Supply chain literature and its alignment to SET 
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Supply chain 
processes 
(Lambert and 
Cooper, 2000) 
SET Construct Description 
Customer 
relationship 
management 
Communication - trust - 
uncertainty  
Information sharing to 
smooth demand and reduce 
uncertainty Communication – 
trust/commitment - 
cooperation 
Customer service 
Management 
Communication - trust - 
uncertainty 
Product/service knowledge 
enables uncertainty to be 
reduced 
Demand 
Management 
Communication - trust - 
uncertainty 
Understanding customer 
demand patterns and 
variation enables better 
planning 
Communication – 
trust/commitment - 
cooperation 
Order fulfilment Communication – 
trust/commitment - 
cooperation 
Coordination of distribution 
activities 
Manufacturing Flow 
Management 
Communication – 
trust/commitment - 
cooperation 
Forecasting and the 
organisation of batches 
Procurement & 
purchasing 
Communication/shared values 
– trust/commitment – 
cooperation/functional 
conflict/uncertainty/propensity 
to leave/acquiescence 
Supplier relationships 
configured cognisant of 
context – commitment 
reduces uncertainty  
Product 
development 
Communication/relationship 
benefits/shared values – 
trust/commitment – 
cooperation/acquiescence 
Products developed 
collaboratively - reduces 
uncertainty and risk, 
increases mutual benefits 
 
By considering supply chain management as operationalising TCE and SET, the 
literature exposes a factor not directly addressed in either theory, although it is 
implicit in both – power. Although power (alternatively expressed as a function of 
dependency) is considered as an antecedent of opportunism, its beneficial role in 
coercion as a means of developing commitment and collaboration is neglected.  
Power is a function of dependency (Macneil, 1980; Stump and Joshi, 1998), which in 
turn is a proxy for relational benefits. It also allows the more powerful partner to 
impose information sharing processes on its less powerful partner, lends leverage to 
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the powerful partner, and imposes termination costs on the less powerful partner, 
thus it can be seen that power is a mechanism by which the antecedents of trust and 
commitment can be generated.  
However it is worth noting that a balance must be struck between power and trust as 
it can be perceived as opportunist if the benefits of a relationship are 
disproportionately allocated to the powerful partner.  A summary of the literature on 
power is provided in Table 3-3. 
 
Table 3-3: Literature on the different aspects of power 
Power  Aspect Source 
Evolution of power through increased dependency (Amaral and Tsay, 2009) 
Different perceptions (buyer vs supplier) of the role of 
power 
(Ambrose et al., 2010) 
Inadequate trust – use power to develop commitment (Co and Barro, 2009) 
Power as a key determinant of relationship 
configuration 
(Cox, 2004) 
Location of inventory – distribution of  benefits (Emery and Marques, 2011) 
Impact of power in developing consolidation in supply 
chain – powerful actors dictate 
(Hingley, 2001; Hingley et al., 
2011) 
Strategies for balancing trust and power: identifying 
authority, common identity, using boundary spanning 
ties, and justice 
(Ireland and Webb, 2007) 
 
3.1.4 Synthesis of Social Exchange Theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics  
Both TCE and SET share a common consideration of opportunism (Bunduchi, 2008).. 
On the one hand TCE relies on opportunism to define make or buy decisions and the 
subsequent organisation of economic activity (Williamson, 1992; Williamson, 1993b) 
whilst on the other, SET embeds opportunism as one of a number of factors that 
determine beneficial non-economic aspects of a relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994). Integral to both theoretical frameworks is the notion that opportunism is best 
mitigated through either explicit or implicit contracting. 
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TCE takes the position that opportunism is mitigated through appropriate 
organisation of economic activity, and where necessary (in hybrid forms) the use of 
explicit contracting 
Explicit contracts take the form of detailed specification of the transaction in terms of 
price, quantity, payment terms, penalties and incentives (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999; 
Cavusgil et al., 2004), and the contract is drafted in consideration of specific 
scenarios which are considered potential hazards (Dahlstrom et al., 2000). Explicit 
contracts make clear the apportionment of risk and penalties according to a bilateral 
agreement. Within the context of opportunism, explicit contracts can reduce 
uncertainty by specifying the governance rules relating to the relationship, although 
inevitably such arrangements also increase dependency between the two parties as 
a consequence of the penalties and incentives embedded in the agreement. 
SET argues that opportunism is negatively related to trust, inferring that trust 
mitigates opportunism. Morgan and Hunt (1994) identify positive relationships 
between shared beliefs/norms and information sharing, inferring that these two 
relational attributes can be used to develop trust and therefore mitigate opportunism. 
Implicit contracts are designed to address unanticipated contingencies, which may 
be the result of bounded rationality or asymmetrical information. In an uncertain 
world some researchers have argued that explicit contracts are rarely used in 
practice, with relationship participants instead preferring to stabilise the relationship 
through commitment reinforced by cooperation, collaboration, and joint problem 
solving framed by implicit contracts.  
The extension of both implicit and explicit contracts is that both stabilize relationships 
by increasing dependency through increased costs of departing the relationship 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Furthermore implicit contracting according to Morgan and 
Hunt (1994), delivers strategic benefits in excess of those found in explicit 
contracting, such as joint problem solving, functional conflict, and cooperation in 
contexts which cannot be anticipated. The SET approach to mitigating opportunism 
has also been framed as a virtuous circle, with the consequences of trust and 
commitment in the form of cooperation deepening the levels of trust between the 
relationship partners (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
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Transaction cost economics’ concentration on economic aspects of the relationship 
puts aside social relationships which have benefits such as cooperation and 
mitigation of opportunistic behaviour and problem joint problem solving, and this 
limits the explaining power of TCE (Ghoshal and Moran, 1995). In the same vein, 
SET underemphasises the fundamental economic basis for business to business 
relationships. It is therefore not that surprising to find a number of papers (Heide and 
John, 1992; Bunduchi; Heide and John, 1990; Heide and John, 1988; Jones et al., 
1997) that have described the integration of SET and TCE into a single unifying 
framework as the best approach to increasing explaining power.  
Nooteboom (1996) parameterises opportunism and then seeks to address each 
parameter directly through the development of a number of strategies that are 
contingent on a firm’s context within a network. Within Nooteboom’s (1996) 
framework firms can either tighten or loosen their relationships using either 
adversarial or cooperative strategies to manipulate the parameters of: switching 
costs, value of supplier/buyer to focal firm; incentives for opportunism, opportunity for 
opportunistic behaviour, behavioural propensity for opportunism and impact. 
Nooteboom’s ({2604 Nooteboom 1996/a;}}  typology of strategy is summarised in 
Figure 3—6. 
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Figure 3—6: Integrated framework for typology of strategy  
Source: Nooteboom (1996) 
The essence of Nooteboom’s (1996) research is that relationship governance should 
be designed cognisant of the objectives and context of the relationship. Others (see 
Table 3-4 for summary) have sought to expose the interaction between explicit and 
implicit contracting, suggesting that the level of formal contracting impacts social 
exchange and vice versa.  
Table 3-4: Interactions between explicit and implicit contracting 
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Contribution Source 
Trust, power and transaction costs. 
Power related to dependencies 
(Bunduchi, 2008) 
Trust and commitment result in 
transaction specific investment 
(Payan and Svensson, 2007) 
Opportunism included in SET as 
behavioural variable. TCE is very narrow 
and opportunism not ubiquitous 
(Ghoshal and Moran, 1995; Toumanoff, 
1984)  
TCE and the organization of economic 
activity frames social exchange 
(Heide and John, 1990) 
Network structure drives asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency of interactions. 
Social networks define the drivers of 
TCE. Networks define hybrid forms of 
organization 
(Jones et al., 1997; Landa and Wang, 
2001) 
Types of exchange governance drive 
SET mediating variables of trust and 
commitment 
(Kee-hung Lai, 2009; Lamothe and 
Lamothe, 2012) 
Trust drives perceptions of behavioural 
uncertainty which drives explicit 
contracting forms 
(Vandaele et al., 2007; Wei et al., 2012) 
Strategic flexibility delivered by trust 
driving balanced investment in 
transaction specific assets. Flexibility 
best secured through trust 
(Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999) 
 
Both TCE and SET describe mechanisms by which relationships in hybrid forms of 
market organisation can be tuned according to the levels of risk and uncertainty 
perceived by a firm. Furthermore, both theoretical approaches use dependency (trust 
and commitment or formal penalties and incentives) as the main instrument of 
governance.  
Figure 3—7 synthesises the various integrated frameworks for TCE and SET. 
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Figure 3—7: Integrated frameworks for TCE and SET 
The consequence of regulating a relationship using either social exchange value or a 
system of penalties and incentives inevitably leads to the development of relational 
inertia, which is a vital component in any CAS. Without friction Bak’s (1999) sand pile 
would not be critically organised and without inertia it can be argued that supply 
networks, while complicated, may not be complex (i.e. emergent and critically 
organised).  
It has already been argued that complex tightly coupled networks may constitute a 
system vulnerable to inevitable disruptions, but the role of adaptation and in 
particular collaboration as a means by which disruption risk can be mitigated, are 
unexplored in  a network context. This results in the following research question: 
What is the impact of adaptation and collaboration between supply chain 
participants on the level of disruption experienced by the network? 
The next section will consider the literature describing relational inertia and in 
particular its role in supplier switching decisions. 
3.1.5 Supplier Switching 
The theories underpinning relationship formation (TCE and SET) accept that firms 
have bounded knowledge and adapt with the purpose of pursuing objectives of self-
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interest. As has been argued previously, these basic foundations for firm interactions 
create an environment that is perpetually changing; a context that constantly tests 
the basis on which a firm’s current relationships were formed inevitably surfaces 
occasions where the buyer or seller decides that an existing relationship can be 
bettered by alternative arrangements. 
The literature has established that there are three factors that drive the consideration 
of whether or not to change suppliers (Thomas Pfeiffer, 2010; Wagner and Friedl, 
2007) 1) the cost of switching, 2) the cost of finding a new supplier, and 3) value of 
the existing relationship. The cost of switching incorporates the costs of disengaging 
with the existing supplier and the cost of creating a new relationship. Disengaging 
costs may include: contractual penalty clauses, dismantling relationships, and 
dismantling or withdrawing from transaction specific investments. Search costs are 
the costs associated in finding and qualifying alternative suppliers, and these vary 
depending on how scarce the type of supplier resource is within the broader network. 
Perhaps harder to quantify is the embedded value in the existing relationship, which 
according to SET would include levels of cooperation, functional conflict, and 
reduced uncertainty (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
Wilson (2012) argues that a consideration of only switching costs is too simplistic and 
should be combined with a consideration of search costs as both can influence the 
supplier switching decision independently. Search costs are highest when there are 
few suppliers, although it can be logically argued that in extremis the monopoly of 
supply can only be achieved if the supplier is easily found. In the contrasting situation 
of plentiful supply, search costs are maintained at a low level because an alternative 
supply is plentiful. Equally scarce supply drives relational investment which increases 
switching costs. 
Geiger et al. (2012) argue that the social exchange value created through trust and 
commitment is the dominant supplier switching consideration. Strategic relationships 
are founded on an anticipation of future transactions which enables the development 
of trust and commitment, thereby releasing relational value in the form of cooperation 
and problem solving. The strategic content of relational value makes it difficult to 
quantify: strategy anticipates continued relationships and to some degree sacrifices 
immediate benefits from alternative arrangements in an expectation of future benefits 
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developed by effective competitive barriers yielding preferred relational status. It is 
therefore not surprising to find that firms prioritise relational value over more easily 
quantified economic benefits, as relational value is more likely to be the key that 
unlocks future markets and ensures a firm’s survival/prosperity.  
Geiger et al.’s (2012) analysis drew on a definition of commitment that could be 
unpacked into two forms: calculated and affective commitment. The former is a need 
related to high levels of dependency, whilst the latter is a desire. An examination of 
Morgan and Hunt’s (1994)model aligns calculative commitment to the benefits and 
costs of a relationsh, whilst affective commitment is aligned to shared beliefs and 
communication.  Irrespective of the commitment form, Geyskens et al. (1996) found 
a strong correlation between commitment (affective and calculative) and 
interdependency. This was later broadly confirmed by De Ruyter et al. (2001) who 
anchored the correlation in relation specific investments, and replacibility which 
others have argued is part of a dependency construct (Leger et al., 2006; Kumar and 
vanDissel, 1996; Petersen et al., 2008), alternatively expressed as a moral hazard 
(Williamson, 1993a; Riordan and Williamson, 1985). 
Dependency is therefore a fundamental driver of switching costs and relational value; 
in addition, dependency also drives inertia which conditions rational switching 
decisions formed from economic (as opposed to economic and relational) 
considerations. 
Figure 3—8 summarises the literature describing the process of supplier switching 
and how this is conditioned by commitment developed inertia. 
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Figure 3—8: Supplier switching conditioned by commitment developed inertia 
3.2 Supplier Strategy and Supplier Selection Criteria - Why Form 
Relationships? 
Skinner (1979) is really the original architect of the supply chain for it was he who 
pointed out the benefits of specialisation and the division of labour in terms of 
increased efficiency. This Smithsonian view of economics inevitably results in the 
economic system self-organising into pockets of specialised production (or value 
adding processes), which become connected by the conversion processes 
necessary to produce a specific product. 
Inevitably, pockets of specialisation evolve into organisational forms that can now be 
recognised as firms; legally separate entities that provide a differentiated 
specialisation to other organisations, which operate under conditions of bounded 
rationality (Coase, 1937).  
In all contexts apart from a monopolistic supply and vertical integrated firms, a buying 
firm will be required to make a rational selection of supplier based upon a process of 
differentiation. The resultant process is an amalgamation of strategy formed from: 1) 
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the buying firm’s context; and 2) the differentiation of suppliers shaped by supplier 
attributes and the buying firm’s priorities.  
This section will therefore consider how extant knowledge informs the development 
of supply strategy before considering more detailed supplier selection criteria as a 
means of differentiating suppliers and establishing supplier preferences. 
3.2.1 Supply Strategy 
In the early 1980s in keeping with the new conversations developing around the 
supply chain (Houlihan, 1985). Kraljic (1983) recognised that: 
 
“In many companies, purchasing, perhaps more than any other business 
function, is wedded to routine. Ignoring or accepting countless economic 
and political disruptions to their supply of materials, companies continue to 
negotiate annually with their established networks of suppliers or sources. 
But many purchasing managers' skills and outlooks were formed 20 years 
ago in an era of relative stability, and they haven't changed. Now, 
however, no company can allow purchasing to lag behind other 
departments in acknowledging and adjusting to worldwide environmental 
and economic changes. Such an attitude is not only obsolete but also 
costly.” 
 
In an effort to remedy this situation Kraljic (1983) synthesised supply risk with item 
criticality to develop a matrix of contextually contingent supply strategies, which could 
be used to guide buying firms to leverage context to their advantage. 
Kraljic (1983) describes the process of developing a supply or purchasing strategy as 
a four stage process. The first phase is to classify supply in terms of item criticality 
and supply risk, the second phase is to assess a firm’s buying power relative to 
potential suppliers, the third phase is to develop a purchasing strategy based on the 
first two phases, and the final phase is the development of an action plan to develop 
more favourable supply options. 
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The purpose of classification within the Kraljic’s portfolio approach is to establish a 
context of supply which drives the tasks, information and decision process required 
to support the purchasing process. These classifications can be presented in a 
Boston Matrix as summarised in Figure 3—9. 
 
Figure 3—9: Product purchasing classification matrix 
Source: Kraljic (1983) 
The second phase of the Kraljic (1983) approach is concerned with dimensionalising 
the assessment of supplier and buyer power. Kraljic provides ten dimensions for 
assessing suppliers (Kraljic, 1983), which can be generalised according to Table 3-5:  
Table 3-5: Dimensions for assessing suppliers 
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Ident Supplier Strength determined by: Buyer Strength determined by: 
1 Market size vs. supplier capacity Purchasing volume vs. main supply capacity 
2 Market growth vs. capacity growth Demand growth vs. capacity growth of 
supplier 
3 Capacity utilisation or bottleneck Capacity utilisation of main units 
4 Competitiveness Market share compared to main competition  
5 Return on investments and return 
on capital  
Profitability of products 
6 Cost and price structure Cost and price structure 
7 Break even stability Cost of non-delivery 
8 Product uniqueness In house production capability 
9 Barriers to entry Entry costs for new supply 
10 Logistics situation Logistics 
This framework provides the means by which a buyer’s context, as defined in phase 
1, can be used to build an understanding of the attractiveness of potential suppliers. 
The object of the exercise is to where possible minimise supplier power whilst 
maximising buyer power. This process in and of itself does not provide the buyer with 
the means by which to allocate importance weights to particular dimensions, but is 
useful in providing a framework which can subsequently be used to determine the 
relative buyer and supplier power across each dimension based on the specifics of a 
buyers context.  
The third phase is concerned with assessing the buying firm’s vulnerability to supply 
through a combination of the context shaped by phase 1, and the supplier 
assessment dimensions of phase 2. Essentially, this uses the relative strengths of 
buyers and suppliers to define three broadly defined strategic directions: exploit, 
balance, and diversify. 
If buyer power exceeds supplier power in any dimension, the buying organisation is 
directed towards a strategy of exploiting that power in relation to that dimension. If 
buyer and supplier power are matched then a balanced strategy is recommended, 
and if supplier power exceeds the buyer’s power then Kraljic (1983) suggests that the 
buyer should adopt a strategy of supply diversification. 
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The final phase provides more detail to the strategy formulation outlined in the 
preceding phase by guiding the design of an action plan to improve a buyer’s 
position by considering the nine dimensions summarised in Table 3-6. 
Table 3-6: Aspects to be considered when designing an action plan to improve a 
buyer’s position  
Policy Buyer power greatest Supplier power greatest 
Volume Spread Centralise 
Price Spot Buy Contractual protection 
New suppliers Maintain contact Search 
Inventories Low High 
Own production Reduce capability Build capability 
Substitution Maintain contact with alternatives Search for alternatives 
Value engineering Force suppliers to provide value Initiate in house 
Logistics Minimise cost Secure supply 
The portfolio approach advocated by Kraljic (1983) has assumed a number of subtle 
variations (e.g. (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010) reflected in 
a number of different dimensions, including power (Campbell and Cunningham, 
1983) and relationship specific investments (Bensaou, 1999). 
The dimensional of power assumes particular significance in the consideration of 
how many suppliers should be engaged, something Kraljic (1983) chooses not to 
address directly, instead providing general guidance in terms of ‘secure supply’. The 
inference being that in situations where dependency is high (supply risk is also high) 
then a supply of materials is best secured through adopting multiple sourcing 
strategies. Further support for this approach can be found in the competitive strategy 
of Porter (1980) who suggested that the greatest cost advantage can be secured by 
ensuring competition amongst suppliers. 
Alternative perspectives regarding the best way to secure supply have been 
proposed by Deming (1986) who suggested that the greatest security of supply at the 
lowest cost is best achieved through higher levels of collaboration with selected 
suppliers.  
Although Kraljic (1983) provides guidance regarding the supply strategy to be 
adopted with selected suppliers, it falls short of guiding the practitioner with regard to 
the number of suppliers that should be engaged. Broader strategic considerations 
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present somewhat of a paradox in this respect. Deming (1986) suggests that optimal 
costs are achieved through superior quality achieved by adopting a single supplier. 
However, Porter (1980) favours the use of competition to check any advantage a 
supplier might seek to develop. Porter’s perspective finds broader support from 
Kraljic and others, who perceive the most advantageous posture for minimal cost and 
security of supply is found in what TCE refers to as the perfect market (plentiful 
supply and low switching costs). 
Dimensions such as power add more detail to any strategic analysis but are 
essentially a re-phrasing of scarcity of supply, likewise, supplier power is 
conceptually anchored in supply scarcity, and relational power is reflected in relation 
specific investment. It is therefore not surprising that the portfolio form has persisted 
and is now accepted as the principal approach to purchasing strategy (e.g. (Cox, 
2004; Wagner and Johnson, 2004) ) 
Despite its dominance the portfolio approach to developing strategy is not without its 
critics who have challenged its applicability based on: its appropriateness to the 
development of sustainable competitive advantage; the restriction of two dimensions 
on which the strategy is formulated (Dubois and Pedersen, 2002) and its static 
formulation (Cox, 2004; Dubois and Pedersen, 2002). Furthermore, although the 
portfolio approach provides a useful framework the dimensions of criticality and 
supply risk have proved hard to operationalise. Boundaries between high and low 
criticality/supply risk need contextualising and indexing (Harrison and van Hoek, 
2011). 
Although the portfolio approach is focused on the dyad as the defining element of 
buyer seller relationships it accepts that the relationship must exist in a context of 
other relationships which can be generalised in an assessment of supply and 
demand scarcity. An alternative approach to the dyadic unit of analysis is to be found 
by using the network as the unit of analysis. This approach does not make 
assumptions about context, rather it explicitly accounts for all relationships between 
the firms that can be found in a network of connected dyads (Dubois and Pedersen, 
2002).  
The essence of the network approach is twofold: 1) that the potential for optimising a 
system is greater than the potential for optimising a dyad (Axelsson and Easton, 
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1992); and 2) the system changes requiring the embedded firms to react to a new re-
defined environment (Blankenburg and Johanson, 1992). Whilst this approach is 
theoretically sound it puts aside the constraints of bounded rationality which infers 
the autonomous actions of any firm are imperfect, thereby initiating a perpetual cycle 
of adaptation as firms react to the parallel imperfect action of other firms. This is of 
course a perfect description of a CAS as described in Chapter 2. 
The consideration of bounded rationality is a useful guide to the integration of 
portfolio approaches into the more holistic network approach of strategy 
development. The portfolio approach recommended by Kraljic (1983) and others has 
proved popular because it can be operationalised heuristically, and may represent 
the best approach given the constraint of bounded rationality. However, even Kraljic 
recognised the ultimate framework for developing supply strategy must accept the 
dynamism of context, requiring any analysis to be perpetually revised:  
“The stable way of business life many corporate purchasing departments 
enjoy has been increasingly imperilled. Threats of resource depletion and 
raw materials scarcity, political turbulence and government intervention in 
supply markets, intensified competition, and accelerating technological 
change have ended the days of no surprises. As dozens of companies 
have already learned, supply and demand patterns can be upset virtually 
overnight”. (Kraljic, 1983, p.109) 
The actions of individual firms in the formulation of supply strategy are therefore 
inevitably anchored in an analysis that assumes a dyadic context but accepts that a 
network context can only ever be partially known to the focal firm. When actions 
constrained in this way are located in a network of parallel actions based on analysis 
made in conditions of bounded rationality, the perpetual adjustments to the actions of 
others is captured by the network unit of analysis and forms a description of a CAS. 
Portfolio approaches structure the decisions made by the elemental components of a 
supply network and represent one rule amongst several that combine to define the 
dynamic nature of the environment or network. 
The need to include multiple dimensions in the formulation of supply strategy has led 
to the dominance of the portfolio approach as a framework within which products can 
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be classified and placed in the context of buyer and supplier power. This guides the 
development of a supply strategy and the on-going strategy of positioning the 
organisation for improved returns. 
Although Kraljic’s (1983) selected analytical dimensions of criticality and supply risk 
have been challenged, they persist because they can be used to reflect many of the 
alternative, more specific, dimensions in supply risk formulations. Furthermore, the 
perpetual review of supply risk, and for that matter criticality, means that the matrix 
can be applied in a dynamic context yielding an applicability that is constrained only 
by the widely accepted phenomenon of bounded rationality and the less well 
understood consequences of parallel autonomous actions. 
However, the development of strategy, whilst yielding strategic direction, does not 
address the full range of supplier criteria, or how these criteria are used in 
differentiating potential suppliers from each other with the intent of securing the best 
possible economic outcome for buying organisations. This process undoubtedly 
contributes to the characterisation of supply as plentiful or scarce, and allows the 
construction of the following research question: 
What is the impact of market structure on the level of disruption experienced by 
networks? 
The next section will address the literature relating to supplier selection criteria and 
how these criteria are operationalised in the supplier selection process. 
 
3.2.2 Supplier Selection Criteria 
The previous section defined how context is the key determinant of supply strategy, 
which is essentially the contextual leveraging or mitigation of buyer or supplier power 
by a buying organisation. This section will present and analyse the literature relating 
to the differentiation of alternative suppliers and the selection process 
Distillation of Kraljic’s (1983) ten dimensions of supplier selection criteria defines four 
themes: 1) the ability of a supplier to be flexible (dimensions 1,2, and 3 in Table 3-5), 
and in particular their ability to flex capacity; 2) the financial stability of a supplier 
(dimensions 5 and 7); 3)  cost (dimensions 4 and 6) and 4) delivery (dimension 10). 
 70 
Scarcity of supply (dimensions 8 and 9) is more of a consideration in the formulation 
of the relationship than a basis of selection/differentiation. 
All of Kralijic’s four thematic supplier selection criteria align well with four of the five 
dimensions determined from the empirical survey work of Dempsey (1978), Dickson 
(1966) and Weber et al. (1991): 1) ability to flex capacity; 2) cost; 3) vendor stability 
(competitiveness, and financial stability measures) and 4) price/cost. Furthermore, 
Kraljic’s dimension of competitiveness can be positioned as a reasonable proxy for 
the combined effect of all four, but essentially are also inclusive of quality, a 
dimension identified by others (Weber et al., 1991; Dempsey, 1978; Dickson, 1966) 
as a fifth generalised dimension of supplier selection criteria. Whether or not it is 
accepted that Kraljic’s themed supplier selection criteria align completely with the 
empirical findings of Weber and others, it is certainly true that Kraljics theory finds 
broad support in empirical research (Gelderman and van Weele, 2005)  
Kraljic’s (1983) argues that product uniqueness is created by material 
scarcity/technology/and barriers to entry. Uniqueness limits a buyer’s power and the 
likelihood that price can be negotiated down. The inclusion of this factor in Kraljic’s 
model is interesting because most alternative or complementary models (Dempsey, 
1978; Porter, 1980) Dickson (1966), Weber et al. (1991) and Dempsey (1978) situate 
power as exogenous to the buyer supplier relationship and contingent on the industry 
sector. The ultimate arbitrator of this dimension must be the empirical evidence of 
Dickson (1966), Weber et al. (1991) and Dempsey (1978), which does not identify 
power as a dimension used in the supplier selection process. However, this does not 
mean that buyer or seller power is irrelevant, as it undoubtedly plays an important 
part in developing a firm’s perception of risk and propensity to act opportunistically. 
Dempsey (1978) used a survey of 379 US firms to develop a five canon description 
of supplier selection criteria. This which was supported by Dickson (1966) who 
surveyed 273 purchasing managers and distilled a list 23 supplier selection criteria, 
which was in turn confirmed by Weber et al. (1991), who although adopting a similar 
approach focused their attention on just-in-time supply strategies.  Table 3-7 
represents a synthesis the three foundation articles and the 23 supplier selection 
criteria. 
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Table 3-7: Supplier selection criteria 
Factor Rank 
Dickson Weber Dempsey 
Quality 1 1 2 
Delivery 2 2 1 
Performance history 3  6 
Warranties and claim policies 4   
Production facilities and capacity 5 5 7 
Price 6 3 3 
Technical capability 7 6 5 
Financial position 8  11 
Procedural compliance 9  13 
Communication system 10  15 
Reputation and position in industry 11  10 
Desire for business 12   
Management and organisation 13 8 9 (control) 
16 
Operating controls 14 10  
Repair service 15 11 4 
Attitude 16 7 12 
Impression 17   
Packaging ability 18 9 17 
Labour relations record 19  18 (moral and legal) 
20 
Geographical location 20 4 19 
Amount of past business 21   
Training aids 22  14 
Reciprocal arrangements 23   
Essentially there is broad acceptance of the criteria across the three surveys; 
however Dempsey (1978) used canonical analyses to reduce the number of factors 
to five canonical functions: vendor stability, basic economic criteria, geographic 
affinity, attendant services and assurance mechanisms. Demsey (1978) goes on to 
argue that the canonical functions can be organised into two groupings, with supplier 
differentiation achieved through a consideration of price, quality and delivery, and 
vendor qualification provided by performance  and stability 
Dempsey’s (1978) canonical analysis provides the underlying structure to the broad 
categories used in the supplier selection process, although the exact formulation of 
the structure is accepted as being dependent on context. Table 3-8 summarises 
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Dempsey’s five fundamental supplier evaluation criteria and their underpinning 
dimensions. 
Table 3-8: The five fundamental supplier evaluation criteria 
Variables 
Factors 
Financial 
Stability 
Price Delivery Flexibility Quality 
Labour Relations 0.73     
Management & 
organisation 
0.71     
Financial Stability 0.63     
Production Facilities 0.57 0.35   0.32 
Moral/legal issues 0.55     
Price  0.72    
Quality  0.69   0.34 
Delivery Capability  0.68   0.41 
Geographic Location   0.67   
Attitude Toward Buyer   0.66   
Performance History   0.57   
Bidding Compliance   0.48  0.41 
Packaging Capability   0.48  0.36 
Training Aids    0.82  
Aid and Service    0.76  
Repair Service    0.67 0.4 
Technical Capability 0.39   0.61  
Reputation 0.41  0.31 0.48  
Control systems 0.34    0.62 
Progress communications 0.31  0.31  0.55 
Source: Dempsey’s (1978) 
3.2.2.1 Factor Loading Matrix Vendor Attributes 
Despite almost four decades of research into supplier selection criteria, Dempsey’s 
list of five fundamentals and the list of 23 dimensions (Weber et al., 1991; Dickson, 
1966) has remained relatively unchanged (Renforth and Chawla, 2012; Swift, 1995; 
Wilson, 1994). However, the variables and the importance weighting of each variable 
is understandably contextual as previously argued in this and previous chapters. 
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3.2.3 Drivers of Supplier Selection Criteria 
The previous section highlighted and classified supplier selection criteria, with 
Dempsey (1978) providing a canonical framework of five supplier selection thematic 
criteria anchored in empirical research. This section addresses the literature 
regarding how the relative importance of the different criteria is influenced, and once 
again Kraljic (1983) provides a reasonable starting point for this discussion. 
Kraljic (1983) located the drivers of supply strategy along two dimensions: 1) 
importance of the item in terms of value added, cost contribution and profit 
contribution; and 2) the risk of supply expressed in terms of supply scarcity, 
substitutability, the pace of technology, and entry barriers.  
Most firms have sufficient data to operationalise the importance of an item to their 
business (Zolkiewski and Turnbull, 2002). They will for instance have more or less 
complete knowledge of the costs, and the profit contributions of an item, this in turn 
yields a reasonable understanding of value contribution. However, all the 
components of supply risk are by necessity exogenous to a buying firm, and are 
framed by bounded knowledge.  
Despite Kraljic’s (1983) framework being underpinned by a significant body of 
empirical literature (Bensaou, 1999; Gelderman and van Weele, 2005; Caniëls and 
Gelderman, 2005; Ellram et al., 2002) 
(Bensaou, 1999; Gelderman and van Weele, 2005; Caniëls and Gelderman, 2005; 
Ellram et al., 2002) 
 a consensus of how to operationalise supply risk remains elusive. Notwithstanding 
the dominance of the dyadic perspective in much of the supply chain literature, there 
are some notable conceptual papers that direct the reader to considering sources of 
risk other than process. Peck (2005) for instance identifies four levels of risk: 
process, network, infrastructure and environment, which she describes as 
interrelated, perhaps hinting at why Kraljic’s (1983) dimension of supply risk is so 
hard to operationalise. Pecks model is summarised in Figure 3—10:. 
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Figure 3—10: The four sources and levels of risk 
Source: Peck (2005) 
If a lens of ‘normality’ is applied to Peck’s (2005) model we can argue for the special 
treatment of level 4: natural disasters, which are unexpected and largely 
unpredictable in their specificity (Sheffi, 2005). However, the other three levels of this 
model provide a useful framework through which to view Kraljic’s (1983) dimension 
of supply risk.  
The first level is process risk and is concerned with the flow of information and 
materials along the supply chain. Disturbance in material flow can be caused by 
disturbed information flow and demand/supply variation. The second level, much like 
the third level, is concerned with dependencies between firms and between firms and 
infrastructure elements. Infrastructure does not generally alter in its designed form 
over the short term; however, it is susceptible to disruption phenomenon akin to 
natural disasters, in other words difficult to predict and rare. This thesis is concerned 
with normal operations and will therefore put aside for the moment any specific 
consideration of infrastructure or environmental sources of risk. 
3.2.3.1 Uncertainty 
The body of literature describing supply chain risk management provides some 
guidance about how process risk can be identified and quantified. The underlying 
premise in this literature is that risk is the product of the probability of an event 
occurring and the negative consequences of that event.  
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In the main this literature maintains the dyadic unit of analysis and is generally 
concerned with the use of inventory buffers (see Waters (2003) for detailed 
formulation) to mitigate the risk of supply disturbances which have a probability of 
occurrence calculated from a firm’s experience of supply and demand variation. The 
projection of variation in supply and demand as a source of risk (with determinate 
probabilities and impacts) has led some to suggest means by which the negative 
consequences of the risk mitigation (increased inventory buffers) could be mitigated;  
the most prevalent of which is the trading of information for inventory to minimise the 
so-called bullwhip effect identified by Forrester (1961). Trading real time demand 
information with suppliers inevitably attracts relationship specific investment, if only in 
the form of process and technology, with such investments increasing dependency 
and therefore increasing the supply risk associated with a restricted number of 
suppliers. 
The bullwhip effect is a consequence of each tier in the supply chain bundling their 
orders for economic efficiency. This masks the real time demand signal and 
consequently generates demand uncertainty. The bullwhip effect is summarised in 
Figure 3—11. 
 
Figure 3—11: The bullwhip effect 
There are sources of uncertainty other than supply/demand, such as quality and 
price/cost fluctuations. Variations in delivered quality require a buying organisation to 
first of all buffer against this uncertainty through a good inventory. Cost/price 
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fluctuations create uncertainty, and in much the same way as other sources of 
uncertainty, drive buying organisations to forward buy and fix intake costs, in other 
words build inventory buffers.   
The last source of uncertainty can be found in the actions of competitors (Akanle and 
Zhang, 2008; Allen et al., 1986; Anderson, 1999; Ashton, 2008) who must seek to 
create advantages by modifying the risk landscape in their own favour by 
participating in disruptive innovations and other competitive actions. These sources 
of uncertainty require a different form of mitigation: responsiveness as opposed to 
inertia inducing dependency strategies (Bergquist, 2006; de Leeuw and Fransoo, 
2009; Kim et al., 2006; Miller and Friesen, 1980). Responsiveness may require a firm 
to use pricing as a means of tailoring demand to match capacity or it could involve 
reviewing the priorities assigned to supplier selection criteria and revising which 
suppliers get selected.  
Uncertainty in its various forms is certainly a driver of supply risk. Given the preferred 
mitigation of efficiently (through the moderating effect of information sharing) building 
inventory buffers it is a little surprising to find no literature that describes the 
associated increase in supply risk generated by the increased dependency that 
results from information sharing processes/technology. The first driver of supply risk 
is therefore uncertainty. 
3.2.3.2 Dependency 
Dickson (1966) and later Caniels and Gelderman (2005) and, Zsidisin and Ellram 
(2003) suggest that buyer and seller dependency, and by association supply risk, 
can be used to define a firm’s behaviour in a particular context (as described by 
Kraljic’s (1983) matrix). However, this approach draws on a limited consideration of 
alternative supply, and is therefore still essentially a dyadic conceptualisation and 
does little to address sources of supply risk from the broader network perspective. 
Chopra and Sodhi (2004b) also emphasise the ‘dependency on a single source of 
supply as well as the capacity and responsiveness of alternative suppliers’ as a 
driver of disruption risk. This aligns with their identification of ‘percentage of a key 
component or raw material procured from a single source’ as a driver of procurement 
risk. In both cases, Chopra and Sodhi (2004b) suggest these risks can be mitigated 
through the effective combination of redundant suppliers/capacity. 
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The perception that multiple sourcing is an effective means of securing supply was 
confirmed by a number of survey based research articles (Hult and Craighead, 2010; 
Zsidisin et al., 2008). By creating multiple supply pathways firms develop their 
potential to re-route material flows in the event of disturbances or disruptions (Bode 
et al., 2011; Bonabeau, 2007; Li et al., 2010; Surana et al., 2005; Greening and 
Rutherford, 2011; 2011a). 
The principle of building alternative pathways is effectively ensuring that the network 
does not become over dependent on a few suppliers. The measurement of a 
system’s dependency on constituent elements is one that has been addressed by 
social and socio-economic network analysis and this provides some guidance as to 
how network dependency can be calculated. In effect, this approach calculates how 
dependent a network is on each participant in the network; if the spread of 
dependency is large then the inference is that the network is overly dependent on a 
small number of its constituents and supply risk is therefore greater compared to a 
scenario where the variation in dependency is small.  
In broad terms, centrality is a synonym for dependency. Even within these formal 
descriptions of dependence expressed at a network level of analysis it is far from 
clear which centrality measure is the most appropriate. For instance, it is not 
necessarily clear whether degree centrality or betweeness centrality provides the 
best measure of dependency. 
The simplest measure of centrality is degree centrality which measures the number 
of links a node (which represents a firm) has. By comparing the degree centrality of 
each node it is possible to establish conceptually the dependency of a network on 
each node. Furthermore, it is possible to extend this measurement by establishing 
the mean and the variation from the mean for the entire population of nodes and 
through this characterise the diversity of network’s centrality. This group measure 
describes the context of dependency variation. 
Betweeness centrality, like degree centrality, can assume a unit identity or a group 
identity. In either case betweeness centrality measures the number of times a node 
is used to bridge to another node, and is often used as a description of power or 
influence. 
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Whilst this analytical approach is of undoubted utility in developing an understanding 
of supply risk, it has been criticised due its assumption that each firm has complete 
knowledge of the network (Varga et al., 2009; Allen et al., 1986; Baldwin et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, this approach provides a useful structure for the 
operationalisation of supply risk and it can be used to conceptualise supply 
substitutability. Plentiful suppliers with a low variation in centrality across a network 
describes a market where switching is easy, and one in which there has not been 
any need to develop dependency as a means of mitigating moral hazard. 
A network perspective also helps conceptualise barriers to entry. Network structures 
that persist describe an environment where buyers stick with suppliers, whilst 
structures that are highly dynamic reflect a willingness of buyers to try alternative 
suppliers. These two contrasting descriptions of network dynamics portray inertia as 
a proxy measure for a barrier to entry. 
Inertia is also a reflection of dependency, with high dependency relationships having 
high inertia and low dependency relationships low inertia. By logical extension, 
dependency when assessed at a network level can describe not just the scarcity of 
supply but also the barriers to entry contained within a network, thereby providing the 
means by which supply risk can be operationalised. 
3.2.4 Operationalising the Supplier Selection Process 
Ho et al. (2010) carried out a comprehensive review of the various forms of 
operationalising the supplier selection process and found it to be dominated by two 
methods: analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
AHP is a robust method for developing relative importance weightings for selection 
criteria through pairwise comparisons. In particular, AHP addresses the inadequacies 
of human judgement when faced with multiple criteria. The basic foundation of the 
technique is the consistent derivation of weights based on the comparison of each 
criterion with all others. In a perfect world free from judgement, the total importance 
of all criteria can be summed to some value, with each criterion making a specific 
contribution. Formally this can be stated as: 
AHP adopts this formulation but accepts that human judgement is not always 
consistent or coherent. The technique then uses a robust (and mathematically 
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complex) means by which it establishes the consistency of the pairwise comparisons. 
It is not important here to describe in detail the method as it is not the core of this 
research and in any event will be returned to in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
Having established the relative importance of weightings for each criterion a buying 
organisation is faced with the task of establishing how all potential suppliers perform 
in terms of satisfying the selection criteria.  
3.2.5 Summary 
In summary, supply risk and item criticality combine to define the context for the 
development of supply strategy. The development of supply strategy as described by 
Kraljic (1983) is broadly supported by the previously described theories of TCE and 
SET. 
The drivers of supply risk are uncertainty and dependency. Dependency also drives 
the network dynamics, which is a source of uncertainty, thereby placing dependency 
at the centre of any supplier switching consideration. 
Suppliers are selected using a range of multiple criteria which can be categorised as: 
price, quality, financial stability, flexibility and delivery. Methods used to execute the 
supplier selection process have been developed by calculating th relative importance 
weights for each of the supplier selection criteria and then assessing the 
performance of each alternative supplier against these criteria to develop a supplier 
score and ranking. Such considerations can range from relatively naïve (not 
considerate of supplier cost inputs and therefore efficiency) to sophisticated 
(considerate of supplier cost inputs and therefore efficiency). 
Increased dependency is considered a means of stabilising a relationship, and this 
building of relational inertia contributes to the critical organisation of the supply 
network. Furthermore, the increased dependency deliberately engineered at the 
dyad level increases vulnerability to opportunism and therefore requires a deeper 
development of trust and commitment, resulting in further relational inertia. 
Therefore, dependency is theoretically the foundation of emergent behaviour within 
supply networks, and a contributor to potential disruptions as described in Chapter 2. 
Whilst the literature reviewed so far reveals the theoretical foundations for market 
organisation, the design of relationships, supplier selection, and supplier switching 
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falls short of describing the process of operating the network embedded relationships 
to secure supply to sate demand. The next section will therefore consider the 
analytically derived principles that define inventory management and the operation of 
a supply chain. 
3.3 Normal Operations and Normal Adaptation 
The previous sections in this chapter have examined the literature pertaining to the 
organisation of supply, supply strategy, and supplier selection. Whilst these 
constitute normal operations they are devoid of any descriptions of transaction 
mechanisms, on which the fundamental operation of a supply chain is reliant. The 
anchor point for material, cash and information transactions across organisational 
boundaries is the management of inventory, with the purpose of securing product 
availability at the greatest economic efficiency given the constraints of strategy and 
supply alternatives (Kraljic, 1983; Waters, 2003). 
Inventory management is the fundamental task of the supply chain as it incorporates 
the tasks that: 1) ensure service levels are sated; 2) availability meets expectations; 
and 3) appropriate levels of responsiveness are secured. Its efficiency is the focus of 
supply strategy, its prioritisation underpins supplier selection, it is the material 
accommodation of uncertainty, and the life blood of relationships. Inventory 
management is conceptualised in Figure 3—12. 
 
Figure 3—12: Inventory management 
Figure 3—12 shows that even if demand is variable, providing that it follows some 
stochastic pattern it can be incorporated into a predictive model that ensures a 
product is ordered from suppliers in sufficient quantities and in a timely manner which 
ensures sufficient inventory is available to sate the variable but predict demand 
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patterns. Figure 3—12 shows that variations in demand can only be accommodated 
by increased inventory buffers. 
The essence of the inventory management literature is that given enough information 
it is possible to precisely formulate the levels of stock to buffer uncertainty, how much 
to order, and when to order. Waters (2003)  amongst others draws on the analytical 
derivation of formulaic descriptions of economic order quantity (EOQ), safety stock, 
and reorder levels, given a set of reasonable assumptions. These assumptions 
include: 1) demand that is independent, 2) the nature of demand (certain/uncertain), 
3) fixed costs, 4) lead time, and 5) prices that are fixed and independent of quantity 
ordered. Table 3-9summarises the formulaic descriptions of EOQ, safety stock and 
re-order level. 
Table 3-9: Formulaic descriptions for EOQ, safety stock and re-order level 
  
Safety stock 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 1.65 ∗ 𝜎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∗  √𝐿𝑇 
EOQ 
𝐸𝑂𝑄 =  √
2 ∗ 𝑅𝐶 ∗ 𝐷
𝐻𝐶
 
Re-order level 𝑅𝑂𝐿 = 𝐿𝑇 ∗ 𝐷 
 
The assumption that demand is independent infers that the demand for a particular 
product is not dependent on other products or considerations. In other words, 
independent demand refers to a context where the product being considered is not a 
component of some other product whose demand would determine the demand for 
the component product.  
Dependent demand means that the demand for a particular product is dependent on 
the demand for some other product with which the first product is associated. This 
association may be that the first product is a component of the second, whilst other 
associations may be that demand for a product is amplified or dampened depending 
on the level of demand for another product (the so called halo effect). If associations 
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are explicit then the association can be incorporated into what becomes a more 
elaborate formulation than those detailed in Table 3-9. 
Whether demand is dependent or independent the understanding and interpretation 
of demand signals is a critical component of inventory management. Forecasting 
methods are often used to predict demand variations as a result of trends or 
seasonality; however, it is generally recognised that such approaches can do little to 
anticipate the consequences of competitive action such as price reductions (Marshall 
, 1930). Competitive actions beget responses and thus the perpetual cycle of co-
evolution develops (see previous chapters).  
In its simplest form forecasting uses historical experience to predict future experience 
based on assumptions about seasonality and whether or not the demand is 
dependent or independent. The analysis can assume various levels of sophistication, 
with at one extreme moving average calculations, and at the other trends projection 
methods. In the absence of any other inputs previous period demand is a reasonable 
indication of the next period’s demand. However, this naive assumption (that there 
are no dynamic influences on demand) does not allow for competitive action 
designed to modify the allocation of demand across competitive organisations. As 
already discussed, competitive action is autonomous and across a network many 
organisations will exercise what influence they can on the allocation of demand in 
parallel to other organisations competitive actions.  
The frequency of organisational interventions designed to increase demand 
describes the volatility of a market and it is generally recognised that volatile markets 
(with many competitive parallel interventions) are difficult to forecast. Competitive 
action is not the only source of demand volatility: customers may be able to 
substitute alternative products or the utility of a product may be surpassed by 
technological innovation, equally demand may be modified by regulations or policies. 
These factors are a consideration in the generation or design of strategy, however 
tactical and operational responses constrained by an organisation’s cost structure 
are largely focused on price adjustments.  
If product innovation and substitution are controlled, tactics dictate that short-term 
future demand will be a reflection of recent historical experience. The inventory 
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needed to sate fluctuations in demand has already been shown to necessitate 
increased inventory holdings, however the amount by which the inventory is 
increased can be minimised at the supply chain level by following two principles: 1) 
centralise inventory holdings at a point as close as possible to its manufacture given 
time and distribution constraints; and 2) leverage product modularity and 
configurability to postpone specific configuration as long as possible given time and 
distribution constraints. 
The minimisation of supply chain inventory holdings requires that information be 
traded for inventory, in other words if consumer demand is shared with 
manufacturers a supply chain can be confident that the manufacturer will carry 
enough inventory to sate demand. Furthermore, the manufacturer can then accept 
the cleanest demand signal (devoid of order batching noise as described previously 
by the bullwhip effect), thereby ensuring the system holds the minimal inventory to 
accommodate true demand fluctuations. Unfortunately, the strategies described here 
load inventory into particular components of a supply chain, inferring that these 
components will not enjoy the same benefits of inventory reduction and the 
associated holding costs as their upstream and downstream partners. This has been 
shown to be a major inhibitor in efficient supply chain wide inventory management 
(Ford et al., 1986; Bastl et al., 2010; Cambra-Fierro and Polo-Redondo, 2008; 
Hausman and Johnston, 2010; Jorde and Teece, 1989; Kim et al., 2010) 
Despite the inhibiting effect of the inequitable distribution of benefits across a supply 
chain, information sharing is still a vital component of efficient supply chain operation 
and inventory management. 
In summary, there is very wide acceptance of the formulaic description of how 
inventory can be managed and the role information sharing has in the efficient 
operation of a supply chain and the resultant flow of materials. 
The next section will draw the previous sections in this chapter together to develop 
an operational framework of buyer supplier relationships and relate these to the 
operation of a supply chain, before positioning these in a supply network framework, 
thus providing a robust foundation for the specification of an appropriate research 
design to answer the research questions formed in this chapter and in Chapter 1. 
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3.3.1 Operational Framework 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the extant literature to establish a 
framework describing the normal operation of supply chains. Thus far the chapter 
has examined the motivation of firms to form relationships, the design of these 
relationships, the risks associated with partner behaviour/uncertain demand, the 
mitigation of these risks, and the management of inventory. This section will begin by 
examining existing supply chain management with a view to synthesising a 
framework appropriate to the questions posed in this thesis. 
Juttner et al. (2010) identified three types of supply chain management frameworks: 
inter-functional, process integration, and business concepts. Functions are discrete 
organisational components that are designed for a particular purpose, for instance 
logistics is primarily concerned with the movement of materials. Inter-functional 
frameworks primarily address the interface between functions, e.g. how logistics 
interfaces with marketing to anticipate and organise activity around promotions. 
Consequently, the inter-functional level of supply chain management is largely a 
consideration of intra-firm activities. 
Frameworks that address processes are devoid of organisational boundaries and 
have become the focus of supply chain management literature. Cooper and 
Lambert’s (1998) framework has been previously described, and it established seven 
(widely supported) supply chain processes which facilitate the movement of materials 
across a supply chain (see Table 3-2):  
Business concept frameworks set the strategic agenda for the supply chain 
perspective adopted within and across firms. For instance, a firm adopting an agile 
business concept in response to variations in demand will design inter-functional 
interfaces that enable inter- and intra-firm processes to respond quickly to any 
changes.  
The organisation of inter- and intra-firm activity at the inter-function and process 
levels of organisation is contingent on context, and its operationalisation must 
therefore include some sensing of the environment. Cooper and Lambert’s (1998) 
framework is presented in Figure 3—13 and is generally representative of the holistic 
approach to the supply chain framework. 
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Figure 3—13: Supply chain framework 
Source: Cooper and Lambert (1988) 
The supply chain framework has five intra-firm functions, nine inter-firm processes, 
and ten management components. This thesis is concerned with inter-firm 
relationships and assumes intra-firm functional integration; management components 
are activities and attributes that span all multiple business processes.  
From the perspective of mapping normal supply chain processes relevant to this 
thesis, the framework processes need to be unpacked and the process components 
examined for relevance to the phenomenon of interest with the purpose of identifying 
potentially simplifying assumptions. Table 3-10 summarises the content of each 
component relevant to each of the processes specified by Cooper and Lambert 
(1998). 
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Table 3-10: Components of normal supply chain processes 
Process 
 
Components 
Customer 
Relationship 
Management 
Customer 
Service 
Management 
Demand 
management 
Order fulfilment 
Manufacturing 
flow 
management 
Procurement 
Product 
development 
Planning and 
control 
Organization of 
relationships 
based on 
dependency 
Information sharing and cooperation to 
minimise inventory and secure service 
levels 
Information 
sharing enabling 
inventory 
Management 
Identifying dependencies and 
organising relationships accordingly 
Inter-functional 
and inter-
organisational 
teams 
Work 
structure 
Levels of integration based on context and dependencies Levels of integration based on context and dependencies 
Organisation 
structure 
Degree to process dominates function – dependent on 
relationship configuration, cultural alignment 
Degree to process dominates function – dependent on 
relationship configuration, cultural alignment 
Product flow 
facility 
structure 
Distribution channel infrastructure and network design Supplier selection and management 
Information 
flow facility 
structure 
Information sharing 
Product 
structure Degree to which customers are involved in product design 
Enablement of 
postponement 
strategies 
Degree to which customers are 
involved in product design 
Partner 
involvement in 
product design 
Management 
methods 
Adaptation to secure increased attractiveness to the market 
Buffering against 
uncertainty 
Adaptation of supplier selection criteria Product life cycle 
Power and 
leadership 
Dependency driven acquiescence 
Strategic location 
of inventory 
Coercion vs collaboration 
Risk and 
reward 
Commitment to customer and self-interest  balance 
Commitment to Supplier and self-
interest  balance 
 
Culture and 
attitude Alignment with customer 
Alignment with  customer and degree to 
which cooperation enabled 
Alignment with supplier 
Partner 
involvement in 
product design 
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An examination of Table 3-10 reveals that in the interest of parsimony and clarity, 
some simplifying assumptions can be considered.  
Product development can be controlled in terms of only considering the supply chain 
operation for a single durable product that is not replaceable. This assumption also 
removes the problem of dependant demand (where a product’s demand is 
dependent on the demand of the product in which it becomes incorporated). Such 
complications are best examined once a basic framework for the examination of 
such factors has been established and some theory developed which can be tested.  
In a similar vein the product structure can be assumed to be given and assumed not 
to render any opportunity for postponement. 
Further examination of the table allows logical arguments to be developed in regard 
to the treatment of organisation structure, information sharing, management 
methods, power and culture. These management components are emergent and a 
consequence of a firm’s risk perceptions/experienced uncertainty. Planning and 
control is therefore the key management component that sets the context for the 
business process, primarily through the organisation of relationships in terms of trust 
commitment, cooperation and information sharing, all of which are again dependent 
on perceptions of dependency/risk and uncertainty. Context therefore defines the 
organisation of relationships and these define the nature of the remaining 
management components which define all business processes. The path 
dependencies described above are summarised in Figure 3—14. 
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Figure 3—14: Path dependencies of supply chain processes 
The logical extension of these arguments, which incorporate the simplifying 
assumptions stated previously, is the development of a set of simple rules. The 
interpretation and execution of these define an organisation’s operations within a 
supply context, specifically organisations should: 
1. Assess context in terms of uncertainty and supply risk – this drives the 
prioritisation of supplier selection criteria, develops purchasing strategy and 
determines the appropriate level of trust and commitment 
2. Specify supplier selection criteria weightings based on context 
3. Select suppliers taking account of context and associated prioritisation of 
supplier selection criteria 
4. Assess attractiveness to the market and modify price to increase/decrease 
attractiveness 
5. Manage inventory in accordance with relationships formed, experienced 
risk/uncertainty, and information shared 
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The essence of this argument is that if autonomy is assumed and a CAS 
perspective adopted, then each firm assesses its context to design its 
relationships with suppliers selected against specified weighted criteria. The 
nature of the relationships developed influences the level of information sharing, 
and impacts direct forecasting and responsiveness, thereby enabling a 
reduction in inventory. Supplier and customer relationships are constantly 
experiencing perturbations because of the adaptive nature of firms to act in self-
interest. 
3.4 Summary 
Chapter 1 provided the background and motivation for this research in the form 
of a problem statement. Chapter 2 provided a theoretical framework and anchor 
for the conceptualisation of disruptions as a consequence of normal operations, 
and Chapter 3 has provided an operational model based upon a set of justified 
assumptions. 
The remainder of the thesis is concerned firstly with the design of an 
appropriate research approach, and then details of the research undertaken. 
The next chapter will outline some of the ontological and epistemological frames 
that shape the research design. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a theoretical foundation for the positioning of 
supply networks as CASs with the behaviours of firms being described by 
supply chain management practice anchored in TCE and SET. In so doing the 
literature review exposed gaps in the extant knowledge relating to our 
understanding of the dynamics of supply networks generated by autonomous 
actions in conditions of bounded rationality. 
This thesis is particularly concerned with how those dynamics may or may not 
generate vulnerability to disruptions, which previous chapters surfaced by 
considering normal accident theory and its application to CASs in the context of 
supply networks. 
The theoretical foundations and gaps in extant knowledge have been used to 
frame the central question of this research:  
How do network structures evolve to develop or dissipate sources of 
network risk as a consequence of normal supply chain operations in 
the context of competing risk and competitive advantage seeking 
strategies? 
The previous chapter framed the purpose of the research with three further 
research questions:  
1. Do supply networks comprising multiple connected supply chains 
experience periods of disruption as a consequence of normal 
operations? 
2. What is the impact of market structure on the level of disruption 
experienced by networks? 
3. What is the impact of adaptation and collaboration between supply chain 
participants on the level of disruption experienced by a network? 
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The dynamics of supply networks have previously been argued to rest upon 
individual firms’ perceptions of supply risk reflected in dependency and 
uncertainty. As a consequence, the initial conditions and in particular the 
population profile can be argued as important in determining the possibilities for 
re-organisation of a network. A population profile can be expressed in many 
ways but in the context of supply strategy and supplier selection, the important 
dimensions are: size of population, differentiation of population and the roles 
(e.g. retailer, wholesaler or manufacturer) of the population. 
The roles of the population allow the population size to be fragmented 
according to the populations’ purpose, and in this way it is possible to describe 
the scarcity of supply experienced by each role. In a similar vein, differentiation 
across a population (defined by its role) is a reasonable indicator of how a 
network may evolve: low differentiation means it is unlikely that a network will 
become over dependent on any one supplier, whilst high differentiation 
suggests the possibility of many buyers choosing the same attractive supplier, 
thereby developing a high dependency on that supplier.  
The impact of initial population in terms of size and differentiation develops a 
set of parameters that must be considered in answering the research questions 
posed. 
Further parameterisation of the problem space can be developed from a 
consideration of firms’ behaviours in terms of how firms choose to respond to 
risk, the degree to which they collaborate, and their strategies for competition. 
These behaviours rely on a firm’s unique interpretation of their context, but it 
has already been argued that systems that permit some or all of these 
behaviours result in different structures. 
Finally, the degree to which incumbent organisations can be challenged by new 
entrants is a reflection of the barriers to entry, and as such this presents another 
parameter which could play an important role in the emergent dynamics of a 
network.  
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By framing the research questions in a parameterised problem space any 
subsequent research into this phenomenon specifies a skeletal research design 
framework. By incorporating these parameters into any methodology it is hoped 
that the research will reveal the major factors that influence supply network 
vulnerability to disruptions. The remainder of this chapter starts by summarising 
the previous chapters to provide the context for the development of an 
appropriate strategy, consideration will then be given to the ontology and 
epistemology of the phenomenon of interest, before considering suitable 
methodologies. The chapter concludes by specifying the approach to be taken. 
4.2 The Nature of Networks - Ontology 
In order to develop theory researchers have to make clear the perspective they 
have adopted, its alignment to a particular ontology, and an epistemological 
justification that reflects perspective and ontology. 
There are three classic perspectives describing the range of philosophies 
adopted in the development of organisation theory: modernism, symbolic 
interpretivism and post-modernism. Modernism is essentially a positivist 
philosophical perspective that assumes reality can be observed independent of 
the observer, whilst symbolic interpretivism relaxes positivist constraints and 
allows reality to be a construct formed from the observer’s/observed unique 
view of the world. Post-modernism takes a constructivist perspective where 
reality is persistently being recreated by the interpretations of its constituents, 
and like symbolic interpretivism it is dynamic and defies any objective definition, 
but can be distinguished by the level of fragmentation and privilege to any 
particular narrative. 
There are a number of theories drawn from each of these perspectives that 
have been posited to understand how n organisation relates to its environment 
and therefore these are relevant to this thesis which is focused on the 
interaction of organisations with their environment described by a population of 
other firms with competing and complementary roles. 
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Modernists’ adopt a positivist view of the world which assumes reality/truth is 
external and observable independent of the observer. Within this perspective 
networks of relationships can be discovered and observed allowing analysis 
which can characterise firms into cliques. Typically research adopting this 
perspective is concerned with the global observations of mortality and birth 
rates of firms – a god like view of the world - leading to understanding of what 
strategies or clique wide strategies are more or less successful. Any 
explanation of why the pattern of strategies a firm develops assumes that each 
firm has a common and complete interpretation of context. Clearly this 
philosophy does not accept bounded rationality, which constrains our 
understanding of inter-firm relationships to at least understanding the world as 
perceived by each firm. 
Ecology theory adopts a modernist perspective and is concerned with clusters 
or cliques of organisations fulfilling particular roles within a network 
environment. The population of a clique is described in terms of the mix of 
strategies produced in seeking improved clique performance. As such it is 
inevitably concerned with the fitness of individual firms constrained by their 
context to develop successful strategies; however, the modernist perspective 
puts aside considerations of how each firm uniquely views its own context 
instead preferring to assume global descriptions and reverting to an observable 
reality.  
Ecology population theory can therefore be framed as describing the macro 
patterns of behaviour that are likely to benefit a population or clique. However, 
the mechanics of how this macro environment is developed are more difficult to 
embed within this framework as each firm has a unique perception of its own 
context. This point is particularly emphasised if conditions of bounded rationality 
are accepted as described in previous chapters relating to TCE and SET. 
The modernist perspective is not entirely constrained to ecology population 
theory but also accepts that firms interact with their environment in terms of 
dependencies to access resources or markets for their products. This 
dependency of a firm is captured by resource dependency theory, but just as 
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ecology population theory neglects a firm’s unique interpretation of their 
environment resource, dependency theory neglects how the actions of a firm 
changes environments.  
The major criticism that can be levelled at the modernist perspective is that it 
neglects the perpetual complex macro-micro interaction dynamic. 
Symbolic interpretivism challenges the modernist perspective. Firms have a 
unique interpretation of their context which is based on bounded knowledge 
which determines their actions. In particular, enacted environment theory posits 
that a firm's interpretation of context can be characterised in terms of 
uncertainty and actions to reduce uncertainty. Firms affirm their interpretations 
through the way they act and their interpretations of their actions, for instance a 
firm that perceives its environment as risky acts to mitigate the risk and 
interprets the consequences of its actions as validation of the original 
interpretation. Enactment theory therefore reflects the emergent nature of 
relationships, as Karl Weick (1979)noted: 
“Enactment creates contingencies as well as events. The initiating 
conditions seem small in comparison to macro events only because 
these examples articulate the local turning point, the point of 
bifurcation, the moment of initiation. These triggering moments often 
serve to implant small but uncontained outcomes in larger systems. 
These embedded, uncontained outcomes continue to grow 
undetected until they spawn unanticipated consequences. “ (Weick, 
1979, p.188) 
Enactment theory is largely limited to a single consideration and it does not 
extend into chains of enactment or their consequences (1999) and others have 
epistemologically framed complex systems as evading detailed linear 
deterministic descriptions but not without patterns and structure which can be 
observed and characterised. The ontological implication is that the patterns will 
be dependent on permitted behaviours which will colour interactions and set 
system conditions. To uncover relationships between observable patterns and 
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permitted behaviours, of which there can be many, requires abstraction, and 
more importantly experimentation. 
I believe that supply networks are formed from the autonomous uncoordinated 
actions of firms executing the process of seeking suppliers to secure resources 
vital to their own operations. A network is not static because the objective of 
each firm within a network is to secure the greatest possible performance (often 
naïvely) by adapting their character to make them more attractive to others. The 
cumulative effect of all firms adapting all of the time is a network which 
perpetually changes. Furthermore, a network is not closed or predefined, 
instead it is open to new entrants to challenge the incumbent’s and existing 
firms will exit a network if they do not perform satisfactorily. A network therefore 
is driven by individual firms’ motivations requiring perpetual adaptation from 
focal firms and those that surround them, whilst being open to challenges from 
new entrants, which may or may not cause existing firms within the network to 
exit due to unsatisfactory performance. 
The ontological interference of this is that network structures are emergent but 
observable and that the structures at any point in time will be the same 
regardless of the observer. In other words, there is an external truth regarding 
network structure to be discovered or observed at any point in time. However, 
our knowledge of how the structures are created can only be developed through 
consideration of the actions of individual firms founded on motivations that can 
only be understood through the eyes of that firm and their perceptions of their 
own context. These are not external truths but rather are internal interpretations 
made by the organisations regarding their observations of their context. This 
results in a structural complexity which is objective whilst the understanding of 
how this objective structure developed requires us to understand subjective 
interpretations made by the firms existing within networks. The CAS’s 
perspective, previously described in Chapter 2, posits that the observable 
objective network structures are a consequence of autonomous subjective 
actions based on interpretations by individual firms using a few simple rules. In 
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other words, simplicity can generate complexity if actions are autonomous and 
subjective. 
The remainder of this chapter is therefore concerned with firstly examining the 
literature describing methodologies suitable for CASs, before developing a 
logical argument in support of the chosen methodology. 
4.3 Autonomous Behaviours and their Theoretical Anchors 
The legitimising of any methodology can only be secured through its grounding 
in robust ontology and adequate reflections of epistemological considerations, 
in the context of this thesis these have been summarised in the previous 
sections of this chapter. However, the ontological and epistemological 
considerations of the previous section draw significantly on the existing theories 
relating to supply decisions, their motivations, and their operationalisation. 
Consequently, this section draws on the existing theory to anchor the constructs 
that underpin the epistemological framework. 
There is fairly common agreement in the literature regarding what theory is: 
constructs, linking propositions, logical arguments/explanations, and 
assumptions that define the scope of the developed theory (Dubin, 1976; Sutton 
and Staw, 1995; Whetten, 1989). Theory is therefore the glue that secures the 
relationships between variables, but it must be testable and grounded in 
data/argument.  
If theory is indeed composed as described above, a reasonable starting point 
for the development of any theory is the situating of current constructs, linking 
propositions, and assumptions in a conceptual model (see Chapters 2 and 3). In 
doing so, the contribution made by answering the research questions can be 
contextualised. 
The incorporation of these constructs into an epistemological consideration 
requires that we understand both the maturity/robustness of the theoretical 
anchors for a conceptual framework and the degree to which these 
conceptualisations have previously been applied to supply networks. In so 
doing the level of supply network conceptualisation is illustrated and the benefit 
 98 
of using these theories in new epistemological contexts is established as a 
sound methodological approach to build on existing theory. 
4.4 Maturity of the Existing Theory 
The maturity of existing theory can be assessed along two dimensions: degree 
of saturation, and clarity of constructs, linking propositions and logical 
arguments. Mature theory has been exposed to many contexts and its 
predicting/explaining power has therefore been widely tested yielding a robust 
grounding in both logical arguments and empirical evidence. Immature theory, 
otherwise described as simple theory (Davis et al., 2009), seeks robustness 
through testing and development. In this context there are a number of logically 
argued challenges regarding the clarity of the network/CAS concepts presented 
previously, specifically: conceptualisation of a network; lack of understanding of 
the interactions (weak dynamic descriptions); and a paucity of empirical 
evidence 
4.4.1 Conceptualisation of the Network 
Several conceptualisations of a supply network can be found in the extant 
literature, which in broad terms can be differentiated by whether or not they 
accept a focal firm perspective. Harland (1996) and Choi (2002) are both 
examples of research that assumes a focal firm perspective, defining the 
network as a tree like structure with a focal firm having many customers and 
suppliers within any specified tier. Critically, this approach does not consider the 
influence of adjacent supply chains, and therefore excludes competitors to the 
focal firm. These conceptualisations have been previously presented in the 
literature review. 
The focal firm definition of supply chains also fails to address any arguments 
regarding irreducibility. The CAS’s perspective posits that interactions between 
systems are a key determent of system behaviour; by excluding inter-chain 
interactions much of the supply network conceptualisations are merely an 
extension of the supply chain paradigm, an observation supported by Harland 
(1996) and Choi (2002; 2001b). 
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The argument that it is necessary to extend the supply chain horizons, and this 
has led to the development of tree like structures that include more and more 
participants as the relationships grow ever distant from the  focal firm. However, 
the tree like structure is still defined by a focal firm, and as such it still excludes 
any of the focal firm’s competitors, who by logical argument are likely to share 
the focal firm’s suppliers/customers. 
Carter et al (2007) stands alone in the literature as they developed a survey 
approach to defining a real-world network with no focal firm. However, such an 
approach is inevitably limited in its consideration of the network dynamics, as it 
can only ever represent snapshots of the network organisation.  
The logically argued and empirically supportable argument that real-world 
research into network behaviour is limited by access to meaningful data has 
drawn many researchers to computer simulations as the means by which 
networks of interacting supply chains can be used to develop formative theory. 
Such formative theory should be more testable with real world data as the 
developed theoretical frameworks provide structure to real-world empirical 
research designs that would otherwise remain elusive. 
4.4.2 Dynamic Nature of Networks 
The emerging body of literature that uses computer simulations to develop 
contributions to supply network knowledge and theory generally adopts a non- 
focal firm perspective.  However, there is no dominant framework that 
addresses the dimension of dynamics. Generally, computer simulations accept 
the concept of parallel actions; however, some place these in static structures 
that have no structural adaptive capability, whilst others relax this constraint 
allowing the network to reorganise within the constraints of a specified 
population.  Further ambiguity emerges when computer simulations incorporate 
dynamic populations, i.e. they permit new entrants and accept exits of poor 
performing firms. 
The body of literature that describes networks from a focal firm perspective, by 
its very nature, assumes that firms are immortal within the temporal boundaries 
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of their consideration and unaffected by competitive action. This reduces the 
system to one that is largely static and in a state of neo-equilibrium. These 
conceptualisations are useful as they provide insights into the relationships 
between organisations in the context of static environments. However, they 
offer little in understanding the real dynamics of networks that embrace firms 
exiting and entering the system and the consequential re-organisation of 
relationships. 
Pathak (2007a) highlights two decision making themes: 
“Two emergent themes that managers frequently encounter 
when making these decisions are (i) the structural intricacies of 
their interconnected supply chains (Choi and Hong, 2002) and 
(ii) the need to learn and adapt their organization in a constantly 
changing environment to ensure its long-term survival 
(Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998)” 
The first of these points directs us towards a consideration of the 
interconnectedness of networks at all levels, highlighted by the broad categories 
of supplier selection criteria highlighted by Weber (1966): quality, price, financial 
stability, delivery/geography, and flexibility. By way of illustration, it is not difficult 
to logically argue that financial stability is related to a firm’s consistent 
attractiveness to its suppliers, this in turn infers that it is willing to participate in 
appropriate relationships determined by its context and that of its customers, 
and financial stability implies good utilisation of assets which impacts a firm’s 
ability to price assertively.  
Within this myriad of connectedness there emerges a number of feedback 
loops, adding to the validity of a CAS perspective being necessary when 
considering supply networks. For instance, in seeking superior performance a 
firm aims to adapt its operations in ways which make it more attractive to its 
customer base, and if effective, this will generate disturbances/disruptions 
which will generate a new back drop requiring further adaptation. 
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The interaction of processes within a firm and across the broader network 
structure is the base mechanism in the generation of firm adaptation, which in 
turn is the base mechanism in generating network dynamics. 
The intra-firm process interactions adopted in this thesis have been previously 
argued and presented, and are anchored in supply chain theory/practice. By 
allowing these interactions to generate network dynamics and not constraining 
firm behaviour to externally imposed design, the network participants are free to 
try and evaluate new formulations of established processes. 
There is an emerging body of literature that is starting to address the open 
nature of real world supply networks (Pathak et al., 2007a; PATHAK et al., 
2009; Pathak et al., 2007b; Brintrup, 2010; Datta and Christopher, 2011b). 
These approaches generally accept that organisations will depart from a supply 
network when they exhaust their cash supply; however, they do not generally 
accept the possibility of new entrants to a network. From an ontological 
perspective this is clearly problematic when considering the long term behaviour 
of a supply network. 
Given that there has been little theory development regarding the dynamic 
behaviour of supply networks, it is no surprise that what empirical grounding 
exists it takes a bounded focal firm perspective. 
4.4.3 Paucity of Empirical Evidence 
The focal firm description of supply networks contrasts with networks that have 
no focal firm. Carter et al (2007) present what is one of only a few examples of 
empirical evidence gathered from surveys to describe a supply network that has 
no focal firm perspective. However, the snowballing method adopted by Carter 
et al’s (2007) research obviously takes a focal firm for its starting point. As well 
as demonstrating how empirical network data may be collected this research 
also demonstrates a limitation of this approach in understanding/describing 
network dynamics. 
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4.4.3.1 Summary of the Maturity of Extant Theory 
This thesis will adopt the broadest definition of a supply network that 
incorporates a ‘no focal firm perspective’, dynamic structures created by 
network participants’ supply chain decisions, the challenge of new entrants, as 
well as the exit of poor performing organisations. In this manner the research 
will embrace the main dynamic mechanisms of a network and minimise the 
criticism concerning over simplification that has been levelled at computer 
simulation approaches to developing theory (Pathak et al., 2007a). 
Assimilation of the above situates the extant theoretical base as applied to 
networks as what Davis et al. (2009) describe as simple theory: useful but not 
complete. 
4.5 Barriers to Further Theory Development  
For theory to be robust it should have been thoroughly tested, assumptions 
clearly stated, and be grounded in both logical arguments and empirical 
evidence. As already described, this presents a number of epistemological 
challenges against which any methodology must be judged, specifically: 
 It must grounded in an existing theoretical base to accept the 
phenomenon of interest, i.e. it must extend the focal firm’s perspective 
and include adjacent supply chains and the associated concepts of 
dynamic competition and connectedness. 
 It must be supported by sound logical arguments developed from extant 
knowledge and which support any assumptions made. 
 Any logical arguments should be supported by empirical evidence or 
strong logic. 
Given the above, this thesis will seek to develop methodologies that build on 
existing theory, thereby enriching and deepening our understanding of supply 
networks. By extension, the adopted methodology will also make more robust 
the extant theories and in so doing will improve the partial answers to the 
research questions that could be deduced/argued from extant knowledge and 
theory. 
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The next section will consider generic approaches that could be suitable for 
developing supply network theory given the ontological, epistemological, and 
extant theory constraints. 
4.6 Methodologies Suitable for Building Supply Network Theory  
Theory can be built inductively and modified by deductive testing, and therefore 
follows an evolutionary path of refinement resulting in robustness and ultimately 
(one hopes) saturation, where no further improvements to the theory can be 
established. 
The ontology previously described presents a number of epistemological 
challenges: how to define the boundaries of a network; the difficulty in 
developing data spanning appropriate timescales; the incorporation of new 
entrants to the market; the difficulty of measuring social 
friction/collaboration/inertia; and the difficulty in developing appropriate controls 
for variables. 
Unlike supply chains which have definitive beginnings and endings 
(conceptually raw materials to customer consumption), networks embrace 
orthogonal dimensions which reflect the boundless connectivity of supply chains 
with other supply chains through shared customers and suppliers. Although not 
directly related to supply chain or network systems, the social phenomenon 
generally described as the six degrees of connection highlights the boundless 
nature of networks. 
The empirical data used to inductively build the six degrees of connection 
theory was drawn from the informal delivery (by hand and without the use of an 
organised postal system) of postal packages to random addresses across the 
US. The delivery process was constrained to individuals passing the packages 
to people who they thought could connect better to the destination address. 
Each time the package was handled a signature was collected, and when the 
package arrived at its destination the addressee was invited to return it with the 
details of the handling signatories. The experiment showed that over a very 
large sample no package was handled more than six times. 
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Although this experiment does not take into account the strength of any 
connections used or exploited to deliver the package, it clearly demonstrates 
that the social world is at least highly connected. It is also logically possible to 
argue that the industrial world contains a much greater differentiation of 
connectivity to the social world, that is to say the world of business is dominated 
by a few large organisations who could act as distributing hubs that any 
packages being passed from one industrial enterprise to another would have to 
pass through. In this sense it may well be the case that the industrial world is 
more connected than the social world.  
Collecting empirical information regarding supply networks that span the globe 
represents a daunting, if not impossible challenge. If it was possible to identify 
the participants in supply networks then the next challenge would be the 
collection and organisation of data spanning considerable timescales reflective 
of the potential propagation of disruptive processes rooted in the inertia of long 
term contracts or other equivalent relational considerations.  
The robustness of any explanations regarding supply network re-organisation 
needs to consider the potential interaction between state variables, processes, 
and how these are modified by inter-firm activity. It is therefore necessary to 
develop a methodology whereby these variables and processes can be 
controlled in an experiment. This is clearly not possible in any real world 
context.  
The epistemological challenges described above have proved major barrier to 
inductively building empirically grounded theory relating to supply networks, but 
have also been the catalyst for increased research in the field using computer 
simulation techniques. 
In generic terms, research into supply network operations has generally taken 
three forms: definition of a network and its behaviour using survey methods 
(Carter et al., 2007) computer simulations of constrained networks, usually 
defined by a single organisational boundary; and computer models that are not 
as constrained but also not as robustly anchored in the real world as the other 
two approaches. 
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The following sections will consider each of these approaches in the context of 
the research questions and the associate ontological and epistemological 
imperatives.  
4.6.1 Empirical Studies to Build/Test Theory 
Empirical data can be used to satisfy two purposes in the context of theory: it 
can be used as the base from which theories are inductively created or it can be 
used as a means of deductively testing/modifying/extending existing theory.  
Earlier sections have argued the case for networks to be considered from the 
constructive relativism perspective, with firms interpreting their context and 
making autonomous decisions that reflect this interpretation and their belief 
system. These decisions interact with other connected firms’ decisions from 
which a network structure emerges. Such a theoretical perspective finds a 
natural home in the theoretical domain of CASs, and presents significant 
barriers to the collection of empirical data as a network is considered 
boundless, irreducible and perpetually changing. 
A well designed research approach based on empirical data has the benefit of 
robust verifiable foundations for its findings; however, its application is usually 
constrained to the data context from which any theories have been developed. 
Such approaches are nevertheless vulnerable to criticisms of being overly 
constrained as they preclude the possibility that an entirely different reality may 
have emerged had the initial conditions been only marginally different. This 
vulnerability is particularly troublesome when the theoretical perspective used 
as the basis for any developed constructs is so reliant on such possibilities (i.e. 
CASs). 
Within the context of supply networks it has been argued that survey based 
approaches, such as those used in social network analysis, have applicability to 
the collection of data in supply networks (Harland, 1996; Choi and Hong, 2002; 
Choi et al., 2001b).. Such surveys rely on organisations being able to identify 
what relationships they participate in and with whom. The survey can then be 
deployed in a snowballing method, whereby identified network participants are 
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asked to identify other participants with whom they interact. The collected data 
can then be used to populate a sociomatrix which can be subjected to 
established social network analysis. In principle this approach can be replicated 
over time to establish how a network changes. 
For the sociomatrix to be useful in the context of network disruptions it needs to 
capture the strength of relationships, direction and any partitioning rules (i.e. 
networks defined by egos and their roles). In practical terms this may present 
significant problems in and of itself, but these become amplified when sensitive 
contextual information is targeted to capture organisational strategy and high 
dependency relationships in particular. This limitation is further emphasised 
when a network incorporates competitors and is not constrained to a focal firm.  
The limitations (both practical and theoretical) may well be the reason that there 
are so few pure empirical studies of supply networks. 
4.6.2 Empirically Validated Computer Simulations 
A feasible means of overcoming some of the restrictions described above for 
pure empirical studies is that of computer simulation, the validation of which can 
be anchored in empirical data. Such an approach allows the researcher to at 
least embrace the philosophical position that CASs are sensitive to initial 
conditions and perpetually changing. Once a model has been validated against 
some real world observations of an existing system, experiments can be carried 
out which vary the initial conditions and indeed potentially some 
parameterisation of behavioural algorithms. In this way a greater extent of the 
possible solution space can be explored giving the researcher the opportunity to 
identify patterns of emergent behaviour that can be linked to the 
parameterisation of behavioural rules. 
Datta and Christopher (2011b) use such a simulation approach to show how 
decentralised/ centralised planning plays a part in the resilience of a firm’s 
internal supply chain. The configuration of the model is validated against 
empirical data before behavioural freedoms are introduced allowing the 
simulated firm to discover better ways of achieving its objectives. The emergent 
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behaviours and successful strategies can then be compared to real world 
operations to identify improvement trajectories. 
Li et al. (2009) uses empirical data in a slightly different and arguably less 
robust manor. They develop a computer simulation to develop loose theory and 
then use a vignette of a case study as an exemplar of the archetype patterns 
identified in the model. Such an approach relies on the ontological argument 
that if patterns can be established from theoretically robust behaviours, then 
real world examples of such patterns must exist and identification of such cases 
can be used to validate the computer simulation. 
Computer simulations augmented by empirical calibration certainly extend the 
range of explorative research, whilst also being able to anchor the model 
conceptualisation in real world data. In addition they inherit some of the 
constraints of the real world which contextually emerged from the unique 
histories of supply network participants. As such empirically calibrated models 
can be justified as superior to empirical data in circumstances which dictate the 
controlled exploration of a large response space and do not necessarily have 
robust theoretical foundations for simulated firm behaviour.  
4.6.3 Using Behaviourally Validated Computer Simulations to 
Develop Theory 
Networks and supply networks in particular, fall into a class of phenomena 
which in real world terms are boundless and difficult to define/difficult or 
impossible to collect meaningful descriptive data from. For instance, the 
participants in a supply network may all have different ways of measuring 
collaboration, profits, and supplier performance. Furthermore access to all a 
supply network participants may not be guaranteed or at least be conditional. 
Whilst it is theoretically possible to impose or derive standardised 
measurements, the magnitude of this task across many organisations is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
In such circumstances Davis et al. (Davis et al., 2009)suggest that: 
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 “[computer] simulation can provide superior insight into complex 
theoretical relationships among constructs, especially when challenging 
empirical data limitations exist.” 
Simulation is a broad description of methods that use computer software to 
virtually represent ‘real world’ processes, systems or events (Law and Kelton, 
1991), and as such they necessarily incorporate levels of 
abstraction/simplification (Lave and March, 1975). In order for any simulation-
based theoretical contribution to be robust it must be anchored by existing 
theory, which has led some to question what contribution simulations can make 
to theory creation/building/development (Chattoe, 1998; Fine and Elsbach, 
2000). However, the incorporation of established behavioural models into a 
single computer simulation controlled appropriately designed experiment can 
elucidate the dynamic interactions between organisations and processes (Nair 
and Vidal, 2011; Brintrup, 2010; Datta and Christopher, 2011b; Chang and 
Harrington, 2000; Li and Sheng, 2011). 
Such simulations can build a new level of linking propositions for extant 
constructs and produce theory which can subsequently be exposed to more 
easily designed empirical tests. This type of computer simulation also benefits 
from a need to develop explicit logical arguments as the means by which 
constructs are linked. This contrasts with the use of empirical observations to 
support hypotheses without necessarily testing mechanisms of causation. 
Without the ability to control experiments through extensive parameterisation 
the emergent theory from traditional empirical research into complex 
phenomena can become overly restrictive or trivial (Pathak et al., 2007a). 
Consequently, the starting point for using simulation as described above has to 
be weak or underdeveloped theory which has no strong/robust linking 
propositions, weak logical arguments, and poorly defined boundary conditions. 
Validating a model that generates a large range of initial state conditional 
networks is difficult as only one network can exist in reality. This perceived 
weakness in the pure computer modelling approach can be overcome by solidly 
anchoring the behaviour of the network participants in robust theory. By taking 
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this approach the modeller can assure themselves that if the initial conditions 
assumed had persisted in reality then the agents/firms could have legitimately 
responded in the manor captured by the model’s algorithms. 
Given the ontological and epistemological imperatives described earlier (i.e. 
emergence generated by many autonomous interactions), it is not surprising 
that the majority of the contributions to date regarding supply networks have 
been either conceptual or based on computer models. 
4.6.4 Summary of Theory Building Approaches Suitable for Supply 
Networks 
Table 4-1 summarises the theory building approaches suitable for networks, 
along with their advantages and disadvantages. 
 
 
Table 4-1: Advantages and disadvantages of network theory building approaches 
Approach General description Advantages Disadvantages 
Empirical 
real world 
studies 
Collection of real 
world empirical data to 
inductively build 
theory or deductively 
test existing theory 
 Data is robust 
 Easy to validate 
 
 Difficult to control 
variables and to 
carry out 
experimentation 
 
Computer 
Simulation 
Computer simulation 
of real world 
phenomena which 
uses the real world 
data for validation 
 Data is robust 
 Easy to validate 
 Allows the 
parameterisation of 
variables and 
therefore 
experimentation 
 
 Limited by real 
world data and 
access to it 
Computer 
Modelling 
Computer simulation 
that is generalised but 
draws on strong 
theoretical anchors for 
validation 
 Allows the 
parameterisation of 
variables and 
therefore 
experimentation 
 Not limited by 
access to real world 
data 
 Cannot be 
validated against 
real-world 
empirical data 
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The ontological and epistemological imperatives described in the previous 
section guide this research towards the computer modelling approach, mainly 
because it is not possible to guarantee access to time related real world 
empirical data across a boundless network that accepts the exit and entry of 
firms to and from a system. 
4.6.5 Computer Simulation/Modelling Approaches 
Computer simulation approaches can be divided into two distinct categories: 
those that assume processes are continuous and those that are concerned with 
events and timings that are discreet and punctuate the continuum of time. There 
is arguably a third type of computer simulation which has generally been 
labelled as operational research or optimisation, and these approaches are 
mathematical and deterministic or stochastic and are generally concerned with 
supporting decisions such as the location of warehouses, level of inventory 
batch sizing, or inventory management practices. 
The following sections describe the various computer modelling/simulation 
approaches and their application to supply chains/networks. 
4.6.5.1 System Dynamics 
System dynamics is founded on the pioneering work of Jay Forester (1958) who 
used computer simulation to show how demand can become amplified as it 
flows upstream in a supply chain: a retailer batches their orders to a supplier, 
and the supplier then batches their orders to their supplier, and in so doing the 
original demand can be shown to oscillate with increasing amplitude and 
periodicity as it moves up the supply chain. 
Forrester (1958) was extremely careful in the specification of his computer 
model, to quote directly: 
“To determine the behaviour of a system by simulating the 
performance of its parts requires that one describe exactly, and 
in detail, the characteristics which are to be included. The 
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validity of the outcome of the system studies depends on the 
judgment of what is pertinent to include in the system 
description.” 
This not only serves to emphasise the importance of correct specification, but 
also how one of the most significant insights into supply chain operations was 
developed - not from empirical observations but from computer simulations. 
Forrester recognised that the supply chain system was one of continuous flows 
and control through various feedback mechanisms and his conceptualisation is 
presented in Figure 4—1. 
 
Figure 4—1: Continuous flows and feedback of a supply chain system 
Source: Forrester (1958) 
This elegant model captures the essence of parsimonious specification: a 
computer simulation to explore the impact of delays, ordering practices, and 
inventory management processes on the dynamic response of a system. In so 
doing Forrester (1958) accepted (at least in his first specification) that effects 
such as marketing, promotions and competitive action did not need to be 
considered.  
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The systems dynamic approach to computer simulation has proved extremely 
valuable in developing our understanding of many issues related to demand 
amplification, such as the impact of information sharing, inter-organisational 
collaboration and inventory management practices. Indeed it secured the 
central axiom that supply chain management is primarily concerned with: flows 
of material, information and cash. 
Interestingly, Forrester’s (1958) first computer models fell into the category of 
models that were not validated using real world data, and were primarily 
concerned with developing or extending the simple theory that already existed 
to describe decisions of how much a firm needs to order and when to place an 
order. Forrester merely extended this concept across organisational 
boundaries. 
4.6.5.2 Discrete Event Simulation 
Discrete event simulation assumes that the phenomenon of interest is not 
continuous but is captured in specific events. These events may persist in time 
and at the level of the event may well assume continuous characteristics. 
In supply chain simulation terms it is hard to differentiate between discrete 
events and system dynamics, this is probably because of the fundamental 
nature of a supply chain which is concerned with the flows of material from one 
organisation to another. However, there is an established place for discrete 
events within this continuum, for instance the availability of capacity, 
disruptions, changes in cost parameters (Rosenfield et al., 1985), and time 
compression (Chang and Makatsoris, 2001). 
The combination of discrete events with system dynamics has proved useful in 
the understanding of external events (Lee et al., 2002) such as disruptions and 
catastrophes, and in the timing of decisions such as supplier switching. This 
combination of approaches comes close to mimicking the real world and is 
conceptually similar to ABM described later.  
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4.6.5.3 Optimisation Methods 
If simulation is about understanding relationships between variables, there 
exists another set of computer models that are primarily concerned with 
optimisation. Whilst these computational methods may seem inappropriate to 
an ontology where local optimisation is prioritised over system optimisation, the 
findings of such models are often operationalised heuristically, and it is 
therefore worth considering them if only to establish computer simulation as a 
feasible means of establishing supply chain and network theory. 
Optimisation approaches can be characterised as having an objective function 
which can be expressed as the minimisation or maximisation of a dependent 
variable subject to various constraints. The general form of approaching 
optimisation problems can be demarked by whether or not the problem can be 
defined as either mathematically resolvable (linear programming, integer/mixed 
integer programming and non-linear programming) or only resolvable by 
searching through a range of potential solutions to find the best (gradient-
based, meta-model, statistical and random search/heuristics). 
Mathematical optimisation methods have been extensively applied to answering 
strategic, tactical and operational supply chain problems, such as where to 
locate warehouses, how to minimise transport costs, and how best to organise 
picking within a warehouse. The search methods of optimisation have been 
used to address phenomena where there are a number of interrelated 
independent variables, such as the establishment of an optimal inventory policy 
given uncertainty in demand and supply and where demand is modified by 
availability (Spall, 1998; Zadeh, 1999; Zhao and Melamed, 2009) . 
4.6.5.4 Agent Based Modelling  
ABM is an organisation of code and processing that allows multitudinous 
simultaneous actions to take place within a computer simulation. This 
organisation of code simulates real world social phenomena much more 
adequately than other code and processing organisations that are more 
orientated to processing actions sequentially. This facility has been widely 
adopted in computer simulations of social systems as it allows system 
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behavioural characteristics to emerge and avoids arguments of tautology much 
more easily than with other computer simulation approaches. It is this aspect of 
ABM that makes it suitable for exploratory computer simulations of complex 
phenomena designed to expose emergent relationships between variables. 
ABM differs from the other forms of modelling previously mentioned in that the 
design is focused on individual action which is formatted as a set of simple 
generic rules that each agent applies using its state variables as inputs, thus 
giving a general rule a specific interpretation. This contrasts with other forms of 
simulation which reflect an abstraction of an observed system. 
ABM has been commonly applied in the understanding of highly dynamic 
ecological systems, such as social networks (Gilbert and Doran, 1994), and 
other time series evolutionary problems including supply network behaviour. In 
this context ABM simulations have developed some traction in efforts to 
understand networks that have a scale (population, temporal, geographical or 
relational) which precludes the collection of empirical data from which to 
inductively develop theory. 
The importance of Choi et al.’s (2001a) conceptualisation of supply networks as 
CASs becomes clear in the consideration of how research into CASs, and in 
particular supply networks, can be carried out as they provide the basic 
structure and components from which a model of a supply network as a CAS 
can be constructed, thereby adding to the case for the incorporation of 
autonomous parallel action into any computer simulation. 
4.6.6 Verification and Validation 
The believability of any theory developed using computerised 
simulations/modelling is self-evidently a model’s verification and validation. 
Verification provides the assurance that our articulation is not devoid of any 
aspects we had wished to design into the model. In contrast, validation is the 
process by which we assure ourselves and others that the model is sufficiently 
rich to adequately reflect the real world. Normally validation draws heavily upon 
the gathering of real-world empirical data which can be used to check the 
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outputs of the abstracted model; however, as previously described there are 
occasions where empirical data is difficult to collect. In such circumstances the 
researcher can only anchor the behaviours of the model components in theory, 
and in so doing make the assertion that if the world behaves as theory 
describes then the computer simulation/model constructed adequately reflects 
these assumptions. 
4.6.7 Summary of Computer Simulation/Modelling Approaches 
In accordance with Jay Forrester’s advice on the rigorous specification of 
computer models, cognisant of a gap in the existing knowledge established in 
the literature review, drawing on the established knowledge in the field  and the 
specific questions posed by the conceptual framework, any computer modelling 
approach designed to answer the research questions posed will have to include 
the following: agency, competitive action, adaptation to improve fitness, dynamic 
relationships in an open systems context 
The adaptation process of a firm is its response to its environment, which when 
given a unique and individual interpretation amounts to agency, inevitably 
incorporating competitive action, and responses to emergent events (the 
consequence of the adaptive actions of others and self), which are ultimately 
reflected in dynamic relationships and death. 
Whilst optimisation computer models are not appropriate to understanding the 
relationships between variables, system dynamics models when combined with 
discrete events can be configured to reflect the essential characteristics of the 
phenomenon of interest.  
ABM offers the only reasonable alternative to system dynamics, and the 
functional difference between the two methods is negligible. However, ABM is 
easier to implement in terms of the CAS ontology as it requires only the rigorous 
specification of the agent and not the system, which is emergent and self-
organising. For the system dynamics approach to complexity to be 
implementable it often requires aggregation to a level where the autonomy of 
individual agents is difficult (but not impossible) to manage. 
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4.7 Generalised Methods for Building Theory using Computer 
Simulation/Modelling 
Davis et al (2009) present a seven stage roadmap for developing theory using 
computer modelling/simulation. This approach is broadly supported by other 
protocols (Law, 2006; Banks, 1998) and is comprised of the following elements: 
 begin with a research question 
 identify simple theory 
 choose a simulation approach 
 create computational representation 
 verify computational representation  
 experiment to build novel theory 
 validate with empirical data 
Accepting the argument presented in the previous sections allows the adoption 
of the above framework as a template for the research process. Although it 
should be noted that the research questions have been previously stated, and 
the simulation approach was justified in the previous section. 
4.7.1 Simple Theory 
The simple theory has been drawn from the literature on supply chain 
management, TCE, SET, and competition theory and is summarised in Table 
2-1. 
Table 4-2: Simple theory drawn from supply chain management literature 
Simple theory Relating to  Exemplar 
Supplier Selection Supplier selection 
process 
Dempsey,William A.; 
2427 Ellram,Lisa M. 
1990; 2731 Shin-Chan 
Ting 2008;}} 
Supplier selection 
criteria 
(Weber et al., 1991; 
Dickson, 1966) 
Inventory Management Calculation of Safety 
stock, re-order point, 
EOQ 
(Waters, 2003) 
Supply chain collaboration Antecedents (Morgan and Hunt, 
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1994) 
 Information Sharing  
Supply chain risk 
Management 
Purchasing Strategy (Kraljic, 1983) 
 Relationship 
management 
(Datta and Christopher, 
2011a; Fisher, 1997) 
Profit Motivation Economics (Marshall , 1930) 
Inertia Commitment  (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994) 
 
This simple theory is used as the basis for the specification of the computer 
representation which is outlined in the following section. 
4.7.2 Computer Representation 
In specifying a computer model’s requirements it is desirable to synthesise the 
research questions and the simple theory described above into a set of 
modelling assumptions: 
 Supply networks comprise organisations making autonomous decisions 
based on limited visibility of the extended community and their restrictive 
coordination, which at best extends over their own individual supply 
chain. 
 In order to maintain their competitiveness organisations will periodically 
review alternative configurations of the supply network. 
 In order to maintain adequate supply for their anticipated demand 
organisations will use established inventory management processes to 
calculate: 
o statistical safety stock 
o EOQ 
o reorder points 
 Supply chain collaboration involves sharing demand information with 
collaborative suppliers. 
 Supply chain collaboration requires commitment which increases 
relationship inertia. 
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 Supply chain risk management is primarily reflected in our propensity to 
adopt multiple sourcing strategies, the prioritisation of supplier financial 
stability, proximity and quality. 
 It is the purpose of organisations to act in the interests of their 
shareholders and to generate profit within the constraints of established 
rules and regulations.  
The following Chapter will describe the fundamental principles of ABM and the 
considerations that need to be given to the design of such a model, before 
describing the specification of the model used in this research. 
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5 Model Specification 
ABM is conceptually capable with sufficient understanding of mimicking the real 
world. However, the constraints of computational power dictate that a trade-off 
between the sophistication of individual agents and the population size be 
considered as the more sophisticated the agents become the smaller the 
population that can be accommodated. Furthermore, the masking effect created 
by complexity cannot be allowed to obscure the phenomenon of interest.  
There are two frameworks for the design of agent based models: ODD 
(overview, design concepts, and design details) and that described by Miller 
and Page (2007). The specification of a model based on an established 
framework is attractive as it serves the purpose of ensuring that experiments 
are reproducible using different programming languages and model 
development environments. 
The ODD framework can be shown to be an elaboration of the Miller and Page 
(2007) approach, with both requiring the specification of: 
 How agents interact with the world 
 Agent objectives and motivations 
 Inter agent communication 
 Strategies for adaptation 
 Agent cognition 
 And diversity 
However, the ODD framework is more widely used and more tightly specified, 
and as a consequence it  will be adopted in the specification of the computer 
model in this research. A summary of Grimm et al.’s () modified ODD framework 
is given in Table 5-1, and will be used as the template for the specification of 
the research model. 
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Table 5-1: Modified ODD framework 
Major Component  Sub-component Brief Description 
Overview Purpose Provides foundation for the 
model 
Entities, state variables and 
scales 
Specifies what variables 
will be used/generated and 
what scales 
Process overview and 
scheduling 
Describes the dynamics of 
the model and what 
influence each process 
exerts on the model  
Design Concepts Basic principles Principles adopted in 
describing agent behaviour 
Emergence How emergence is 
reflected in the model 
Adaptation How adaptation is reflected 
in the model 
Objectives What objectives drive 
agent behaviour 
Learning How adaptation is reflected 
in the model 
Sensing  How and what agents 
sense 
Interaction How agents interact with 
each other and the 
environment 
Stochasticity How stochasticity is used 
in the model (distributions 
and justifications) 
Collectives  What agent types are used 
and how they are 
differentiated 
Observations What observations of the 
model are made and how 
these relate to the purpose 
Details Initialisation  How are the initial 
conditions set 
Input data What input data is required 
to make the model work 
Sub-Models What sub-models exist and 
how are these used by the 
agents 
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The detail required by each of the ODD components of the model specification 
should be sufficient to allow experiment replication without the constraint of 
modelling language. 
5.1 Model Overview 
The model overview provides a high level structured description of the model by 
explaining: its purpose, the nature of the entities and variables, and how the 
agent’s behaviour is controlled in terms of timing and processes. The following 
sections will describe each of the model overview components in more detail. 
5.1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of the model is to address the research questions posed in the 
previous chapters. 
The model structure is summarised in Figure 5—1 and comprises one agent 
type embedded in a main object. The main object is residence for global 
functions relating to the environment, the collection and processing of global 
data, global variables and parameters. The environment and the collections of 
agents are all defined in the main object. 
5.1.2 Entities, State Variables, and Scales 
The generic agent object contains the agent functions, variables and states, 
which combine to define the agent type and the agent specific attributes. 
There are three agent types: retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers, all 
representing a particular configuration of the generic agent. The retailers 
consume inventory and can be supplied by either wholesalers or manufacturers. 
Wholesalers distribute inventory to retailers and purchase inventory from 
manufacturers. Manufacturers produce inventory and supply wholesalers and 
retailers. The agent structure is summarised in Figure 5—1  
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Figure 5—1: Agent structure of the model 
Figure 5—1 can be used to highlight a number of state variables that have no 
intra-agent dependencies or which are used in any intra-agent processes: type 
and role, just born, alive or dead, location, and cash. The type and role of an 
agent determines the permissions it has to engage in relationships, for instance 
a retailer cannot supply any agent, similarly a wholesale cannot supply a 
manufacturer but a manufacturer can supply any other type of agent.  
The just born and dead or alive state variables are used to simplify the 
programming of the model. Finally, an agent’s location is used by buying agents 
as part of the supplier selection process.  
The state variables are summarised in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2: State variables of the model 
State 
Variable 
Variable 
type 
Used by 
[process] 
Significance Scale 
Type & role String 
Supplier 
Selection 
Used to identify feasible 
suppliers 
N/A 
Supply 
Strategy 
Used to establish scarcity of 
supply and dependency 
Risk 
Assessment 
Alive or 
Dead 
Integer Supplier 
Selection 
Only live suppliers can be 
selected 
0/1 
Just Born Integer Initialisation To allocate attributes based 
on the experience of the 
incumbents 
0/1 
Operating 
Costs 
Double Financial 
Management 
Used to calculate fixed costs 0→∞ 
Demand Double 
Inventory 
Management 
Calculate ROL 0→∞ 
Demand 
uncertainty 
Double Calculate safety stock 0→∞ 
Holding 
Costs 
Double 
Calculate EOQ 
0→∞ 
Order Costs Double 0→∞ 
EOQ Double Order size 0→∞ 
ROL Double When to order 0→∞ 
Expected 
Stock 
Double Modifies ROL 0→∞ 
Allocated 
Stock 
Double Inventory 
Management 
& Order 
Fulfilment 
Determines stock available to 
sate orders 
0→∞ 
Stock Double Used to calculate available 
stock in the order fulfilment 
process 
0→∞ 
Risk Attitude Double Risk 
Assessment 
Modifies global risk 0→1 
Financial 
Stability 
Double 
Supplier 
selection 
Determines which suppliers 
are selected by prioritising 
these supplier selection 
criteria based on context 
0→1 
Flexibility Double 0→1 
Quality Double 0→1 
Location Double X & Y co -
ordinates 
Price Double Range 
specified in 
initialisation 
Cash Double 0→∞ 
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In the main the scaling of variables is obvious in that those that exist in the 
range 0 to infinity are describing variables that can assume any positive value. 
In contrast, the variables describing whether or not an agent is alive or dead, or 
newly born are binary. However, there are a number of variables describing 
supplier selection criteria and risk perceptions that are scaled between 0 and 1 
which require a more detailed description. 
The financial stability of any agent is reflected by the amount of cash an agent 
has compared to the richest agent of the same type. This ensures that the 
richest agents are always assessed as having a financial stability of 1 and 
provides the benchmark for all other agents of the same type. 
Flexibility is calculated according to the following formula: 
Equation 5-1: 
𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 + 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
2
 
Where: 
Equation 5-2: 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
 
Equation 5-3: 
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠
 
 
In other words, flexibility is the average of the buyer’s dependency on the 
supplier and the supplier’s dependency on the buyer. Maximum flexibility 
therefore occurs when both supplier and buyer totally depend on each other 
with no alternative buyers or suppliers. It is important to recognise that the 
buyer’s expectation of flexibility is determined by their perceptions of supply 
risk, and the full application of these calculations can only be understood in the 
context of the supplier selection process and algorithm. 
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Quality is a measure of how many orders an agent has failed to fulfil, and again 
the value of this state variable is determined by comparing all agents of a type 
with the agent of that type which has fulfilled the most orders. 
5.1.3 Process Overview and Scheduling 
Each agent carries out a number of processes which are described in Table 
5-3. 
Table 5-3: Processes conducted by each agent 
Process Overview Scheduling 
Performance 
Measurement 
Determines status (alive/dead) Every tick* 
Supplier Selection Determines what relationships an agent 
forms 
Every tick 
Inventory 
Management 
Determines when to place orders Every tick 
Calculate 
Commitment 
Determines the appropriate level of 
commitment based on risk assessment 
and dependency 
Each tick 
Risk Management Determines supply strategy Every tick 
Supply Strategy Determines whether a dual or single 
sourcing strategy is required 
Every tick 
Compete Determines price based on assessment 
of capacity utilisation 
Every tick 
Order Fulfilment Determines whether or not an order can 
be satisfied – fulfils order or sends 
notification that the order will not be 
fulfilled 
When order 
received 
* A tick represents a simulated day 
It should be noted that whilst processes such as supplier selection are 
scheduled for every tick, the likelihood that they will result in a network re-
organisation is tempered by the level of relational commitment. That is to say 
considerations of alternative relationships are shaped by the agent’s current 
relationship in the form of commitment levels, articulated as relational inertia. 
Inertia develops as a function of two factors: perceived supply risk and mutual 
dependency. The former is subjective and therefore uniquely perceived by the 
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agent but is based on some assessment of the global supply risk, whilst the 
latter is a measure of how much both the supplier and buyer are dependent on 
the other. Where mutual dependency is high neither organisation is incentivised 
to exit the relationship and the detailed operationalisation of this is specified in 
section 5.4.5.  
The ‘compete’ process refers to the ability of the agent to modify its price in 
response to how well its capacity is utilised. If an agent’s capacity is 
underutilised it can modify its prices to make it more attractive to potential 
buyers (bounded by the conditions of the experiment described in the next 
chapter). Furthermore, the modification of price is calculated using rolling 
averages over a 30 day period with a threshold set at an increase or decrease 
in demand of 20% more or less than capacity, this avoids the agent 
overreacting to small unstained changes in demand. 
In addition to the above agent related process, a number of other processes are 
executed in the main/global environment and these are detailed in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4: Additional processes executed in the main/global environment 
Process Overview Scheduling 
Create new agents 1 new manufacturer is created every 
300 days, 1 new wholesaler every 150 
days, and 1 new retailer every 100 days 
According to 
specified 
timing given 
in overview 
Measure disruption Measures the number and magnitude of 
new relationships formed 
Every Tick 
Determine market 
share for retailers  
Allocates retailer market share 
according to specified algorithm 
(detailed in initialisation) 
Every Tick 
Measure global risk Measures the  coefficient of variation for 
dependency across the network  
Every Tick 
 
Detailed descriptions of the above processes are contained subsequent 
sections, however some explaining arguments are required for the specification 
of different birth rates for the different agent roles.  
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In deciding what birth rates are desirable, it is important to avoid the creation of 
too many new agents. New agents are created with cash reserves that are 
consumed by the agent as they evaluate strategies with the purpose of 
establishing a sustainable business model. In doing so, agents may temporarily 
distort the market by operating non-sustainable business models. If too many 
agents are created then the model suffers from permanent distortions. 
The birth rate was conceived using the following guiding principles: 
 New agents of each type must be created more than twice during the 
1000 day simulation run. 
 Retailers are created more frequently than wholesalers and 
manufacturers as they require less investment and are initialised with 
smaller cash reserves to reflect their lower operating costs. 
 Wholesalers are created less frequently than retailers, but more often 
than manufacturers, thereby reflecting the levels of investment and 
operating costs. 
 New agents are initialised with cash reserves that represent 40 days of 
the average operating costs for the agent role (manufacturer, wholesaler 
or retailer). This infers that there should be at least 80 days between new 
entrant events (as resources would be depleted for unsustainable 
models by then, giving a reasonable allowance for an unsuccessful 
business attracting some business). 
The next section describes in more detail the model design concepts in 
accordance with the ODD framework. 
5.2 Design Concepts 
The purpose of this section is to outline the how the model implements core 
ABM concepts and follows the established ODD structure/protocol. 
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5.2.1 Basic Principles 
This section outlines the basic principles assumed in the model which are 
embodied in the processes of: supplier selection, supply risk assessment, 
collaboration, inventory management, and life and death. 
5.2.1.1 Supplier Selection  
Each buyer (wholesaler or retailer) selects a number of suppliers based on their 
single/multiple sourcing strategy determined by their assessment of risk 
modified by their individual risk attitude. The exact formulation of how the supply 
risk is calculated is given in section 5.2.1.2.  
Suppliers are selected by establishing their viability, do they belong to an 
appropriate collective (wholesaler or manufacturer), and their utility is 
determined by the application of relative importance weightings of the 
behavioural (selection) values, this is described in more detail in section 5.4.2.4 
which describes the supplier selection sub-model.  
5.2.1.2 Risk Assessment  
Risk assessment impacts behaviour in two ways: the adoption of single or 
multiple sourcing strategies; and the determination of buyer seller commitment 
and therefore collaboration.  
An agent’s risk assessment is coloured by their unique risk attitude as applied 
to a globally defined risk measurement, and in doing so gives each agent a 
unique interpretation of the network environment. Furthermore, each agent uses 
their perception of global risk to define their expectations of relational risk, and 
the specific levels of commitment thereby preferred. The role of risk in agent 
behaviour is summarised in Figure 5—2. 
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Figure 5—2: Role of risk in agent behaviour 
The calculation of global risk uses two calculations of the coefficient of variation 
(CoV). The CoV is generally accepted as a measure of dispersions and when 
applied to a network using demand as the variable reveals the variation in 
dependency across the network. High values denote a higher dependency on a 
few agents, whereas low values suggest that dependency is more evenly 
distributed. Essentially, the CoV compares the standard deviation of 
dependency (expressed as demand) to the average demand. Logically this 
measurement is only concerned with the demand experienced by suppliers, 
which in this model’s case are represented by wholesalers and manufacturers. 
The first calculation yields the maximum theoretical CoV where all supply is 
sourced from a single entity. This is represented by Equation 5-4. 
Equation 5-4:  
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑥 =  √𝑁 − 1 
Where N is the number of supply agents available. 
The second calculation reveals the actual CoV for the network, and is 
calculated using Equation 5-5. 
Equation 5-5:  
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 =
𝜎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
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By comparing the actual to the theoretical maximum, the supply risk of the 
network is scaled 0 to 1 and this is formalised in Equation 5-6. 
Equation 5-6:  
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑥
 
Each actor is given a unique (randomly generated) risk attitude from a normal 
distribution ranging from 0.2 to 0.8 with a mean of 0.5. The supply risk is then 
modified by each agent according to the following algorithm: 
If (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + ((𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 0.5) ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)) > 1 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 1 
If (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + ((𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 0.5) ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)) < 1 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 0 
Else 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + ((𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 − 0.5) ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)) 
The logic underpinning this algorithm is best explained by considering two 
agents with different risk attitudes. Agent 1 has a risk attitude of 0.4 (mildly risk 
averse) whilst Agent 2 has a risk attitude of 0.6 (more risk averse than Agent 1). 
Now consider a network where the supply risk is 0.5: Agent 1 will perceive the 
supply risk at 0.45 (slightly less than the actual risk), whilst agent 2 will perceive 
it as 0.55 (slightly more than the actual risk).  
The algorithm is also robust at the extremes, such as when the network risk is 
high for example 0.8, in this case Agent 1 will perceive the risk as 0.72, and 
Agent 2 0.88; similarly if the network risk is 0.2 Agent 1 perceives the risk at 
0.18 and Agent 2 at 0.22. 
Perceptions of risk are used to determine whether or not to single or dual 
source suppliers; inevitably this modifies buyer dependence which when 
combined with supplier dependence on the buyer yields the formulation of 
relational commitment  
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The operationalisation of risk assessment is detailed in section 5.2.1.2 
5.2.1.3 Collaboration and Commitment  
The willingness of a supplier to collaborate forms part of the supplier selection 
process in that if the circumstances dictate that collaboration is desirable then 
those partners most likely to collaborate are given preference. The degree of 
flexibility desired of potential partners is calculated according to the following 
formula: 
Equation 5-7: 
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 
 
Where the number of suppliers is determined by the supply strategy formed 
from a firm’s perception of supply risk. In circumstances of high supply risk the 
number of suppliers will be 2, otherwise it will be 1. 
Once suppliers have been selected the decision to collaborate or not is 
determined by three factors: the supply risk, buyer dependency and supplier 
dependency. The calculation of supply risk has already been given in Equation 
5-6. 
Buyer dependency is defined as: 
Equation 5-8:  
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
1
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠
 
Supplier dependency is defined as: 
Equation 5-9: 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
Relational risk is defined as: 
Equation 5-10: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝐴𝐵𝑆(𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 − 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦) 
Relationship commitment is defined as: 
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Equation 5-11: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
= √𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
3
 
This formulation ensures that relationship commitment does not prioritise any of 
the input variables and is scaled 0 to 1. It should be noted that all the input 
variables will be >1 except where the network has assumed a minimal risk 
configuration resulting in the perfect market requiring no relationship 
commitment. 
If the relationship commitment is >0.5 then the buyer shares demand 
information with the supplier in real time allowing the supplier to remove any 
impact that the relationship may have on the bullwhip effect.  
The operationalisation of information sharing is captured in the collaboration 
sub-model described in section 5.4.5. 
5.2.1.4 Inventory Management  
All agents calculate the amount of safety stock required to protect them against 
uncertain demand for a given service level. The agents also calculate the EOQ 
based on assumed holding rates, order costs, their buying price and specified 
ordering costs. Buying price is determined by the supplier selection process. 
Finally, each agent will establish an appropriate inventory level at which to place 
orders based on its selected suppliers and their lead time, which in turn is 
determined by their location. The operationalisation of inventory management is 
described in section 5.4.3. 
The EOQ is calculated as: 
Equation 5-12: 
𝐸𝑂𝑄 = √
2 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
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Where  demand is the demand for the year, ordering costs reflect the cost of 
placing an order and reflect the cost of holding inventory, generally assumed in 
the model to be 25% of the purchase price. 
The re-order point is calculated as: 
Equation 5-13: 
𝑅𝑒 − 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 
Where lead time is the elapsed number of days between placing and receiving 
an order. 
The safety stock is calculated as: 
 
Equation 5-14:  
𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 1.65 ∗  𝜎𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∗ √𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
Where 1.65 reflects a 98% availability, 𝜎𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 is the standard variation in 
demand, and lead time is the elapsed number of days between placing and 
receiving an order. 
5.2.1.5 Life-and-Death  
Agents are provided with an amount of cash upon model initialisation or their 
post-initialisation creation (see section 5.1.3 for details). Regardless of revenue 
cash is consumed by the agents to satisfy fixed and variable costs. Fixed costs 
are set at initialisation and represent 80% of the initial sales volume, whiles 
variable costs are associated with inventory holding and the 
transport/distribution costs associated with fulfilling orders. No other costs are 
accounted for in the model. 
If an agent exhausts its cash supply (which can be replenished by revenue 
created through sales) it dies and can no longer partake in the simulation.  
New agents are introduced into the environment at a rate determined by the 
model parameters (previously described and discussed in section 5.1.3). The 
behavioural variables of these agents is randomised which allows the system to 
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discover new behavioural variable mixes which can challenge the incumbent 
agents. 
5.2.2 Emergence  
Each agent executes its processes autonomously as guided by their state 
variables (see section 5.2 for operationalisation of this behaviour). 
Conceptually, the autonomous activity of each agent is executed before each 
time step takes place and effectively represents an environment generator as 
the aggregated effects are presented to the agents within the time step, thereby 
providing an environment to which the agents subsequently react. No agent has 
a priori knowledge of any other agent’s actions or the consequences of those 
actions, for instance the aggregated effect of the supplier selection process and 
the placing of orders may result in some suppliers having no inventory 
available, and the re-evaluation of pricing strategies as part of the adaptation 
processes followed by each agent may result in an increased or decreased 
market share depending on the actions of other agents across the behavioural 
space. 
5.2.3 Adaptation 
Agent adaptation within the model takes two forms: adaptation to changes in 
risk, and competitive adaptation to increase capacity utilisation though the 
manipulation of price. 
As the risk environment changes agents modify their supplier selection criteria 
and their supply strategy. The influence of perceived risk on supply selection 
criteria is detailed in section 5.4.2. 
Agents monitor their capacity utilisation (capacity is allocated during the 
initialisation phase and is described in detail in section 5.3.1). If the 30 day 
rolling average of experienced demand is more than 20% below an agent’s 
capacity, then the agent endeavours to make itself more attractive by reducing 
its price, and similarly if capacity is over utilised by more than 20% the agent 
increases its price (within the constraints describing the market conditions for 
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the experiment). By maximising capacity utilisation the agent also maximises its 
revenue and therefore profit.  
5.2.4 Objectives 
Each agent has two objectives: to minimise risk and to maximise capacity 
utilisation. 
The pursuit of profit is strongly anchored in the literature summarised in the 
literature review (TCE and classical economics). Similarly, the intent to minimise 
supply risk is anchored in the supply strategy literature and has also been 
previously discussed. 
The objectives described above neglect strategic alliances that sacrifice current 
profit opportunities for greater future profits. This simplifying assumption can be 
defended by reflecting on the purpose of the model which is to understand 
whether normal operations generate disruptions. Strategic alliances created to 
disrupt existing markets by sacrificing immediate financial priorities are, if 
successful, guaranteed to generate disruption, but do not represent normal 
operations. 
5.2.5 Learning 
There is no learning within the model; the agents do not retain knowledge 
based on their experience of previous adaptations.  
5.2.6 Prediction 
The only prediction made by the agents is based on the assumption that the 
immediate past is the best indication of the immediate future. This is primarily 
reflected in the calculation of safety stock and the timing of orders (this is 
operationalised in the inventory management sub-model described in section 
5.4.3). In a similar fashion, the application of quality criteria in the supplier 
selection process penalises poor historic performance. 
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5.2.7 Sensing 
All agents sense their environment in terms of their interpretation of 
dependency patterns which guides the supply strategy. Further sensing takes 
place at the dyadic relational level with agents sensing the dependency of 
partners to develop an interpretation of relational risk, which guides relational 
commitment and the development of relational inertia. 
Agents also sense their environment by placing orders with suppliers and 
monitoring whether or not the supplier agent satisfies that order. Furthermore, 
all agents can measure the supply populations’ performance in satisfying 
orders.  In this way an agent can establish which agents make good partners 
and which do not. 
5.2.8 Interaction 
Agents interact directly with each other through the placing of orders and the 
communication of whether or not there is any stock available to satisfy those 
orders. Buyers place orders with selected suppliers which are fulfilled providing 
the supplier has sufficient inventory. If the supplier does not have sufficient 
inventory the buyer is notified and the performance of the buyer is downgraded 
to reflect its inability to sate the order, this will be reflected in subsequent 
supplier selection processes by a depreciated value for quality. 
The description of how this is operationalized is given in section 5.4.4 
5.2.9 Stochasticity 
Stochasticity within the model is generally used to produce noise around 
normalised behaviour and to apply probability densities to outcomes. Table 5-5 
summarises where stochasticity has been used in the model. 
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Table 5-5: Instances of stochasticity in the model 
Variable Stochastic description Operationalisation 
Location X and Y coordinate: 
Uniform (min=0.2; 
max=0.8;) * 500  
 
Randomly locates agents 
in a space 500 * 500 (units 
represent km) 
Price  Uniform (min, max) The minimum and 
maximum value is 
specified according to the 
agent type by the 
experiment market 
conditions 
Risk Attitude Normal (min =0.2; max= 
0.8; mean = 0.5) 
Provides a range of risk 
attitudes which avoids 
synchronicity 
Current Demand for 
Retailers 
Variation in 𝜎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 drawn 
from a uniform distribution 
(min=0.03; max=0.05) 
Current demand taken 
from normal distribution 
(mean as specified, 
standard deviation as 
determined from above) 
Ensures there is a degree 
of uncertainty in the 
retailer demand 
Create new agents Timing is specified with 
variation added drawn 
from a uniform distribution 
(min=1; max=15) 
Avoids synchronicity of 
new agent creation  
 
Consideration of Table 5-5 reveals that two types of distribution have been used 
in the model: normal and uniform. Normal distributions are generally used 
where normalising factors are expected, for instance in supplier selection values 
and stock. Uniform distributions have been used where constrained 
randomness is expected, for instance location and price. Price is initiated using 
uniform distributions to give a randomness or variation to the initial conditions; 
however, it should be noted that price is subsequently modified by the agent 
with the intent to maximise capacity utilisation. 
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5.2.10 Collectives 
There are three collectives used in the model: retailers, wholesalers and 
manufacturers. The unique attributes assigned to each of these collectives are 
summarised in Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6: Attributes of the three collectives in the model 
Collective Description Operationalisation 
Retailers Consume stock Retailer demand is 
determined using an 
algorithm that mimics a 
pareto distribution 
dimensioned using price 
proportion of market 
share (see Figure 3—2) 
Wholesalers Operate in a price band 
that is < retailer price 
but >manufacturer price  
They persist in the 
model where it makes 
sense for a product to 
be concentrated at 
wholesalers in 
preference to 
manufacturers. 
Manufacturers Produce product using 
raw material costs as 
their main input 
The model requires that 
there is always one 
manufacturer 
 
5.2.11 Observations 
The model provides a rich source of data and the following data is collected 
from the model when disruptions are detected (Table 5-7): 
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Table 5-7: Data collected from the model after detection of a disruption 
Measurement Purpose 
Experiment version Records each experiment 
Replication Identifies the replication 
Time Records the time of the event 
Manufacturing Price Variation Records the experiment settings for 
market structure  Retail Price Variation 
Wholesale Price Variation 
Wholesale Margin Input 
Buyer Records the buyer in the relationship 
Supplier Records the supplier in the relationship 
Magnitude of Change The magnitude of change as expressed 
in the number of units normally 
exchanged in the relationship 
Total Number of Connections Used to describe the connectivity and 
nature of the network Total Magnitude of Connections 
Number of Live Retailers 
Number of Live Wholesalers 
Number of Live Manufacturers 
These observations allow an analysis that assumes a supply network behaves 
as a CAS, which is critically organised generating a long tailed cumulative 
distribution of events described by frequency and magnitude. The data also 
facilitates other analysis regarding the temporal separation of events. 
5.3 Detail 
5.3.1 Initialisation 
The model is initialised by reading the input data describing the overall retail 
market size expressed as units, the number of retailers, the number of 
wholesalers, and the number of manufacturers. The algorithms summarised in 
Table 5-8 are then applied to the input data.  
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Table 5-8: Initialisation algorithms 
Algorithm Purpose 
Read input file Provides market and population data 
Give location to agents Random locations provided to control (through 
repetition) for location within the experiments 
Determine selling price for all 
agents 
To provide initial value to determine current 
attractiveness reflecting a unique history for 
each agent 
Allocate demand to retailers 
based on pricing strategy 
Retailers provide the pull in the system and their 
selection of suppliers combined with their 
demand determines the systems dependency 
Allocate demand to suppliers 
based on initial supplier selection 
criteria 
Having allocated demand to retailers the 
demand is distributed across the supplier agents 
through the supplier selection process 
Allocate stock to all agents based 
on buyers selections 
Every agent is allocated 100,000 units of stock  
Allocate capacity to each agent 
based on their initial demand 
Each agent’s capacity range is set at their initial 
demand +/- 20% 
The initialisation process ascribes each agent with feasible variables that reflect 
a unique history allowing new structures of relationships to emerge based on 
the micro-macro interactions described previously, specifically: 
 Each agent is given a location randomly generated using the distribution 
previously described. 
 Each agent is assigned to a collective or type (i.e. retailer, wholesaler or 
manufacturer). 
 Each agent is given an amount of initial stock (100,000 units). As each 
agent consumes this stock at different rates the amount of stock can be 
the same for each agent and there will be no synchronicity of ordering as 
a consequence. 
 Each agent is assigned a selling price according to the market conditions 
described by the experiment parameters, taking account of which 
collective they belong to. 
The initialisation makes two important assumptions: location is random and 
does not follow any pattern; and retailer attractiveness is determined by price. 
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The first of these assumptions is justified by considering an alternative 
assumption that suppliers will cluster around buyers. This is accounted for in the 
model through the life and death process: suppliers that are not attractive will 
not survive and new entrants that are more attractive because of their location 
will displace less attractive incumbents.  
Wholesalers and manufacturers measure their demand directly from the orders 
they receive. However, the model does not have any customers for retailers and 
assumes that market share follows a Pareto distribution implemented using the 
following algorithm: 
1. Sort all retailers in reverse order of selling price 
2. Staring with the agent with the lowest selling price  
a. Allocate 20% of the market 
b. Reduce the market by the amount just allocated 
3. Repeat until the market is reduced to less than 0.1 (note 0 is never 
achieved using this algorithm) 
Having allocated the retailers’ market share, the retailers then choose suppliers 
based on price alone. It should be noted that this selection is temporary as the 
selection criteria will be subsequently modified when data has been generated 
to reflect each supplier’s additional selection criteria of quality, location, financial 
stability and flexibility (these criteria are discussed in more detail in section 5.4.2 
describing the supplier selection sub-model). 
The above process necessitates the model having a stabilising period of 
approximately 60 days. 
5.4 Sub-Models 
The following sections describe the sub-models incorporated into the model and 
which are used by the agents to implement their ‘normal’ operations. 
5.4.1 Adaptation Sub-Model 
Each agent calls this sub-model each tick. Each agent adapts to their 
interpretation of their environment in two ways: they act to mitigate supply risk, 
 142 
and then to maximise the utilisation of their capacity. The former relies on the 
following algorithm used to assess supply risk: 
 
Figure 5—3: Assessment of supply risk algorithm 
Each agent then applies a coefficient to the calculated supply risk (calculated as 
per Equation 5-6) which is a reflection of their risk attitude. This is necessary to: 
1) reflect the real world where interpretations are not uniform; and 2) to avoid 
synchronised uniform adjustments to supply strategy and the supplier selection 
preference weightings. 
The use of dependency as a measure of supply risk is supported in the supply 
strategy literature previously described (Marshall , 1930; Kraljic, 1983; 
Williamson, 1993b). 
The rationale underpinning the use of price as the primary means of maximising 
capacity utilisation is again supported in the previously described literature 
(Marshall , 1930); however, in order to avoid large changes which are both 
unrealistic and could represent over-reaction, the changes to price are 
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constrained to movements of 10% and the assumed market structure which 
sets upper and lower bounds for each agent type. 
The algorithm used for the maximisation of capacity utilisation is summarised in 
the flowchart given in Figure 5—4 
 
Figure 5—4: Maximisation of capacity utilisation algorithm 
5.4.2 Supplier Selection Sub-Model 
The supplier selection model exists within each agent and is called at each tick. 
The supplier selection processes follow a 3 step process: 1) calculate the 
importance of each of the criteria; 2) calculate the fit of each supplier to each 
criterion; and 3) calculate an overall score for each supplier. 
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5.4.2.1 Calculation of Importance Weights 
All importance weights are calculated in a way that positions the weighting on a 
scale of 0 to 1. The importance weighting is an expression of the relative 
importance of each criterion and is based on a calculated value of the criterion 
compared to the sum of all criteria values. 
The calculated value of supplier financial security is calculated as being equal to 
the buyer’s perceived supply risk (which exists on a scale 0-1). In other words, 
the highest weight is attached to the financial security weight when the 
perceived supply risk is greatest. This is formally stated in Equation 5-15. 
Equation 5-15: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 
The calculated value of location is dependent on the variability of supply (). The 
closer suppliers, the less the lead time and the less inventory is needed to 
buffer against uncertainty. Consequently, the value of location is calculated 
according to Equation 5-16. 
Equation 5-16: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 =  
𝜎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖
𝜎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
This ensures that the agent experiencing the greatest uncertainty in demand will 
place the highest value on location. 
The calculated value of price is determined by the agent’s consideration of 
selling margins. Agents with high margins place less emphasis on buying price 
than those with very low margins. The value of buying price is calculated as: 
 
Equation 5-17: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 1 −
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
Where 𝑖 identifies the buying agent. 
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This ensures that the agent with the highest selling margin assigns the lowest 
importance to buying price. 
The calculated value of quality is dependent on the agent’s experience of 
supply and perceptions of supply risk. The importance weight of quality is 
calculated according to Equation 5-18 and Equation 5-19. 
Equation 5-18:  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 =
(1 − % 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖) + 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
2
 
Equation 5-19: 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 1 −
𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑
 
This ensures that the agents which experience the poorest quality place the 
highest value on quality. 
The value placed on flexibility is a reflection of dependency, which in the case of 
the buying organisation is dependent on the number of suppliers selected in the 
supply strategy. The value placed on flexibility is therefore formally stated in 
Equation 5-20. 
Equation 5-20: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 =
1
𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖
 
5.4.2.2 Calculation of Scores 
Having established the importance of each criterion based on an agent’s 
context, relative importance weightings can be calculated for each criterion 
based on the generalised formula given in Equation 5-21. 
 
Equation 5-21:  
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖
∑ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑖=1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛
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Each supplier’s performance against each criterion can then be assessed. Each 
supplier’s performance is compared to the best performance for that criterion 
using the generalised formula given in Equation 5-22. 
Equation 5-22:  
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑥,𝑗
 
Where 𝑖 refers to the agent’s identity and 𝑗 to the supplier selection criterion 
being considered. 
The best performance of each criterion is determined using the rules 
summarised in Table 5-9. 
Table 5-9: Rules for selecting the best performance of criteria  
Criterion Best performance 
Price Lowest price 
Quality Highest percentage of satisfied orders 
Location Closest to buying agent 
Flexibility Closest to commitment requirement 
Financial security Highest cash reserves 
The total score for each supplier can then be calculated using the formula 
described in Equation 5-23. 
Equation 5-23:  
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 =  ∑(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗
𝑗=5
𝑗=1
) 
Where 𝑖 identifies the agent and 𝑗 the supplier selection criteria. Equation 5-23 
allows suppliers to be ranked in terms of attractiveness, and consequently the 
most preferable supplier can be identified and selected. 
5.4.2.3 Consideration of Commitment 
The model assumes that if as previously described the relationship commitment 
is greater than 0.5, then the relationship partners will collaborate. The 
collaboration process requires relationship investment in the form of 
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commitment to share information and information sharing process configuration. 
As described in Chapter 3, this builds relational inertia in the form of a reduced 
propensity to exit the relationship ().  
Each agent maintains a record of suppliers with whom it collaborates. These 
suppliers receive a premium to their score in the form of a 5% uplift. This 
ensures that they are the preference as long as they are within 5% of the best 
supplier.  
The collaboration sub-model is described in more detail in section 5.4.5. 
5.4.2.4 Summary of the Supplier Selection Sub-Model 
The supplier selection sub-model is summarised Figure 5—5. 
 
Figure 5—5: Supplier selection sub-model algorithm 
In essence, the supplier selection process involves establishing normalised 
scores for each potential supplier based on their price, commitment, location 
and financial stability. These scores are then multiplied by the importance 
weightings given to each of these criteria by the buying agent to yield a 
weighted significance specific to the buying organisation and cognisant of its 
priorities. Suppliers can then be ranked according to their overall score and 
selected according to the purchasing strategy adopted which is a function of an 
agent's perception of supply risk. 
Table 5-10 summarises the specifications of the supplier selection sub-model. 
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Table 5-10: Specifications of the supplier selection sub-model 
Parameters Selection criteria weightings, supplier 
prices, agent location, cash position of 
suppliers  
Dimensions N/A 
Design See Figure 5—5 
Justification Select suppliers that offer the best fit to 
suppliers selection criteria of the buying 
agents 
Testing (verification) Comparison with manual calculation 
Testing (validation) Literature 
Values N/A 
5.4.3 Inventory Management Sub-Model 
The inventory management sub-model requires three agent specific 
calculations: the reordering point, the EOQ, and the level of safety stock. These 
are formalised in Equation 5-12, Equation 5-13Equation 5-14 (previously given 
in section 5.2.1.4)  
The safety stock calculation requires each agent to maintain a record of the 
orders it receives (demand). To avoid over sensitivity the demand used to 
calculate safety stock is the rolling 30 day average. 
Equally, these calculations require the buying organisation to have a reasonable 
anticipation of the lead times from their selected or preferred suppliers. This is 
generated using Equation 5-24. 
Equation 5-24:  
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡(2 + (
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗
50
⁄
24
 )) 
This formula reflects a day to process the order at each end of the supply, and 
assumes a transport speed of 50km/hr. The lead time is expressed as whole 
days. 
At each time tick the buying agent assesses its inventory levels together with 
any expected deliveries (for orders placed and not yet fulfilled) against the 
calculated reorder level, thereby enabling it to make a decision of whether to 
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place orders with suppliers or not. In the event that a buyer places an order for 
an EOQ, the buying agent will check that the order quantity is greater than the 
product lead time and demand. If the EOQ is too small the agent will place more 
orders until a sufficient pipeline of expected orders is generated. This step 
ensures that the order quantities are sufficient given a particular anticipation of 
demand and lead time. 
When an order is placed the order quantity is added to the expected order value 
of the buying agent. 
The inventory management sub-model is summarised in Figure 5—6. 
 
Figure 5—6: Inventory management sub-model algorithm 
Table 5-11 summarises the specification of the Inventory management sub-
model. 
Table 5-11: Specifications of the inventory management sub-model 
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Parameters Historic demand, lead time, ordering 
costs, holding rate 
Dimensions Inventory (units) 
Design See Figure 5—6 
Justification Established processes that are embedded 
in many real world inventory management 
systems 
Testing (verification) Compare to manual calculations; test in 
isolation to establish appropriate inventory 
management given limitless supply 
Testing (validation) Literature 
Values 0 to + infinity 
5.4.4 Order Fulfilment 
Orders are transmitted in the model as messages detailing the quantity, 
ordering agent, and lead time. 
Upon receipt of an order the agent checks if it has sufficient inventory available 
to satisfy the order. If sufficient inventory is available then the demand is 
recorded and two sets of actions are generated: 
1. Inventory is moved from the supplier’s available stock to allocated stock 
2. An action to move the inventory from the supplier’s allocated stock to the 
inventory of the buying organisation after an elapsed period specified by 
the lead time. At the same time the allocated stock of the supplier is 
downgraded by the appropriate demand and the expected order quantity 
of the buying agent is downgraded by the order amount 
If the supply agent does not have sufficient inventory available it records the 
order as unfulfilled and sends a message to the buying agent detailing the order 
quantity and the identity of the supply agent.  The buying agent downgrades its 
expected order quantity by the order amount. 
The information collected during the order fulfilment process enables the supply 
agent to maintain a quality record of how many orders it has satisfied and how 
many it failed to satisfy 
The order fulfilment process is summarised in Figure 5—7. 
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Figure 5—7: Order fulfilment sub-model algorithm 
Error! Reference source not found. summarises the specification of the order 
ulfilment sub-model. 
Table 5-12: Specifications of the order fulfilment sub-model 
Parameters Stock, available stock, expected stock 
Dimensions Inventory (units) 
Design See Figure 5—7 
Justification Established processes that are embedded 
in many real world inventory management 
systems 
Testing (verification) Compare to manual calculations; test in 
isolation to establish appropriate inventory 
management given limitless supply 
Testing (validation) Literature and expert panel 
Values 0 - infinity 
5.4.5 Collaboration Sub-Model 
The collaboration sub-model allows the buying agent to share with its suppliers, 
on a daily basis, the 30 day moving average demand information providing both 
organisations having appropriate levels of commitment. This avoids any blurring 
of the demand signal through order batching by sharpening the demand signal 
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resulting in a decreased level of safety stock. The benefits of the cost reduction 
achieved by the supplier are reflected in the potential of the supplier discounting 
its prices to its buying community. 
To avoid double counting demand supply agents check whether any received 
orders are from buyers with whom they are collaborating. 
As previously mentioned collaborating suppliers benefit from a 5% uplift in their 
supplier score in the supplier selection process. 
Figure 5—8 summarises the collaboration process. 
 
Figure 5—8: Collaboration sub-model algorithm 
Table 5-13 summarises the specification of the collaboration sub-model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 153 
Table 5-13: Specifications of the collaboration sub-model 
Parameters Global risk, relational risk, closeness 
Dimensions 0,1 
Design See Figure 5—8 
Justification Collaboration is motivated by risk 
mitigation 
Testing (verification) Generate response curve for a range of 
parameterised inputs 
Testing (validation) Literature 
Values -infinity to + infinity 
5.4.6 Purchasing Strategy Sub-Model 
The purchasing strategy sub-model is used by the buying agent to determine its 
purchasing strategy in terms of whether it has a single or dual source supply. 
The decision to dual source is determined by the buying agent’s perception of 
supply and risk, which is calculated by comparing the actual supply network 
configuration with the highest risk supply network configuration. This calculation 
was given in equation 5-6, although it should be noted that the agent’s 
perception of risk modifies this value as described in section 5.2.1.2. 
The model assumes that if the perceived risk is more than half the maximum 
risk then the agent will dual source. 
Table 5-14: Specifications of the purchasing strategy sub-model 
Parameters Supply risk, risk attitude 
Dimensions 0,1 
Design See description 
Justification Highest risk is where all orders are placed 
with a single supplier. 
Testing (verification) Extremes modelled, low variations in 
dependency result in global risk 
approaching 0, high variation approach 1 
Testing (validation) Literature 
 Expert panel 
Values 1 or 2 suppliers 
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5.4.7 Birth and Death 
Agents within the model are initialised with a substantial cash holding; however, 
when an agent exhausts its cash supply it ceases to exist. This simple algorithm 
is a significant component of the self-organising process. In a similar vein the 
model also allows new entrants into the market as they play a significant role in 
challenging the incumbents and any established norms. 
Birth rates have been previously specified and discussed in section 5.1.3. 
5.5 Validation and Verification 
In the context of computer simulations/models verification refers to the internal 
consistency that determines model behaviour, whilst validation refers to how 
well the model/sub-models and algorithms reflect the real world (Campbell and 
Stanley, 1966). 
5.5.1 Verification 
Computer models offer high degrees of internal verification as each algorithm 
can be tested with sample data that should produce known outcomes. To this 
purpose the algorithms previously specified have been subjected to sample 
inputs to outputs which were compared to outputs calculated manually. 
However, whilst this process verifies the individual algorithms it does not verify 
the impact of integrating the algorithms in a sequence of actions. 
A reasonable approach to verifying the integration of algorithms in the model is 
to build the program (a collection of connect algorithms) incrementally and test 
at each level of the integration. In principle, this allows the developer to 
establish whether or not the latest level of integration results in the model 
performing as anticipated; however, as the complexity of the program develops 
it becomes increasingly difficult to predict model outcomes. 
An alternative approach to verifying a model with high levels of integration 
involves the use of placing breakpoints within the program that allow variables 
to be traced at each time step. Changes to variables can then be linked to 
components of the program and specific lines of code. 
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Once the model designer is satisfied with the program following testing in a 
simple environment (the smallest number of agents required to allow execution 
of the programme/algorithm), complexity can be introduced into the model 
environment by increasing the number of agents. 
Table 5-15 summarises the model algorithms and the principles adopted in 
verifying them, placing them in the sequence of model build. 
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Table 5-15: Verification of the model algorithms 
Sequence of 
build 
Model description Sub-Model Test 
1 Agents that consume stock Inventory 
Management 
Check agents stock depletes according to 
their demand 
2 1 + Agents that place orders Check: 1) agents generate orders at 
appropriate levels; 2) don’t run out of stock 
3 2 + Agents that receive orders Check: 1) agents satisfy orders only when 
they can; 2) register demand; 3) make the 
necessary adjustments to their stock 
records (available, allocated and expected 
stock) 
4 3 +Order fulfilment Order fulfilment Check: 1) agents only fulfil orders they have 
stock for; 2) inventory adjustments are 
made correctly for both the buying and 
supplying agents  
5 4 + Agents assess risk and 
develop purchasing strategy 
Supply Strategy Check: 1) globally assessed risk does not 
exceed 1; 2) risk increases as the number 
of suppliers is reduced; 3) purchasing 
strategy changes from single to dual source 
when perceived risk exceeds 0.5 
6 5 + Agents select suppliers Supplier selection Check: 1) suppliers are accurately ranked 
(manual calculation comparison); 2) 
selected suppliers are registered properly; 
3) suppliers are switched when preference 
is changed 
7 6 + Agents choose to 
collaborate 
Collaboration Check: 1) when conditions for collaboration 
are met suppliers are registered as 
collaborating,2) suppliers are removed from 
the collaboration list when conditions for 
collaboration are no longer met 
8 7 + Agents share demand 
information 
Check: 1) buying agents demand is 
registered with collaborating suppliers; 2) 
information is not shared when conditions 
of collaboration are not met; 3) orders from 
collaborating partners are not registered by 
suppliers 
9 8+ Agents build relational 
inertia 
Check: 1) collaborating suppliers are given 
5% uplift in their scores; 2) suppliers are not 
given any uplift in their scores when they no 
longer collaborate 
10 9 + Agents modify prices in 
response to capacity 
over/under utilisation 
Adaptation Check: 1) agents modify their prices by +/-
10% when under/over utilised capacity is 
>20%; 2)  Check prices do not get modified 
to levels that are outside those permitted by 
market conditions 
11 10 + New agents created Birth and Death Check: 1) new agents are created 
according to specified timings; 2) agents 
with <0 cash die; 3) new agents are 
initialised appropriately (initial values) 
12 11 + Agents die 
 
5.5.2 Validation 
Verification of complex systems models is certainly difficult (Pathak et al., 
2007a; Pathak et al., 2007b; Davis et al., 2007; Pathak et al., 2010). The main 
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problem being that any valid model is nondeterministic and emergent, inferring 
that small changes in some variables may produce disproportionate changes in 
outcomes. Verification is further complicated by the difficulty of gathering real-
world empirical data against which the system can be compared. This is 
particularly true of systems such as supply networks that are of large-scale and 
geographical spread bound together by autonomous decisions made under 
conditions of bounded rationality. 
This thesis uses two approaches to validating the computer model: 
 Sound theoretical anchors for the algorithms 
 Verification of algorithm descriptions using an expert panel. 
5.5.2.1 Theoretical Anchors 
Table 5-16 summarises the theoretical anchors for each element of the model 
described previously in this chapter. 
Table 5-16: Theoretical anchors for each element of the model 
Sub-model / Core 
Component 
Algorithm Theoretical anchor 
Core component Supply risk TCE: (Kraljic, 1983; 
Williamson, 1996) 
Collaboration Relational risk SET: (Hunt and Morgan, 
1994) 
Information sharing Supply chain management: 
(Fisher, 1997) 
Price Competition Price adaptation Economics: (Marshall , 
1930; Williamson, 1996) 
Purchasing Strategy Single/dual sourcing TCE, purchasing (Kraljic, 
1983) 
Inventory Management Inventory management Operational research: 
(Waters, 2003) 
Birth and Death New entrants CAS: (Bak, 1999) 
Supplier Selection Supplier selection criteria Supplier selection : (Weber 
et al., 1991; Dempsey, 
1978; Dickson, 1966) 
Relational inertia SET (Hunt and Morgan, 
1994) 
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5.5.2.2 Panel Verification 
In addition to the theoretical anchors provided above, the model was validated 
at a number of workshops comprising practitioners and academics from the 
field. The selection of the panel was designed to balance academics with 
practitioners. The composition of the panel is given in Table 5-17 
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Table 5-17: Composition of the validation workshop panel   
Panel Member Background Title and affiliation 
Colin Dulson Practitioner Supply Chain Director, AAH 
Pharmaceutical 
Mike Griffiths Academic Department of Informatics, 
Shrivenham 
Professor Peter Allen Academic Director Complex Systems 
Group, Cranfield University 
XX Practitioner World Wide Duty Free 
Richard Street Practitioner Supply Chain Director, 
Mothercare 
In addition to the workshops the approach was presented at the Logistics 
Research Network conference and the European Operations Management 
Association conference. 
The workshops consisted of the author presenting the algorithms described 
previously and inviting the audience to challenge the algorithms and the 
underpinning assumptions.  
A number of challenges were presented, and these are summarised in Table 
5-18 together with the conclusion reached by the author and the conclusion 
justification. 
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Table 5-18: Challenges to the model arising from the validation workshops 
Challenge Response Justification 
EOQ sensitive to holding 
costs and re-order costs 
Agent checks that EOQ 
covers lead time demand 
This amounts to a hybrid 
approach incorporating 
elements of both EOQ and 
order up to levels 
Use of a single product does 
not reflect the complicated 
nature of real supply chains 
The single product abstraction 
involves less assumptions 
regarding interdependencies 
between different products in 
different organisations which 
would only obscure the 
system response and 
response mechanisms 
Single product adopted, but 
observation noted and 
reflected in recommendations 
for further work 
Risk assessment is  less 
formalised  
This is probably true but it 
was agreed that it would 
include the principles of the 
proposed algorithm 
Retain the calculations of risk 
proposed but note comments 
and include in 
recommendations for further 
work 
Supplier selection not as 
sophisticated as the model 
Births of new companies 
involves an assessment of the 
market 
Undoubtedly true but the 
operationalisation of this 
within the model would 
introduce added complication 
It was agreed that market 
assessments are typically 
based on bounded rationality 
and are often naïve 
Responses to underutilisation 
are more varied than price 
adjustments 
This is also true, but 
suggestions include activities 
anticipated in the model such 
as bundling and strategic 
location 
The single product abstraction 
does not permit bundling and 
re-location of resources would 
require extension of the model 
run time to beyond 
reasonable limits within the 
broad range of experiments 
necessary 
Product criticality ignored This is also true but the 
assumption of using a single 
product requires the strategic 
purchasing options to be 
reduced to whether or not to 
collaborate, and whether or 
not to dual source 
Whilst the implications of 
ignoring product criticality are 
clearly a simplification of 
Kraljic’s (1983) purchasing 
strategy they are supported 
by TCE, SET and indeed to a 
large extent by Kraljic 
Why not allow multiple 
sourcing to be more than two 
suppliers 
Extending the possibility of 
multiple sourcing including 
more than 2 suppliers would 
require agents to balance the 
benefit with the resources and 
costs required to manage the 
extra suppliers 
Two suppliers was felt to be 
realistic if not all embracing 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has described in detail how the underpinning conceptualisation of 
supply networks as CASs susceptible to normal accidents as described by NAT 
has been incorporated into the design of an ABM suitable for assimilation in an 
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experimental design to provide answers to the research questions identified by 
the literature review. 
The model design has been verified at elemental levels through careful 
stepwise construction, staged testing of components, and integration of 
components. The algorithms, sub-models and consequently the model itself 
have been validated by anchoring the design in strong theoretical anchors 
drawn from SET, TCE, and supply chain management. Further validation was 
secured through the reflections of an expert panel on the components of the 
model. 
The model was developed using Java programming language in the Anylogic 6 
development environment. The model code is provided in Appendix A 
The next chapter will describe the design of the experiments used to generate 
data from which the answers to the research questions can be developed 
through appropriate analysis congruent with the theoretical underpinnings of 
CAS and NAT. 
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6 Experiment Design 
Chapter 4 showed how the collection of real-world empirical data using survey 
methods whilst notionally attractive has practical limitations when trying to 
understand a complex system’s behaviour in response to events that are 
unpredictable and often rare. Furthermore, the difficulty in establishing real-
world systems boundaries is prohibitively resource expensive.  
Chapter 4 also showed how computer models can be built using established 
supply chain practice as the basis for organisational behaviour. Although the 
model abstraction is founded on empirically validated organisational behaviours 
it extends the environment within which these behaviours play out, thereby 
providing a more realistic representation of the real world than that which would 
be deliverable from even the highest quality surveys. 
Chapter 5 specified a computer model that is anchored in extant theory, but 
which accepts a new dynamic environment. Furthermore, the model 
specification, cognisant of the research questions identified in Chapters 2 and 3, 
provides the basis for submitting the model to a series of experiments designed 
to answer the research questions. As a consequence, this chapter is primarily 
concerned with describing a rigorous and robust approach to the definition of an 
experimental program. 
This chapter starts by describing the design principles adopted and then uses 
these to specify an experiment design before considering the inference this has 
on the data collected with a view to the subsequent analysis. The chapter 
concludes by integrating design principles, design and analysis into a validation 
of the approach taken. 
6.1 Design Principles 
“An experiment is a series of tests in which purposeful changes are 
made to the input variables of a system so that we may identify the 
reasons for change that may be observed in the system response. 
“     (Montgomery, 2009, p.1)  
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The primary purpose of any experiment is to reveal the factors that have an 
impact on a phenomenon of interest and in so doing establish their relationship 
(if there is one) with the phenomenon (usually expressed as a system 
response). Furthermore, as any computer model design inevitably incorporates 
a degree of abstraction it is vitally important that any experiments are robust 
and repeatable. 
There are two fundamental strategies to experiment design. The first accepts 
that independent variables do not interact and therefore each variable can be 
varied in turn. This variation of one variable at a time is often referred to as an 
OVAT strategy. The second strategy assumes that the independent variables 
may interact and the experiment design has therefore to account for all of these 
interactions. In this case each combination of variables is referred to as a 
treatment.  
In adopting the CAS perspective it is clear that any experimental design should 
accept that the independent variables could interact, which in turn guides the 
experimental design to a variation of what is generally termed a factorial design. 
A full factorial experimental design includes every possible combination of 
variables and is the most complete of the factorial designs. The feasibility of a 
full factorial design depends on two considerations: the number of variables and 
the number of levels of those variables that need to be taken into account. An 
experiment with five variables with two levels for each variable will require 32 
treatments, however if three variable levels are used then the number of 
treatments increases to 243. 
It therefore follows that the design possibilities are a function of the number of 
independent variables and the number of levels that it is appropriate to vary 
these variables over.  Furthermore, the experimental design may need to 
account for a number of nuisance variables; variables that are not of direct 
interest to the research but may have an effect on the response variable. These 
can be controlled by randomly varying their values within a number of repeated 
experiments. 
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The design of an appropriate experiment can therefore be distilled into three 
principle components: 1) selection/design of appropriate response variables, 2) 
robustness (how to control nuisance variables), and 3) the choice of appropriate 
factors that influence the response variable (Montgomery, 2009). The following 
sections will consider each of these principles in the context of developing an 
experiment design suitable for answering the research questions. 
Montgomery (2009,p.14) provides a useful set of guidelines that encompasses 
the basic principles described above, specifically: 
1. a clear recognition and statement of the problem 
2. selection of the response variable (a reflection of the phenomenon of 
interest) 
3. choice of factors, levels and ranges 
4. choice of experimental design 
5. statistical analysis of the data 
6. conclusions and recommendations 
The above framework will be used as a structure for the following sections. 
6.1.1 Selecting a Response Variable 
The first step in any experiment design is to establish the system response 
variable. Clearly the phenomenon of interest is supply network disruption as a 
consequence of normal operations.  
Disruption has previously been defined as a special class of disturbance which 
requires a re-organisation of the relationships. Therefore a reasonable 
operationalisation of a measure of disruption is the size of relationships that are 
dissolved or created. The measure of disruption in the model is operationalised 
according to the following algorithm: 
 At each tick 
o For each agent 
 Compare list of suppliers with previous list of suppliers 
 Record any changes in supply (agent and magnitude)  
 166 
The above algorithm records the detail of structural changes to the relationships 
that define a network.  
For the purposes of clarity it is worth considering how this algorithm acts in the 
more difficult context of a change from single sourcing to dual sourcing. In this 
context the algorithm would only record the new relationship as a structural 
change to the network. Alternatively, in the opposite circumstance where a 
buyer changes its strategy from dual to single sourcing, the algorithm records 
the dissolved relationship. 
The algorithm therefore only records structural changes to the network in terms 
of the amount of demand the buying agent allocates/allocated against a specific 
supplier. 
The disruptions described above can only be caused by changes in risk 
perception, changes in attractiveness, or agents ceasing to trade, which 
anchors them in the normal operation of the network. 
However, it is also necessary to recognise that the model contains a number of 
variables (not of primary interest) whose impact on the response variable is not 
known. These are generally known as nuisance variables and their 
consideration in the experiment design is described in the next section. 
6.1.2 Dealing with Nuisance Variables 
Robust experiments require that nuisance variables are controlled so that the 
effect of the primary independent variables can be tested in a range of contexts 
reflected in different configurations of the nuisance variables. In this way the 
robustness of any effects on the response variable generated by the 
independent variables of interest can be established. 
The effect of nuisance variables can be minimised by randomising the variable 
values and repeating the experiments using different values. In computer 
experiments this typically necessitates assigning stochasticity to variables that 
are likely to vary in the real world and repeating experiments with alternative 
(randomly generated) values for these nuisance variables.    
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An essential element of a CAS is its critical organisation and its far from 
equilibrium state. This implies that a CAS’s specific behaviour will be sensitive 
to its initial conditions, although the system’s response will not be without 
structure or pattern. The structures that persist through ranges of initial 
conditions can be considered fundamental (Choi et al., 2001a; Bak, 1999; 
Dooley and Van, 1999). 
This raises the question of what variables should be controlled for (randomised) 
and which ones should be considered influencing factors. The guiding principle 
in this design is that factors that influence the central dynamic of supplier 
selection and supply strategy should be considered as factors and other 
variables should be randomised. As a consequence, the variables included in 
the model can be organised into three categories: 1) those that are emergent 
and change as the networks evolves; 2) those that describe the initial 
conditions; and 3) those that persist throughout the experiment. 
The variables that emerge as the network evolves include such factors as 
supplier quality, financial stability, and price. These variables guide agent 
behaviour but are not of primary interest in this research; nevertheless they 
cannot be simply discarded, and in accepting a CAS perspective they must be 
allowed to influence the system. Essentially, these three variables form part of 
the supplier selection criteria and reflect an agent’s historic attractiveness. The 
one agent variable that stays fixed throughout any experiment is location. 
Location impacts on supplier selection and therefore also on supply risk, agent 
financial stability, and price; furthermore, the agent is not permitted to modify its 
location, making location a nuisance variable. This can be controlled by 
adopting an experimental strategy that includes repetitions where this variable 
is randomly varied so that any persistent observations are clearly not a 
consequence of agent location. 
The price variable also assumes an initial value which can be considered a 
proxy for the agent’s unique history, as such the initial price also represents a 
nuisance variable which also needs to be accounted for through repetitions 
using randomised values. 
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Having identified the nuisance variable and established the basis for how 
experiments can be replicated to control for these nuisance variables the next 
section will consider the selection of factors or variables that impact the system 
response and are of interest in answering the research questions. 
6.1.3 Choice of Factors Impacting the Response of the System  
The second step in any experiment design is the logical or theoretical anchoring 
of variables that relate to the phenomenon of interest.  
As this thesis is primarily interested in the dynamic character of a supply 
network, the primary mechanism for defining structure is found in the supplier 
selection process. Buyers select suppliers to develop their competitive 
advantage, which in the context of industrial marketing is primarily a reflection of 
their attractiveness to their potential customers balanced with a consideration of 
how to manage supply risk. 
The initial conditions of a market can be described by vertical and horizontal 
levels of differentiation. These values describe the differentiation in price 
between the various tiers of the market, and also the level of variation within a 
tier. In the real world these values are not artificially constrained and are a 
function of scarcity of supply and demand (as previously described in section 
3.2.1). 
These conditions can be framed in a way that allows them to persist through the 
duration of the experiment, in other words they represent constraints within 
which the agents must act. 
In parameterising market conditions two assumptions have been made: 
 Raw material price is fixed at some assumed level 
 The parameterisation range should allow the price ranges in tiers to both 
overlap and be clearly differentiated 
The literature also revealed that two key behaviours were likely to impact the 
dynamics of a supply network: collaboration and adaptation in terms of price 
competition. The operationalisation of these behaviours within the model 
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specification permits agents to modify their existing behaviour in consideration 
of their perceptions of risk and experienced demand. In other words, the 
behaviours cannot be controlled directly from outside the model.  
However, whether or not an agent is permitted to collaborate or adapt its pricing 
to attract more customers defines two scenarios within which the impact of 
market structure can be specified exogenously and comparisons across these 
scenarios be made. 
Finally, Priogine (1997) amongst others noted that complex systems can 
operate far from equilibrium, partly because the systems are not closed with 
resources being allowed to flow in and out of the system or in the case of this 
thesis the network. This presents another scenario within which both the impact 
of market structures, collaborative capability and price competition can be 
evaluated. 
Fundamentally the literature reviewed and the model specification can be 
synthesised to develop a framework of experimentation which is summarised in 
Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6—1: Experimental framework 
Having established a framework which specifies the variables of interest that 
impact the response variable it is necessary to consider what the appropriate 
range and number of levels over which these variables should be. 
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6.1.4 Levels and Range of Variables 
6.1.4.1 Market Structure 
Before deciding how many levels should be applied to each variable that 
defines market structure, it is necessary to define how these variables are used.  
Market structure is defined along two dimensions: vertical and horizontal. The 
vertical structure is bounded by two values: raw material costs and mean retail 
price. This requires the specification of the mean manufacturing margin and the 
wholesale mean margin.  
The horizontal structure is bounded by the minimum and maximum price for 
each tier; however, it should be noted that the maximum retail price has already 
been specified. The horizontal market structure therefore requires the 
specification of the retail price variation, the wholesale price variation and the 
manufacturing price variation. 
Key: MMM: manufacturing mean margin, MWM: mean wholesale margin, MPV: 
manufacturing price variation, WPV: wholesale price variation, MRP: maximum retail 
price and RPV: retail price variation 
 summarises the logic of the market structure which can be defined by five 
variables: manufacturing mean margin, mean wholesale margin, manufacturing 
price variation, wholesale price variation and retail price variation; and two fixed 
values, raw material price and maximum retail price. 
 
Figure 6—2: Market structure logic 
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Key: MMM: manufacturing mean margin, MWM: mean wholesale margin, MPV: 
manufacturing price variation, WPV: wholesale price variation, MRP: maximum retail 
price and RPV: retail price variation 
In designing an experiment to establish whether or not there is any relationship 
between market structure and a network’s vulnerability to disruption, it is 
necessary to decide what variables should be used, how many levels should be 
tested, and what values should be used for each level. 
Having shown that the market structure can be defined by five variables with 
two assumptions, consideration needs to be given to how many levels should 
be used to adequately describe the system/network conditions. As general 
guidance linear relationships can be described by two levels, and curves by 
three. 
Each of the five variables describing market structure when considered in 
isolation have a positive/negative relationship with diversity, and diversity in a 
CAS has been used as a proxy for resilience and robustness (e.g (Bonabeau, 
2007; Nair and Vidal, 2011; Cunha and Joao Vieira da Cunha, 2006; Allen et 
al., 2006). For the purposes of clarity the variables can be considered as two 
groups: the first defines how close the tiers of the network are in terms of supply 
price, and the second how close the various agents within a tier are likely to be 
in terms of price. 
Increasing margins of the tiers brings the tiers closer together, thereby making 
the pool from which a supplier can be selected bigger. This is essentially a 
positive linear relationship with no minimum or maximum in the relationship 
between margin and diversity. It therefore seems reasonable to adopt a two 
level experiment design in this regard. 
Increasing the variation in prices within a tier will increase the differentiation of 
suppliers and reduce the feasible set available for supplier selection within the 
tier. Once again this appears to be a linear relationship (albeit negative), and 
consequently a two level experiment design seems valid. 
The specification of variable levels is guided by the following assumptions: 
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1. Manufactures have the highest levels of investment to recover and have 
the lowest intake costs; therefore, they have the highest margins. 
2. Wholesaler’s intake costs are greater than manufacturers but their 
investment is less; therefore, the wholesale margin is less than the 
manufacturing margin. 
3. Retailers have the lowest investment and their margin is less than that of 
wholesalers. 
4. Price variation within any tier is never less than 5% and never more than 
20%. 
Table 6.1 synthesises the above assumptions into a specification of the market 
structure variables for the experiment design. 
Table 6-1: Specification of market structure variables 
Variable High Low 
Manufacturing mean margin 0.5 0.35 
Mean wholesale margin 0.3 0.15 
Manufacturing price variation 0.2 0.05 
Wholesale price variation 0.2 0.05 
Retail price variation 0.2 0.05 
6.1.4.2 Permitted Agent Behaviours 
The consideration of permitted agent behaviours is simpler than that of market 
structure in the sense that the behaviour or behaviour combination is either 
permitted or not. This binary description of permitted behaviours by necessity 
results in each variable having two levels. 
It is also convenient to include whether or not a market is closed or open as a 
behavioural variable, as to do so facilitates the comparison of agent behaviours 
in open and closed markets in any subsequent analysis. Furthermore, permitted 
behaviours, like open or closed market conditions, are expressed at the network 
level. 
Permitted agent behaviours are therefore characterised as three variables with 
two levels denoting the presence or absence of the behaviours. 
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6.1.5 Experiment Design and Specification 
The third step in the design of an experiment is to establish the appropriate 
range over which variables should be varied. This is the parameterisation of 
variables and a fundamental step in establishing the experimental design. The 
design is translated into a specification by mapping the combination of 
parameter variations into treatments and blocks. 
6.1.5.1 Treatments and Blocks 
Treatments refer to variations of a specified parameter, whilst blocks refer to the 
conditions under which the parameter is varied. The design framework identified 
two treatment dimensions: permitted agent behaviours and market conditions. 
This leads naturally to the design of two related experiment designs: 1) an 
experiment where market structure (treatment) is varied in specified permitted 
behavioural contexts (blocks); and 2) an experiment where permitted agent 
behaviours are varied (treatment) in specified market conditions (blocks). This 
fundamental structure for the design of the experiments will reveal data that 
permits a complete investigation of how the variables describing both market 
structure and permitted agent behaviours of collaboration and price competition 
impact open and closed network disruption responses to normal operations. 
Table 6-2 summarises the 32 configurations of market structure, and Table 6-3: 
the eight configurations of permitted behaviours. 
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Table 6-2: Market structure configurations 
Treatment
/Blocks 
Manufacturing 
Price Variation 
Manufacturing 
Mean Margin 
Retail 
Price 
Variation 
Wholesale 
Price 
Variation 
Mean 
Wholesale 
Margin 
1 High High High High High 
2 High High High High High 
3 High High High High High 
4 High High High High High 
5 High High High High High 
6 High High High High High 
7 High High High High High 
8 High High High High High 
9 High High High High High 
10 High High High High High 
11 High High High High High 
12 High High High High High 
13 High High High High High 
14 High High High High High 
15 High High High High High 
16 High High High High High 
17 High High High High High 
18 High High High High High 
19 High High High High High 
20 High High High High High 
21 High High High High High 
22 High High High High High 
23 High High High High High 
24 High High High High High 
25 High High High High High 
26 High High High High High 
27 High High High High High 
28 High High High High High 
29 High High High High High 
30 High High High High High 
31 High High High High High 
32 High High High High High 
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Table 6-3: Permitted behaviours configurations 
Treatments 
/blocks 
Permitted Behaviours 
Collaboration Price 
competition 
Open Market Closed Market 
1 No No No Yes 
2 Yes No No Yes 
3 No Yes No Yes 
4 Yes Yes No Yes 
5 No Yes Yes No 
6 Yes Yes Yes No 
7 Yes No Yes No 
8 No No Yes No 
 
6.1.5.2 Replications 
Having specified the levels of the logically argued treatments and blocks the 
final component of the experimental design is the number of replications that 
are required to control for the nuisance variables.  
In noncomplex systems this generally involves using statistical methods to 
define sampling and repetition regimes. However, as already established, CASs 
are non-deterministic in that they are non-linear, path dependent and emergent. 
Levin (2002)  eloquently summarised these characteristics as: 
“The study of complex adaptive systems is the study of systems 
limited in their predictability. Because complex adaptive systems are 
systems in which microscopic interactions and evolutionary 
processes give rise to macroscopic phenomena through nonlinear 
interactions, these systems are subject to path dependence, with 
implications for the likelihood of multiple stable states, chaotic 
dynamics and frozen accidents.”  
The characteristics of a CAS therefore precludes any statistical basis for 
determining the number of repetitions required to satisfy the prescribed 
confidence limits. However, the observations made by Bak (1999) and the 
limits of practicality regarding how many simulation runs can be made with 
the available computational resource can be combined to determine ex 
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post whether or not the number of repetitions provides sufficient data to 
develop a good fit model for the cumulative distribution of disruption 
events. 
Give the length of time it takes to run a single simulation of 1000 days and 
the number of treatments and blocks, the initial level of replication was set 
at five. The replication level was tested using the most complex case 
(maximum diversity and all agent behaviours permitted), and the results 
were then formally tested against power and exponential cumulative 
distribution curves.  
The results of this experiment to establish whether or not the level of 
repetition is adequate are summarised in Table 6-4 and Figure 6—3. 
Table 6-4: Determination of level of repetition 
 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable:   days>magnitude  
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Power 0.729 4997.436 1 1855 0.000 199729.068 -0.716 
Exponential 0.978 81465.309 1 1855 0.000 1564.144 0.000 
 
The independent variable is Magnitude of disruption 
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Figure 6—3: Cumulative distribution of disruption events in determining the level 
of repetition 
Parameters: maximum diversity, maximum range of permitted behaviours and five 
repetitions. 
Examination of Table 6-4 and Figure 6—3 shows the cumulative 
distribution of disruption events can be described as being exponential 
with an exponent of 1564.144, which explains 98% of the observed 
variation. This level of fit was deemed acceptable as it provided a high 
level of explaining power and was affordable in terms of the computing 
power available. As a consequence the number of repetitions was set at 
five which would require just over 1300 hours of simulation.  
6.2 Summary 
The experiment design is structured as two experiments which alternately take 
market structure and permitted behaviour as treatments and blocks. Experiment 
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1 is configured as a five factor (market structure), two level factorial experiment 
with eight permitted behaviour blocks. Experiment 2 is configured as a three 
factor (permitted behaviours), two level factorial experiment with 32 market 
structure blocks. 
Each experiment generates 256 cases, each being described by a unique 
combination of market structure and permitted behaviours and repeated with 5 
different random seeds. These experiments permit data to be collected for 1000 
simulated days. Each case is controlled for the nuisance variables of location 
and price by repeating the simulations with different random number seeds. 
The following chapter will describe the data collected from these experiments 
and their subsequent analysis with the intent of directly answering the research 
questions developed in consideration of the extant literature summarised in 
Chapter 3. 
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7 Findings 
The previous chapters have addressed the underpinning theories, 
operationalisation of normal operations, model specification, and experiment 
design. This chapter will present the results from the experiment through a lens 
of appropriate analysis which allows answers to be developed regarding the 
research questions specified in Chapter 2. 
The chapter will begin with a generalised description of the results which will be 
used to frame the subsequent statistical analysis. The statistical analysis will 
identify cases framed by the experiment design which are statistically different 
before applying post hoc tests to develop explanations for the differences 
observed. The chapter concludes by synthesising the results into coherent 
answers to the questions posed. 
7.1.1  Testing for a Significant Difference 
The statistical testing of the difference between experimental treatments is the 
primary tool used to establish whether or not the treatment influences the 
networks vulnerability to disruption.  
There are two primary tests that can be used to establish statistical difference 
between samples: the first is a comparison of means and assumes a normal 
distribution within the sample (e.g. analysis of variance or ANOVA), whilst the 
second does not assume any distribution and is generally described as non-
parametric. 
It is not possible to assume that the distribution of disruption events follows a 
normal distribution, and in fact the literature suggests that it will not (Bak, 1999). 
It is for this reason that non-parametric tests will be used to test whether or not 
there is any statistical difference between different treatments.  
For the purposes of clarity it is important to understand the broad principles on 
which non-parametric tests are designed. The simple assumption underpinning 
all these tests is that if the treatments are similar then when the treatments are 
aggregated and ranked (for example by the number of days on which 
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disturbances exceed a particular value), then there should be an even 
distribution of data drawn from the treatments throughout the ranked results. 
Alternatively, and uneven distribution would suggest that the treatments were 
significantly different. 
The most common non-parametric test of statistical significant difference is the 
Kruskal-Wallis test, which will be used in the analysis of treatments in this 
chapter. 
7.2 Generalised Description of the Results 
The experimental design resulted in two experiments each with 256 cases. 
Each case represented a unique combination of market conditions and 
permitted behaviours. 
Aggregated results over the simulated period can be used to give some 
indication of how cases compare in terms of the total disruption experienced. 
These results are merely a sum of the disruptions over 1000 simulated days 
and five repeated simulations with different random seeds. These results are 
presented in Table 7-1. 
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Table 7-1: Aggregated results over the simulated period 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 4394318 944598 5052780 306146 1101512 2232806 176699 1376184 1838036 848961 247339 1726636 2271738 942626 871867 1477839
2 324309 1110998 1238483 854364 1510765 1355881 447512 1109575 706869 884364 207296 1389784 797250 1337119 459036 1536882
3 1069187 2268380 1310070 909360 813059 811581 197496 5126657 1504547 889421 1701132 2325755 361992 1330056 2482427 1920839
4 2367242 2411356 1915170 1543313 2076821 2162805 2054242 2241208 2237625 2016609 2006532 2296905 2084622 2530200 2133693 2591986
5 5672873 2951956 2689239 4162864 7948773 5157728 4143863 3740697 3152642 4159601 2766624 4137340 5839044 2945320 2975417 6072073
6 8427767 9582124 7586435 8074854 6675772 8471757 5594101 6849870 10174114 10454710 8721207 5831474 5484274 4713483 7002221 13092852
7 6300286 5291983 7928616 6401896 2631488 2859055 7121542 9291380 4190407 7586454 6452416 5408757 5368229 6330914 4474030 5318029
8 3434060 6388942 3038966 4700065 3848152 4844238 7190577 2574638 6912519 9868102 5922741 6478889 4505310 5437356 2493202 4313771
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
1 578152 3873171 4877960 728028 3341759 1741636 2350105 727131 2950498 1339185 751744 2027950 5080777 238578 1189582 1748437
2 1224802 407331 311463 861316 2785788 1162709 1755569 750287 946752 2527545 1407582 640580 521241 2075442 716111 1207298
3 284110 6613895 190932 2074561 766238 1350411 811839 778972 448885 528712 5451999 668642 453785 281036 171201 1302210
4 2114245 2092494 1982986 2097577 2651088 2142208 1826344 1919037 2041475 2484204 2238444 2147467 1586621 2181115 2423430 2110604
5 3404973 5347584 2911507 3499326 4437353 4923255 3453138 4159320 2326317 10479686 5572716 5360593 4023154 4392485 3464618 3728421
6 8025939 13631581 5338817 10504215 5208408 6668124 5721360 11253385 13172955 7151271 8076865 8207445 6078472 17678303 12166012 9615080
7 2303760 10231487 4109819 8074500 5842002 3023487 3562840 8566151 1924570 6198622 5240989 5748643 8995750 6646792 3853298 6694020
8 3103834 3763654 2511263 2703157 2786700 4208980 3946662 4866652 4937456 3146554 6347900 8799438 4260711 3336689 4235177 4425984
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Examination of Table 7-1 allows comparisons to be made within the columns or 
rows. The rows represent the results for experiment 1 (where the permitted 
behaviours are fixed and the market conditions varied), whereas the columns 
represent the results for experiment 2 (market conditions fixed and permitted 
behaviours varied). 
The first observation that can be made from Table 7-1 is that all combinations of 
market conditions and permitted behaviours experienced levels of disruption as 
a consequence of normal operations. This generalised observation poses a 
number of more interesting questions:  
 Are the observed disruptions symptomatic of supply networks being 
CASs? 
 Are closed networks different to open networks? 
 Is there any significant difference between cases as defined by market 
conditions and permitted behaviours? 
7.3 Research Question 1  
Do supply networks comprising multiple connected supply chains 
experience periods of disruption as a consequence of normal operations? 
This question is framed by an assertion that supply networks behave as CASs 
and therefore are vulnerable to normal accidents as described by NAT. As 
such, the question can be reduced to two testable hypothesises: 
H1: The pattern of cumulative distribution of disruptions experienced 
by a network under any of the permitted behaviours and market 
conditions conforms to an exponential law description 
To understand whether or not the observations can be related to the concept 
that supply networks are CASs it is necessary to estimate the curves of the 
cumulative distributions. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 7-2. 
 
 184 
Table 7-2: Model summary and parameter estimates 
 
 
Scenario Equation Model Summary Parameter 
Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
1 Exponential 0.466 18048.602 1 20713 0.000 667.227 0.000 
2 Exponential 0.663 20762.331 1 10568 0.000 366.282 0.000 
3 Exponential 0.338 7473.901 1 14620 0.000 459.962 0.000 
4 Exponential 0.840 63860.786 1 12177 0.000 398.683 0.000 
5 Exponential 0.748 102687.909 1 34606 0.000 835.818 0.000 
6 Exponential 0.792 192140.930 1 50451 0.000 1179.749 0.000 
7 Exponential 0.813 161755.807 1 37120 0.000 819.785 0.000 
8 Exponential 0.719 105991.962 1 41495 0.000 932.674 0.000 
The dependent variable if CoM 
The independent variable is SumOfMagnitude. 
Table 7-2 shows that the R square value for closed market behaviours is less 
than open market behaviours, an observation that may be indicative of the 
network deviating from the expected behaviour of a CAS, or it could be that the 
permitted behaviour level of analysis is too coarse. A more granular 
examination of deviations from an exponential description shows…..  
The graphical representations were primarily used to establish whether or not 
the network’s experience of disruptions allowed it to be described as a critically 
organised CAS. The initial graphical analysis takes the form of a least squares 
regression approach to curve estimation for each of the 256 treatments. For the 
sake of brevity Table 7-3 reports only those cases where the R Square value is 
less than 0.7 on the basis that the other models provide good fits (an example 
of a more complete set of results is given in Appendix B, although it shoud be 
noted that a full set of results would require in excess of 64 pages). 
 
 
 
 185 
 
Table 7-3: Least squares regression for curve estimation for H2 
 
The coding of the cases detailed in Table 7-3 and Appendix B describes the 
permitted behaviours as the first digit and the second two digits describe the 
market conditions. For instance, case 315 describes permitted behaviours of 
collaboration in a closed market under market structures described by a vertical 
structure (high manufacturing margin, low wholesale margin) and a horizontal 
structure (low price variation for manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers). 
A number of general observations can be made regarding Table 7-3. All but one 
of the poor fit models are cases describing closed markets and the exponential 
description of the phenomenon has the best fit which generally supports the 
theoretical positioning of supply networks as CASs.   
The cumulative distribution of disruptions for the cases summarised in Table 7-3 
are presented in Figure 7—1. Examination of the Figure 7—1 reveals that a 
Case Equation R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1
105 Power .615 713.313 1 446 .000 13860800.991 -1.499
Exponential .500 445.786 1 446 .000 275.057 .000
106 Power .642 2358.797 1 1315 .000 35433460.910 -1.541
Exponential .532 1493.111 1 1315 .000 1009.325 .000
120 Power 0.547 116.906 1 97 0 5316.842 -0.599
Exponential 0.606 149.099 1 97 0 93.856 0
125 Power .200 102.373 1 409 .000 68878.565 -.701
Exponential .269 150.679 1 409 .000 670.278 .000
126 Power .494 534.934 1 549 .000 358776285.167 -1.865
Exponential .509 568.790 1 549 .000 659.567 .000
129 Power .358 619.488 1 1110 .000 139208.487 -.712
Exponential .660 2159.216 1 1110 .000 1977.154 .000
304 Power .338 452.385 1 886 .000 4223005.143 -1.388
Exponential .299 377.683 1 886 .000 558.828 -.001
308 Power .138 132.676 1 831 .000 18516.676 -.478
Exponential .460 709.145 1 831 .000 2940.371 .000
314 Power .689 2087.654 1 944 .000 4233714.848 -1.354
Exponential .597 1400.901 1 944 .000 592.342 .000
315 Power .380 179.799 1 293 .000 5618.155 -.470
Exponential .606 451.473 1 293 .000 368.351 .000
822 Power .695 4299.178 1 1889 0.000 1673511.747 -1.052
Exponential .651 3516.613 1 1889 0.000 1367.576 .000
Model Summary Parameter Estimates
 186 
cumulative distribution of disruptions can be described by a series of steps, 
which whilst following the general pattern of an exponential description with a 
negative coefficient, deviate significantly from the equivalent graphical 
descriptions of open systems. 
 
Figure 7—1: Examples of poor fit cumulative distributions 
One possible explanation for the observed ‘step’ phenomenon in closed 
networks may lie in the way in which the constraints on the closed system drive 
its evolution. In the period immediately after initialisation the network 
participants have the greatest range of suppliers, then as the network evolves 
the number of suppliers is reduced until a state of equilibrium (as opposed to a 
state of far from equilibrium) develops with little or no changes to the population 
or the associated supply risk. As a consequence, the network participants are 
increasingly unlikely to change suppliers and the level of disruption is 
minimised. 
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For the above argument to hold a plot of available suppliers for the closed 
system should reveal a state of equilibrium being attained after a period of time. 
Figure 7—2 shows the supply population dynamics for the exemplar case (105) 
as having a poor curve fitting to either an exponential or power law distribution 
of disruption events. 
 
Figure 7—2: Supplier population profile for poor cumulative distribution fit 
Further examination of closed market cumulative distributions of disruption 
responses reveals that the steps identified in the cases presented above are 
prevalent, although the specific pattern of most cases accepts a ‘good fit’ 
description as an exponential law. This observation is supported further when 
the punctuated equilibrium profiles for closed markets are compared to those of 
open markets, where once again time based comparisons show how closed 
markets tend to states of equilibrium whilst open markets tend to far from 
equilibrium states (Figure 7—3). 
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Figure 7—3: Exemplars of punctuated equilibrium for each permitted behaviour 
In the context of CASs, the substantive difference between power law and 
exponential law descriptions is that the exponential distribution tends to zero 
much quicker than the power law. It is therefore not surprising to find that the 
exponential description is dominant, as the level of disruption in the experiments 
is ultimately constrained by fixed demand. 
Consideration of the characteristic distribution responses for open networks 
reveals cumulative distribution patterns that are a much better fit to exponential 
laws, suggesting that open systems do indeed conform to Baks (1999) definition 
of a critical organisation.  
The observations made above can be statistically supported by considering 
whether or not there is any statistically significant difference between the R 
squared statistic for the curve estimations for open and closed markets.  
This is achieved through a two-step process: firstly the samples are tested for 
homogeneity of variances using Levene’s non-parametric test of homogeneity 
of variances, and secondly by applying the Kruskal-Wallis test for significant 
differences between the ranked means of the sample. The later test assumes 
homogeneity of variance and therefore justifies the first. 
Levene’s non parametric test indicated that there was no significant difference 
in the homogeneity of variance of open and closed markets (f= 8.059 ; p= 
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0.005) and a Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the R squared values for the 
exponential curve estimation of open markets were  significantly higher than the 
R squared values for closed markets (Mdn= 0.954 for open markets), 
U=283592, p= 0.000, r =7945). 
However, it should be noted that the post hoc analysis of the cumulative 
distribution R squared values for closed systems was below 0.7, which when 
considered in the context of the population dynamics and punctuated 
equilibrium suggests that far from being critically organised closed systems 
tended to states of neo equilibrium. 
H1 is therefore retained for open systems where resources can enter and leave 
the system resulting in significantly higher R squared values for the curve 
estimation than closed systems. However, H1 is not retained for closed systems 
where the R squared values were significantly less than those in the open 
network and states of neo-equilibrium were observed. 
The implications of this finding are significant as the traditional 
conceptualisation of supply chains and some supply networks is that of a closed 
network where resources do not enter or exit the network. The results here 
show that such a network will tend towards a state of equilibrium. However, if 
resources do in fact enter and exit the network (new suppliers are formed and 
others become inefficient and exit) then the system is maintained far from 
equilibrium in a critical state and will experience significant disruptions as a 
consequence of nothing more than normal operations. 
This is not to say that supply chain conceptualisations are inappropriate; they 
have provided the sound basis on which the practice of supply chain 
management responds to the dynamics of the market. However, when 
considering the balance between efficiency and risk mitigation ,and in particular 
the mitigation of systemic network risk, the findings of the experiment suggest 
openness of the network should be taken into account. 
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The next two research questions were formulated to develop a deeper 
understanding of two parameters on a supply network’s vulnerability to 
disruption as a consequence of normal operations. 
7.4 Research Question 2 
What is the impact of market structure on the level of disruption 
experienced by networks? 
The second research question is formed from the theory describing CASs which 
posits that the disruption response of a CAS, and therefore a supply network, is 
sensitive to initial conditions. This can be framed by the following hypothesises 
H2: there is no difference in the magnitude of disruptions experienced by 
networks with different market conditions in any of the permitted agent 
behaviours combinations considered 
As with the previous hypothesis, the results for each permitted behavioural 
block are first tested for heterogeneity of variance. Three blocks of permitted 
behaviours showed a significant difference between the differences of ranked 
means of variation according to Levene’s non-parametric test for heterogeneity. 
A post hoc Tukey analysis found that in all these cases only one homogenous 
grouping was identified  
Table 7-4: Levene’s and Kruskal-Wallis test results for H2 
 
Levene’s non parametric test indicated that there was no significant difference 
in the homogeneity of variance of open and closed markets (f= 8.059 ; p= 
0.005) and a Mann-Whitney U test indicated the R squared values for the 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig Null Hypothesis Sig Outcome
Post Hoc Pairwise 
Comparisons
1 18681.854 31 602.640 1.209 .231 N/A 0.452 N/A
2 14943.616 31 482.052 .981 .504 N/A 0.678 N/A
3 17325.692 31 558.893 1.229 .212 N/A 0.05 N/A
4 22227.008 31 717.000 1.529 .053 N/A 0.609 N/A
5 23834.751 31 768.863 2.074 .003
Only 1 homogenous 
subgroup identified 0.592 N/A
6
17375.740 31 560.508 1.180 .258 N/A
0.048
Reject the null 
hypotheis
7
25145.887 31 811.158 1.633 .031
Only 1 homogenous 
subgroup identified 0.524 N/A
8 24341.479 31 785.209 1.73 0.019
Only 1 homogenous 
subgroup identified 0.867 N/A
P
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d
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Levenes Test
Post Hoc Tukey Results
Kruskal-Wallis
The distribution of 
total magnitude of 
disruptions is the 
same across all 
market conditions
Retain the null 
hypothesis
Retain the null 
hypothesis
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exponential curve estimation of open markets were  significantly higher than the 
R Squared values for closed markets (Mdn= 0.954 for open markets), 
U=283592 , p= 0.000, r =7945). 
Subsequent Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric testing found only one permitted 
behaviour indicated a significant difference in the magnitudes of disruption 
across the different market conditions (Mdn= 0.954 for open markets), 
U=283592 , p= 0.000, r =7945). Subsequent post hoc Kruskal-Wallis with 
Bonferroni correction testing indicated no significant difference in the magnitude 
of disruptions for the different market conditions for these permitted behaviours 
(Mdn= 0.954 for open markets), U=283592 , p= 0.000, r =7945). 
Whilst the above analysis addresses total disruptions experienced over a 1000 
simulated period it does not compare the characteristics of the disruptions 
experienced. Unfortunately, the closed market cumulative distribution of 
disruptions does not follow an exponential law description and comparisons 
between the variation in exponents and constants is precluded. 
It therefore follows that H2 is accepted and no significant effect on the total 
magnitude of disruptions experienced by the network over a 100 day simulated 
period can be established.  
7.5  Research Question 3 
What is the impact of price competition and collaboration between supply 
chain participants on the level of disruption experienced by the network? 
CAS theory also predicates that agency, and therefore behaviour, is an 
important mechanism in determining the system or network’s disruption 
response. This can be formally stated as: 
H3: There is no significant difference between the magnitudes of 
disruptions experienced by networks with different permitted behaviour 
across all the considered market conditions. 
The above hypothesis can be tested by a similar process to those used to test 
the previous hypothesises and he results are summarised in Table 7-5. 
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Table 7-5: Least squares regression for curve estimation for H2 
 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances showed that in all cases except one 
the cases could be defined by no more than two homogenous groups, 
permitting constrained testing using the Kruskal-Wallis test for significant 
differences in the ranked means. Before considering the analysis of the groups 
with homogeneity of variance, it is worthwhile examining the exception to the 
general observation. 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig Post Hoc Tukey Results Null Hypothesis Sig Outcome
Post Hoc Pairwise 
Comparisons
1
541.312 7 77.330 8.890 .000
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0.001 2-6; 2-5
2 111.452 7 15.922 .707 .666 0.002 1-6; 2-6
3
570.780 7 81.540 6.453 .000
3 homogenous groups 
identified 0.012
No significant 
differences identified
4 172.284 7 24.612 1.590 .174 0 3-6; 1-6
5 144.252 7 20.607 1.092 .392 0.001 1-6; 3-6; 1-5; 3-5
6 329.020 7 47.003 1.932 .097 0.009 3-6;
7
267.490 7 38.213 4.646 .001
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0 3-6;
8
312.188 7 44.598 1.641 .160
0.014
No significant 
differences identified
9 285.084 7 40.726 1.777 .127 0.004 2-6; 1-6
10
316.864 7 45.266 3.250 .010
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0.001 1-6;
11
306.544 7 43.792 3.184 .011
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0 2-7; 2-6; 1-6
12
242.300 7 34.614 1.132 .368
0.011
No significant 
differences identified
13
353.276 7 50.468 3.335 .009
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0.001 3-5; 3-6
14
346.880 7 49.554 2.490 .037
1 homogenous group 
identified 0.019
No significant 
differences identified
15 437.052 7 62.436 3.16 0.012
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0.006 2-6
16 147.964 7 21.138 .791 .600 0.016 1-6
17 123.248 7 17.607 1.299 .283 0 3-5; 3-6; 1-6
18 516.976 7 73.854 3.87 0.004
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0.006 2-6
19
372.336 7 53.191 2.968 .016
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0.002 3-6; 2-6
20 259.708 7 37.101 1.928 .097 0.001 1-6; 2-6
21 320.512 7 45.787 1.574 .179 0.019 3-6; 2-6
22
255.612 7 36.516 1.323 .272
0.006
No significant 
differences identified
23
512.832 7 73.262 4.033 .003
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0.016 3-6
24 153.404 7 21.915 2.069 .076 0 2-7; 2-6; 1-7; 1-6
25 237.680 7 33.954 2.140 .067 0 3-8; 3-6; 1-6; 2-6
26 269.084 7 38.441 1.869 .108 0.001 3-6; 3-5; 1-5
27
346.076 7 49.439 3.185 .011
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0.023 1-6
28 223.932 7 31.990 2.016 .084 0 3-8; 2-8
29 223.292 7 31.899 1.536 .191 0.001 3-6; 2-6
30
258.300 7 36.900 3.582 .006
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0 1-7; 1-6; 3-6
31
314.752 7 44.965 4.676 .001
2 homogenous groups 
identified 0 3-5; 3-6; 2-6
32
314.752 7 44.965 4.676 .001
6 homogenous groups 
identified
Levenes Test Kruskal-Wallis
M
ar
ke
t 
 C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s
Reject the null 
hypotheis
The distribution of 
total magnitude of 
disruptions is the 
same across all 
permitted 
behaviours
No comparison of means possible
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Levene’s non parametric test indicated that there was a significant difference in 
the homogeneity of variance for market conditions 32. The inference of this 
result is that in the context of these market conditions the variation in total 
disruption across the range of permitted behaviours is significant and not 
suitable for analysis using the Kruskal –Wallis test for significant differences.  
Considerate of the disruption response generated by market conditions 32 
inspection of Table 7-5 suggests three immediate observations: 1) market 
conditions 22 shows no significant difference in mean rankings; 2) permitted 
behaviours 6 dominates the comparisons for significant differences in 
disruptions; and 3) market conditions 28 is the only exception to the previous 
observation as it contains a significant difference in disruption responses 
described by contrasting permitted behaviours 8 with 2 and 3. Further 
examination of the full set of results confirms the preliminary observations with 
permitted behaviours 6 and 8 experiencing significantly higher magnitudes of 
disruption than a range of closed network permitted behaviours in all but 2 
cases. Furthermore, examination of the ranked means for market conditions 32 
shows that permitted behaviour 6 also has the highest ranked mean of 
disruptions for that case. 
Inspection of the cumulative distributions of disruption for market conditions 22 
(Figure 7—4) does not directly challenge the dominance of permitted 
behaviours as the context in which the greatest magnitude of disruptions are 
found. 
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Figure 7—4: Experiment 2 cumulative distributions of disruption for market 
conditions 22 
A similar inspection of the cumulative distributions of disruption for market 
conditions 28 (Error! Reference source not found.) reveals a similar narrative 
ith little observable difference between the disruption response for permitted 
behaviours 6 and 8. However, this analysis also draws attention to the fact that 
permitted behaviours 8 reflects open markets with no collaboration and no price 
competition, highlighting the significance of the open market element of both 
permitted behaviours 6 and 8. 
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Figure 7—5: Experiment 2 cumulative distributions of disruption for market 
conditions 28 
The experiment also identified five market conditions where there were no 
significant differences between the disruption responses for the different 
permitted behaviours (market conditions 3, 7, 12, 14, and 22).   
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Figure 7—6: Experiment 2 total magnitude of diruptions market conditions 3 
Examination of the boxplot in Figure 7—6 helps identify why no significant 
differences between the total magnitude of disruptions were detected. A number 
of outliers can be identified that draw the ranked means of the samples closer 
together. It would be inappropriate to remove these outliers; however, it is 
observable that if they did not exist then it is likely that significant differences 
between the samples are likely. Examination of the boxplots for market 
conditions 8, 12, 14 and 22 reveal similar characteristics.  
Experiment 2 therefore supports the rejection of H3, establishing that permitted 
behaviour produces significant differences in disruption across all the market 
conditions considered in the experiment. In particular, the experiment illustrates 
that permitted behaviours of collaboration and price competition in open 
markets results in the highest levels of disruption. 
Consideration of the cumulative distributions also highlights the nature of the 
disruptions in the context of the total disruptions experienced. That is to say 
how significant are the differences in disruption responses at different levels of 
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magnitude? Are the differences a result of a few large or many small 
disruptions? 
Figure 7—7 presents the cumulative distribution for the significantly different 
totals for market conditions 1, 9, 11, 15, 18, 19, and 24, all of which contrast 
with permitted behaviours 2 and 6. A number of observations can be made from 
this graph which helps to characterise the nature of disruptions. The first is that 
the permitted behaviours yielded between 3.25 and 13.5 days when disruptions 
exceeded between 25 and 50% of the total flows. The second is that the closed 
network didn’t experience large disruptions because it tended to an equilibrium 
state in which the population was less than the initial population of suppliers. 
The third is that the proportion of days in which between 25 and 50% of the 
network material flows were rerouted ranged between 1 and 10%. Similar 
observations were made of the other market conditions where significant 
differences in total magnitude of disruptions were detected. 
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Figure 7—7: Cumulative distribution of disruptions comparing permitted 
behaviour blocks 2 and 6  
Experiment 2 has highlighted significant differences in total magnitude of 
disruption across a number of contrasting permitted behaviours. Examination of 
the cumulative distribution of the disruptions for these contrasting cases 
highlights the difference between the permitted behaviours in the various 
market condition contexts. 
7.6 Summary of Results 
Table 7-6 summarises the results in the contexts of the research questions and 
the derived testable hypothesises. 
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Table 7-6: Summary of results 
Research 
Question 
Hypothesis Accepted/ 
Rejected 
Comment 
Do supply 
networks 
comprising 
multiple 
connected supply 
chains 
experience 
periods of 
disruption as a 
consequence of 
normal 
operations? 
 
H1: The pattern of 
cumulative 
distribution of 
disruptions 
experienced by a 
network under any 
of the permitted 
behaviours and 
market conditions 
conforms to an 
exponential law 
description 
 
Accepted 
for open 
networks, 
rejected 
for closed 
networks 
Open networks are 
critically organised and 
maintained in far from 
equilibrium states. As 
such they experience 
more disruptions of all 
magnitudes than closed 
networks 
Closed networks tend 
towards population 
equilibrium and 
experience fewer 
disruptions 
What is the 
impact of market 
structure on the 
level of disruption 
experienced by 
networks? 
 
H2: there is no 
difference in the 
magnitude of 
disruptions 
experienced by 
networks with 
different market 
conditions in any 
of the permitted 
agent behaviours 
combinations 
considered 
 
Accepted Market structure does 
not have any significant 
effect on the level of 
disruption experienced 
in any of the permitted 
behaviour 
configurations 
What is the 
impact of price 
competition and 
collaboration 
between supply 
chain participants 
on the level of 
disruption 
experienced by 
the network? 
 
H3: There is no 
significant 
difference between 
the magnitudes of 
disruptions 
experienced by 
networks with 
different permitted 
behaviour across 
all the considered 
market conditions. 
Rejected Permitted behaviour of 
collaboration and price 
competition results in 
significantly higher 
levels of disruption than 
alternative permitted 
behaviours in all the 
market conditions 
considered 
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7.6.1 Research Question 1 
7.6.1.1 Observation 1 
The generalised description of the results showed that supply networks of 
interconnected supply chains experience disruptions as a consequence of 
normal operations, the minimum considered scope of which was the agent’s 
consideration of risk in the development of supply strategy in closed markets. 
Even at the minimal levels of permitted behaviours 25-50% of the network flows 
are being re-organised for 3% of the operational days. 
7.6.1.2 Observation 2 
The nature of the disruptions experienced by the network can be differentiated 
by closed and open markets. Closed markets tend towards an equilibrium state 
of organisation with steady populations of supply whilst open markets are 
maintained in a critical far from equilibrium state by the flows of suppliers into 
and out of the market. 
7.6.2 Research question 2  
7.6.2.1 Observation 
No statistically significant difference was detected in the networks disruption 
response as a consequence of market conditions. 
7.6.3 Research Question 3 
7.6.3.1 Observation 1 
Open markets experienced higher levels of total disruption than closed markets. 
Furthermore, they also experienced more frequent disruptions at all magnitudes 
of disruption.  
7.6.3.2 Observation 2 
Permitted behaviours of collaboration and price competition produced the 
highest total magnitude of disruption, although there was no significant 
difference in the descriptor of the cumulative distributions of disruptions. The 
inference of this last point is that whilst open systems can be described as 
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critically organised, the nature of this organisation and the permitted behaviours 
cannot be differentiated by this characterisation.  
7.7 Discussion 
This thesis has used CAS theory as the foundation for conceptualising supply 
networks. The results of the experiments are significant in that they illustrate the 
difference between the more traditional supply chain conceptualisation and the 
broader more dynamic networks.  The agents use a few simple rules to 
determine their actions: 
1. Manage inventory by optimising the balance between uncertainty of 
demand and inventory holding 
2. Establish a supply strategy that reflects the risk of supply 
3. Select suppliers using five criteria, the importance of which is dependent 
on the utilisation of capacity and supply risk 
4. Fulfil orders placed 
5. Optimise capacity utilisation 
These five rules are all drawn from existing theory and are validated by practice; 
in fact, many have been formulated using the more static conceptualisation of 
the supply chain. CAS theory has been used as a lens through which to view 
supply chains by a number of scholars (Bode et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2001a; 
Surana et al., 2005; Nair et al., 2009; Greening and Rutherford, 2011; 2011a; 
Allen et al., 2006). Although a few researchers have operationalised the 
fundamental aspects of autonomous supply chain management into agent 
based models there are notable exceptions (Nair and Vidal, 2011; Brintrup, 
2010; Chang and Harrington, 2000; Allen et al., 2006). Furthermore, the 
combined impact of these autonomous management activities on the dynamics 
of the network have not previously been assessed in the context of disruptions.  
Examination of the extant literature also reveals conceptualisations that accept 
critical organisation but understate the role openness plays in the 
conceptualisation of supply networks as CAS. For instance Choi et al.’s (2001a) 
seminal paper describing supply chains as CASs  accepts that supply networks 
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exist in far from equilibrium states but neglects the mechanism by which this is 
maintained. Prigogine (1997)  recognised that the far from equilibrium state can 
only exist in open systems which provide a flow of resources into and out of the 
system.  
Understanding complexity is difficult, as Pathak (2007a)  reminds us in quoting 
Amaral and Uzzi (2007): 
“In contrast to simple systems, such as the pendulum, which has a 
small number of well-understood components, or complicated 
systems, such as Boeing jet, which have many components that 
interact through predefined coordination rules (Perrow, 1999), 
complex systems typically have many components that can 
autonomously interact through emergent rules. In management 
contexts, complex systems arise whenever there are populations of 
interacting agents that can act on their limited and local information. 
The agents and the larger system in which they are embedded 
operate by trading their resources without the aid of a central control 
mechanism or even a clear understanding of how actions of (possibly 
distant) agents can affect them.” 
Naturally extant knowledge provides the base from which new theory can make 
advances. In this context earlier work on supply networks as CASs provides the 
foundation for this research which seeks to advance the current theory by 
incorporating network openness as a means of generating criticality and 
understanding the phenomena of disruptions as a consequence of normal 
operations. 
Whilst conceptually it is accepted that supply networks permit new entrants and 
the exiting of old, few models have been designed that reflect this aspect of 
complexity. Some models reflect death (e.g. (Nair and Vidal, 2011; Brintrup, 
2010) but very few birth. This limited acceptance of a supply network tends to a 
population equilibrium and limits the extent to which the network can become 
critically organised. Furthermore, closed systems are not generally reflective of 
the supply network environment: it is the intent of all suppliers to displace 
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incumbent suppliers for their own advantage. This research shows that when 
agents are allowed to exit the system (death) but are not replaced by new 
agents, then the system tends towards a state of population equilibrium and 
away from a critically organised state.  
The fact that CASs are sensitive to initial conditions and are path dependent 
makes their understanding problematic. However, their critical organisation and 
other properties can be considered fundamental and characterise the system 
(Bak, 1999). Fundamental structures persist over a wide range of conditions 
and the analysis of the experimental data generated by this research shows that 
collaboration and price competition in open markets create significantly more 
disruptions in nearly all the market conditions evaluated. The openness of 
supply networks is therefore critical in allowing a new fundamental structure to 
start to emerge: collaboration and price competition in open markets resulting in 
significantly higher magnitudes of total disruption.  
In identifying this structure some components of the mechanism that causes the 
phenomenon are exposed; in particular, the combination of price competition 
and collaboration. Whilst this thesis stops short of a detailed examination of how 
these components combine to develop disruptions logical arguments can be 
formed to explain the observations.  
7.7.1 Price Competition and Collaboration 
Collaboration requires commitment and trust between parties allowing 
organisations to design their interactions based on an assumption that both 
parties will preference the relationship above alternatives (Hunt and Morgan, 
1994). Expressed differently, this amounts to increased inertia, a phenomenon 
that is established in the extant literature (Huxham and Vangen, 2004; 
Yanamandram and White, 2010). In contrast, competitive pricing is designed to 
disrupt relationships by displacing incumbent suppliers through increasing the 
attractiveness of the alternatives, and positions collaboration and competition as 
opposing forces. In this context it is possible to argue that competition dampens 
the inertia of collaborative relationships, yet the results of the experiments 
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suggest otherwise with the combination of collaboration and price competition in 
open markets resulting in significantly higher magnitudes of disruption. 
If collaboration could exist in isolation from price competition then supply 
networks would gravitate towards neo equilibrium. New entrants would find it 
difficult to displace existing suppliers without being permitted to increase their 
attractiveness through aggressive pricing. Instead, they would have to compete 
by increasing their attractiveness through the other supplier selection criteria, 
such as reliable delivery, shorter lead times, financial stability, or flexibility. All of 
these criteria are to some extent dependent on variables outside the control of 
the focal agent. Reliable delivery is a function of uncertainty in demand, which 
decreases with attractiveness. Shorter lead times is largely a function of 
location relative to the buying organisation, while financial stability is a 
consequence of attractiveness as well as a driver of it, and flexibility is a 
reflection of the willingness of an agent to collaborate. Of course organisations 
can take actions to improve the attractiveness of any of these variables but the 
effectiveness of these interventions is moderated by externalities, whereas price 
competition is directly controlled by the supplier and also impacts financial 
stability, and through third order effects dependency flexibility. 
Collaboration distorts attractiveness by potentially maintaining buyer supplier 
relationships which are uncompetitive. Inflating the attractiveness of any 
supplier creates a feedback which increases the supplier’s financial stability and 
reliability (as demand uncertainty is reduced by multiple buyers and shared 
demand information). This virtuous circle implies collaborating suppliers can 
become more attractive to the population as a whole. 
The benefits of collaboration have particular potency in static environments, 
where competitors do not react and new entrants are not permitted. However, in 
open systems that permit competitive pricing, agents can (within the confines of 
market structures) discover strategies that overwhelm the attractiveness of 
collaboration. In such circumstances the incumbent supplier is constrained in its 
own response to challenge by its own well utilised capacity.  
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Successful collaborating suppliers can meet the challenge of new suppliers by 
investing in new capacity based on an assumption that they will remain 
attractive. This investment decision is cached in terms of balancing the 
commitment of existing buyers with the need to protect existing relationships by 
maintaining the existing character of the operation. This phenomenon has 
assumed the popular description of the ‘competency trap’. However, the nature 
of open markets ensures that there is a constant stream of competitors with 
business propositions that differentiate them from the incumbents; 
consequently, it is likely that eventually the incumbents succumb to the 
challenges and are usurped as suppliers. When incumbent suppliers are 
replaced the magnitude of the disruption depends on the how successful the 
incumbent supplier was: the more successful the previous supplier the bigger 
the magnitude of disruption when they are replaced. 
This mechanism of inertia building a competency trap for the incumbent 
suppliers has received some attention in the academic literature and can be 
observed generally in the rise of the internet firm Amazon usurping traditional 
book shops, or the rise of electronically distributed music usurping compact 
discs and magnetic tapes. 
This research made a simplifying assumption that agents would not be 
permitted to invest in extra capacity because the decisions to do so are 
complicated and drive the modelling process towards full economic models. 
However, the observations made suggest that if the model reflected the process 
of successful incumbent suppliers investing in extra capacity adequately, then 
the observed phenomenon may reduce in frequency but increase in magnitude, 
inferring that the findings remain robust. 
The findings differentiate between closed and open markets suggesting that 
closed markets, whilst still experiencing disruptions, experience a much lower 
magnitude of disruptions. Closed markets represent high barriers to entry, and 
their tendency to consolidate into configurations that sustain equilibrium are 
characteristic of oligopolies or monopolies. In this respect the experiment’s 
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comparison between open and closed markets is really a reflection of the open 
markets and monopolies/oligopolies (Williamson, 1991).   
7.7.2 Initial Market Conditions 
The research has also shown that the initial conditions of the network specified 
by a framework of market structure have no significant effect on the magnitude 
of disruptions. Discussion of this observation must start with an understanding 
of how the market conditions are used within the model and how this relates to 
the operations of supply chains.  
Within the model market conditions do two things: 1) they specify the average 
price for each tier of the supply market; and 2) they specify the range within 
which the agents are permitted to modify their price.  
The market conditions reflect the reality that products are manufactured from 
raw materials, the cost of which is reflected in the process of extracting the raw 
materials. The subsequent conversion of raw materials into products requires 
resources, which infers that the product can be offered to the market at a price 
that sustains the extraction, conversion and subsequent distribution. At each 
stage business are only sustainable if they generate surplus revenues or profits. 
By setting the average intake price (raw material price) and the selling price it is 
possible to set the prices for manufacturers and wholesalers (this was specified 
in section 6.1.4.1).  
The agents modify their prices within the constraints set out by the market 
conditions in response to whether or not their capacity is under or over utilised. 
This establishes pricing as a dynamic within the model constrained by 
boundaries, and the inference of the observations is that the boundaries have 
no impact on model behaviour.  
It is conceivable that when agents are provided with a large range within which 
to price their products they may never have to price at the boundaries. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that they quickly reach the limit of their 
permitted pricing resulting in no further changes until their context changes and 
they are motivated to modify their prices away from the current limit.  
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Unfortunately, the model did not collect data relating to the pricing adopted by 
the agents and therefore no data exists to prove or disprove the mechanisms 
described here. However, parameterisation of pricing across the tiers was 
considered by the author and the validating panel to be realistic in terms of the 
margins generated and the overlap permitted between tiers. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that agents who were permitted to change prices generated 
significantly higher magnitudes of total disruption than those that did not, thus 
inferring that permission to change prices impacted agent behaviour in terms of 
supplier selection and switching. 
The most likely explanation is that any impact of market structure constraints on 
model behaviour is overwhelmed by the other dynamics contained in the model, 
and as a consequence, agents did not find the limits of pricing imposed on them 
to be restrictive resulting in no significant effect being detected. This represents 
a potential area of further work but is unlikely to detract from the findings 
regarding the impact of collaboration, and price competition in open markets.  
7.7.3 Supply Chain Risk Management 
The extant literature that considers supply chain disturbances as an 
endogenous risk generally advocates collaboration as a process that facilitates 
information sharing to sharpen the demand signal, reduce overall inventory, and 
increase responsiveness.  However, there is very little literature that considers 
the impact of collaboration on what has generally been framed as exogenous 
risk. 
This research suggests that whilst there are undoubted benefits in terms of 
collaboration sharpening the demand signal facilitating inventory reduction, 
there are a number of implicit assumptions that exclude consideration of the 
wider implications. The most substantial of these is that decisions made within 
the supply chain have no consequences outside it.  
This research exposes a persistent paradox that whilst collaboration delivers 
beneficial reductions in inventory and increased responsiveness in the 
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‘business as usual’ context, it is also a significant factor in increasing risk 
associated with disruptions as opposed to disturbances.  
In doing so the findings deliver a degree of predictability to a phenomenon that 
previously was unpredictable; if supply networks are open with price 
competition then collaboration significantly increases the risk of disruption. The 
increased levels of risk, when compared to traditional supply chain 
conceptualisations where supply strategy and collaboration are used as means 
by which supply risk is mitigated, are between 3 and 7 times greater when 
expressed as the number of days on which between 25 and 50% of the material 
flows are re-organised. 
Several studies have highlighted how globalisation has increased the risk of 
disturbance in a supply chain (Bode et al., 2011; Greening and Rutherford, 
2011; 2011a; Tapiero and Grando, 2008; Arnold et al., 2010a). Logically this is 
inevitable: lead times and extended geography increases order size which is 
amplified as the demand information flows up the supply chain in the form of 
orders creating amplified demand uncertainty (). At the same time businesses 
are pressurised to reduce inventory increasing the coupling of the supply 
network. These observations are supported by a number of surveys: 
“[a] study of 138 global firms by the Aberdeen Group …….. found 99 
per cent had been affected by at least one incident in their supply 
chain over the past 12 months. In addition, 58 per cent of the 
respondents said they had incurred financial losses as a result of the 
disruption.” 
Aberdeen Group (2008) 
“Over 70 per cent of organisations reported at least one supply chain 
disruption in 2012, with 39 per cent of disruption originating from a 
tier below the immediate supplier. “  
BCI (2012) 
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“Efficient supply chain design works well when the environment is 
stable and predictable but the vulnerabilities are clearly on show 
when the environment becomes volatile and uncertain.”  
CIPS CEO David Noble (2009) (2011) 
If organisations are to operate in these liberal global markets it makes sense 
based on the analysis contained in this research to design risk mitigation 
strategies that reflect the systemic risk rooted in collaboration and competition. 
The design of these strategies is beyond the scope of this research; however, 
the findings suggest that successful strategies will undoubtedly have to 
embrace dynamism, critical organisation and emergence.  
This will require the extension of current flexible/agile supply chain strategies to 
include proactive de-coupling triggered by heightened contextual awareness. 
Simulations of the type performed by this thesis may well provide industry with a 
new tool to map context and strategy in a virtual world. The ability to explore 
quickly emerging competitive landscapes will require refined sensing abilities 
and the technological capability to articulate these in simulations where the 
robustness of alternative strategies can be evaluated.  
Kraljic’s (1983) portfolio approach to supply strategy still has tenancy in the 
world of supply networks. However, it may be viewed through the alternative 
lens of this research which places a subtly different emphasis on various 
aspects. For instance, Kraljic placed considerable emphasis on developing 
strategies that sought to increase the buyer’s power over the seller, which in 
many cases involves increasing the dependency of the supplier on the buyer. 
This research exposes the need to be cognisant of the impact of dependency 
on the dynamics of relationships and within the broader context of the supply 
network. Any strategy that increases the motivation for firms to collaborate in 
markets other than oligopolies and monopolies is likely to result in a significant 
increase in supply disruption, which Kraljic (1983) framed as supply risk. If 
Kraljic’s purchasing strategy framework is used naively then it entertains the 
possibility of generating a vicious circle, where deepening collaboration 
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generates periodic episodes (punctuated equilibrium) of more supply disruption 
generating deeper collaboration. 
This research suggests that the purchasing strategies developed by Kraljic 
(1983) should be coupled with a broader consideration of the supply risks those 
strategies may generate, situating purchasing strategy as a more dynamic 
process incorporated into the broader aspects of risk management and 
business continuity planning. The intelligent implementation of Kraljic’s 
purchasing portfolio approach should include consideration of how dependency 
can be balanced with the ability of competitors to price aggressively. If Kraljic’s 
(1983) portfolio approach to purchasing strategy is implemented naively then 
this research suggests that collaborative or high dependency strategies are 
likely to result in a network being vulnerable to disruptions. 
The findings fundamentally modify the approaches to developing appropriate 
supply chain risk management strategies by identifying previously unknown 
risks associated with collaboration, requiring these to be balanced with the 
established benefits.  
7.7.4 Normal Accident Theory 
The empirical foundation of NAT is that of complex tightly coupled technology 
occasionally presenting novel unpredicted configurations, for which there is no 
contingency. These unpredictable events sometimes trigger human 
interventions, which because there is no prepared design can amplify the 
consequences of the original technological event generating more novel 
presentations and more interventions. In effect the systems become emergent 
and critically organised. It is not surprising therefore to find considerable overlap 
between CST and NAT. However, the complexity referred to in NAT is not 
agency based.  
Supply networks are essentially tightly coupled complex social systems, similar 
to the technological systems described by NAT; however, they can be 
differentiated by the presence of agency, transforming them from complex 
systems into the more specific CASs. CASs require the lens of NAT to be 
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modified to accept that problematic novel configurations can emerge in social, 
as well as technological systems. This extension of the NAT conceptualisation 
is made easier by the descriptions of interactions in terms of rules that behave 
as mechanisms, albeit with higher levels of uncertainty. 
The research reveals that social supply networks experience episodes of 
disruption as a consequence of unpredictable presentations of agent system 
states, which aligns with Perrow’s (1999) definition of tightly coupled complex 
systems and the frameworks of NAT as described in Chapter 2. 
Even without adaptive capabilities supply networks exhibit the properties of a 
system that might experience normal accidents – tight coupling generated by 
inventory reduction strategies, shared modes, unfamiliar feedback loops, and 
multiple interactions. However, the introduction of agency only serves to 
increase complexity by blurring dependencies and redesigning relationships. 
Furthermore, the increased commitment associated with collaboration increases 
coupling, whilst price competition and openness increases the level of 
information to be processed resulting in increased complexity. 
These research findings extend normal accident theory and apply its framework 
to the social aspects of adaptation in supply networks. In doing so the findings 
align with the agency–free framework already established by Perrow (1999) but 
also draws the framework towards HRO theory. 
One question that emerges from the findings is: 
If supply network disruptions are an inevitable consequence of complexity 
and coupling then what interventions can be taken to mitigate the risk of 
disruptions? 
The answer to this question lies beyond the immediate scope of this research; 
however, the financial imperative of inventory minimisation (inferring 
collaboration) precludes the obvious answer of de-coupling the network by 
increasing inventory buffers. In this context the first and third principles of HRO 
may have particular relevance in requiring organisations to have a pre-
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occupation with the potential of disruption and to develop elevated levels of 
sensitivity in operations. 
7.8 Summary 
The results show that networks with permitted agent behaviours of collaboration 
and price competition in open markets experience significantly higher levels of 
disruptions than the networks with alternative permitted behaviours. 
Furthermore, open networks are shown to experience significantly greater 
magnitudes of disruption than closed networks. 
The results also showed that market conditions did not have any significant 
effect on the level of disruptions experienced by the network in any of the 
market structures considered. 
Finally, the results showed that closed networks tend to states of supply 
population equilibrium, whilst open networks are maintained in far from 
equilibrium states. 
As the each experiment generated 1000 lines of data it is impractical to include 
the 1.2M lines of results, however a sample collection of data is provided in 
Appendix C 
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8 Conclusions and Further Work 
This research is primarily motivated by observations of how disruptions flow 
along pathways that connect adjacent supply chains. When lightning struck the 
Phillips microchip plant in Albuquerque Ericsson’s original supply chain 
disruptions were amplified by the actions of Nokia in the adjacent but connected 
supply chain. Although other cases were presented in chapter 1 this simple 
observation highlights two important characteristics: 1) connectivity allows 
disruptions and the consequential actions of others to flow across networks 
impacting multiple supply chains and 2) firms within supply networks act 
autonomously according to their perceptions of context and environment. 
The significance of disruption is generally supported by various supply chain 
risk surveys such as the 2012 Business Continuity Institute’s (2012):  
 “39% of analysed disruptions originated below the immediate tier 1 
supplier, underscoring the second consecutive year the deep-rooted 
nature of disruption” 
Furthermore disruptions are not uncommon; in 2008 the Aberdeen group (2008)  
reported that:  
“ ….99 per cent [of firms surveyed] had been affected by at least one 
incident in their supply chain over the past 12 months “  
Chapter 1 set out the context of disruptions in detail; however It appears that 
despite practitioner awareness of how connectedness and complexity can 
combine to present significant supply chain risk, managers are still grappling 
with how best to mitigate that risk. 
Chapter 2 set out the theories that underpin the supply network dynamic 
conceptualisation: 
Two theoretical bases combine to provide a theoretical framework underpinning 
the phenomena described above: CAS theory and NAT. 
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CST identifies two important characteristics of complex systems relating to the 
process by which the system experiences episodes of significant reorganisation 
(punctuated equilibrium) (Bak, 1999). The first of these is critical organisation 
which can otherwise be described as sensitivity to conditions, small changes 
may or may not (dependent on the states of all the system components) result 
in unpredictable transitions to new levels of organization. The second 
characteristic is the fundamental mechanism of inertia, which is central to the 
generation of criticality (Bak, 1999) . 
Both CST and NAT draw on complexity as a mechanism by which unique, 
unpredicted and un-designed configurations of the system are generated. 
However CST unpicks the mechanisms of transitions to expose inertia as a 
crucial component in the generation of re-organization/disruption. 
CAS theory extends the framework of CST to incorporate autonomous adaptive 
agents and in doing so increases the complexity but becomes more 
representative of supply networks where firms act autonomously under 
conditions of bounded rationality to mitigate risk and maximise profit. This 
results in a structure that is constantly shifting as a consequence of 
autonomous actions. 
By positioning supply networks within the CAS theoretical framework where 
organisations act to minimise inventory and increase coupling between 
suppliers and buyers, we are forced to ask whether the basic tenants of NAT 
still apply: do tight coupling and complexity combine in a fundamental structure 
that inevitably presents unique unpredictable configurations where coincident 
disturbances combine to generate disruptions as a consequence of nothing 
more than normal operations  
Critical to this question is the understanding of what is meant by normal 
operations. This can be defined through examination of the extant literature 
describing supply chain management. 5 rules are drawn from the literature 
underpinned by theories of TCE and SET as an abstraction of the supply chain 
co-ordination of material flows across organisational boundaries.  These rules 
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also embrace the fundamental principle that firms compete to access limited 
resources in order to create advantage. The fundamental rules are: 
 inventory management 
 risk management 
 maximise capacity utilisation 
 fulfil orders 
 and select suppliers 
The operational framework of normal operations demonstrates how these rules 
accept an agents particular perception of supply risk to develop supply strategy, 
prioritise supplier selection criteria and manage relationships. Risk and risk 
perceptions are therefore a fundamental input into the mechanisms by which 
the dynamics of supply networks are generated and maintained. Furthermore 
risk provides an important input into the decision-making process regarding 
whether or not agents should choose to invest resources into developing trust 
and commitment to enable collaboration (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), which is 
recognised in the literature to develop relational inertia (Kim et al., 2006). 
Of equal note amongst the cadre of supply chain management practices is that 
of inventory minimisation, not least because this increases the coupling 
between organisations whilst accelerating the flow of both information, material 
and therefore disruption. The consequences of inventory management are 
framed by NAT which posits that complexity removes traceability and coupling 
increases the likelihood of events coinciding to create bigger events or in the 
case of this thesis disruptions.  This conceptualisation develops a crucial 
argument: the complexity of overlapping supply chains with multitudinous firms 
and connections disguises sources of disturbances which when coincident 
overwhelm the tightly coupled but economically efficient inventory buffers to 
become a disruption transmitted in a domino effect across the various network 
pathways. 
The locating of supply networks and their dynamics in a frame of NAT and CAS 
theory sets the context for the overarching question posed in this research: 
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How do network structures evolve to develop or dissipate sources of 
network risk as a consequence of normal supply chain operations in 
the context of competing risk and competitive advantage seeking 
strategies? 
Which has been alternatively framed as 3, more specific research 
questions, the first of which is: 
Do supply networks comprising multiple connected supply chains 
experience periods of disruption as a consequence of normal 
operations? 
Consideration of the role inertia plays in critical organization directs a reflection 
of whether or not inertia generating and inertia destroying behaviours of 
collaboration and price competition results in more or less disruptions, the 
resultant questions posed in the research were: 
What is the impact of market structure on the level of disruption 
experienced by networks? 
 
What is the impact of adaptation and collaboration between supply 
chain participants on the level of disruption experienced by the 
network? 
 
One reason why normal accident theory may not have been commonly applied 
to the supply chain environment is that it is founded on complex technological 
systems, whilst considering human interventions in response to the emergence 
of unique unpredictable technology configurations as a key component to the 
escalation of disturbances in to disruptions or incidents in to catastrophes 
(Perrow, 1999).  
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It is in this context that we note supply chains and therefore supply networks of 
connected supply chains are essentially social systems where the components 
can not only reconfigure themselves as a system but also adapt as components 
within that system to redefine the systems capabilities (Choi et al., 2001a). 
A consideration of the phenomena of normal accidents and punctuated 
equilibrium reveal the difficulty of collecting real world empirical data across 
extensive supply networks: timings of events are unpredictable and without 
notice of the conditions that may or may not generate supply disruptions data 
collection is difficult to organize.  
In such circumstances Davis et al (2009) recommend the use of computer 
simulations using extant knowledge to specify the mechanisms, interactions and 
dynamics of a system in order that it can be exposed to rigorous experimental 
design not feasible in the real-world. If computer simulations are adopted as an 
approach it is imperative that the model is anchored in extant theory, validated 
by practitioners, and rigorously verified in its construction. These principles were 
adopted in the construction of the computer simulation resulting in a 
computerised abstraction of real world phenomena underpinned by extant 
theory and validated by practioners. 
By incorporating the abstracted operational rules into simulated autonomous 
adaptive agents interactions can be established and an abstracted 
representation of the real world parameterised for experimentation. In line with 
both NAT and CAS theory the parameters selected reflect the two dimensions 
of the agent behaviour and market constraints.  
A full 2 level full factorial design of  256 cases was specified which represented 
two levels of vertical market structure across 2 supply tiers, two levels of price 
diversity across 2 supply tiers, with permitted behaviours of collaboration and 
price competition expressed in isolation and combination in both open and 
closed markets.  
The nuisance variables of location and initial pricing were controlled for each 
case by implementing repeated experiments seeded with different random 
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number generators. In all 1280 simulations were carried out permitting statistical 
testing of the difference between cases to reject or accept the research 
questions. 
The research questions were reformed into testable hypothesis in order that 
they could be statistically tested and significant differences between 
experimental cases exposed. The following section summarises the findings 
discussed in the previous chapter with relation to the research questions posed 
8.1 Research Question 1:  
Do supply networks comprising multiple connected supply chains 
experience periods of disruption as a consequence of normal 
operations? 
Hypotheses:: The pattern of cumulative distribution of disruptions 
experienced by a network under any of the permitted behaviours and 
market conditions conforms to an exponential law description 
The research found that all network configurations experienced levels of 
disruption as a consequence of normal operations. However the analysis of the 
data showed that whilst open systems demonstrated patterns of disruption that 
followed an exponential law description as a consequence of being critically 
organised and maintained in a far from equilibrium state, closed networks did 
not. The closed networks tend towards an equilibrium of supply population 
which resulted in patterns of disruption not conformant to descriptions of 
criticality. 
The finding extends supply network knowledge by demonstrating that critical 
organisation can only be established in open but not closed networks. This 
partially supports the conceptualisation of supply networks presented by Choi 
(2001b) and Pathak (2007a), however it also highlights that closed networks are 
not critically organised and therefore not complex.  
In establishing open networks as critically organised the research also places 
supply networks in the collection of systems considered by NAT.  
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The practical implications for the findings are: 
Risk mitigation strategies for systemic risk in open networks should directly 
address inertia generating and inertia destroying activities 
The emphasis on managing the risk associated with closed systems should be 
the mitigation of disturbances, which whilst not neglected in the management of 
open systems sits alongside increased emphasis on business continuity 
planning in open systems.  
Business continuity planning should be cognisant that the adaptation of 
potential purchasing strategies across the network may increase the systemic 
risk and will therefore need to be balanced with appropriate supply strategy. 
In the context of these implications to practice It is noted that the BCI 2012 
survey stated:    
“When considering the involvement of business continuity practioners 
in the procurement process, there is still a long way to go.  51% state
d that business continuity featured as in integral part of the procurem
ent process from the start, a modest improvement on 47% in 2011, 
but a significant minority either ignore business continuity or make it 
a post-purchase activity.”  
 
8.2 Research question 2:  
What is the impact of market structure on the level of disruption 
experienced by networks? 
Hypothesis:: there is no difference in the magnitude of disruptions 
experienced by networks with different market conditions in any of the 
permitted agent behaviours combinations considered 
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Given a specified combination of permitted agent behaviours the findings show 
that market conditions did not have any significant effect on the level of 
disruption experienced by the network 
CST and CAS are both premised with arguments that complex systems are 
sensitive to initial conditions. By allowing agents to generate their states by 
acting within specified boundaries (market conditions) the research resolves 
any ambiguity about how system or network level constraints impacts emergent 
system level behaviours.  
In practical terms the regulation of market structure expressed as permitted 
pricing does not have any impact on network level disruption within the bounds 
of the experiments specified. The findings can therefore be useful in guiding the 
design of regulatory instruments. 
8.3 Research question 3:  
What is the impact of adaptation and collaboration between supply 
chain participants on the level of disruption experienced by the 
network? 
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the 
magnitudes of disruptions experienced by networks with different 
permitted behaviour across all the considered market conditions. 
The research found that combined permitted behaviours of collaboration and 
price competition in open markets generated significantly higher levels of 
disruption than behavioural configurations 
This finding makes two contributions to theory: the first contribution supports the 
findings addressing the first research question as it confirms the 
conceptualisation of supply networks as complex adaptive systems is not 
appropriate to closed supply networks but is appropriate to open supply 
networks.  The second contribution is that within open supply networks the 
combination of collaboration and price competition produces significantly more 
risk of disruptions than other combinations of permitted behaviours. 
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With regard to practice this finding presents managers with a paradox to be 
managed: in open markets collaboration strategies need to be balanced with 
risk mitigation when price competition is permitted and not regulated.  
The disruption risk presented by open markets with collaboration and price 
competition is emergent and therefore lacks precise definition requiring 
managers to develop responsive capabilities using the principles contained in 
HRO theory (described in chapter 1).  
Having directly addressed the three research questions it is desirable to return 
to the overarching question and express the findings in terms of how networks 
evolve to dissipate or concentrate disturbances resulting in disruptions.  
The computer experiments carried out show combined behaviours of 
collaboration and price competition in open markets describes an environment 
where risk of disruptions is significantly greater than in in other behavioural 
configurations. This observation highlights how, in the context of supply 
disruptions, permitted behaviours are a key determinant of a supply networks 
evolution and its vulnerability to disruptions as a consequence of normal 
behaviour. 
As a consequence of this research strategies to mitigate systemic disruption 
risk are directed to addressing the interaction between inertia generating and 
inertia destroying behaviours of collaboration and price competition in open 
markets. 
8.4 Critique and further work 
The motivation for this thesis was to address the gap in extant knowledge 
regarding the role of behaviours and structure generating systemic risks in 
emergent supply networks. By using the lenses of NAT and CAS to examine the 
complexity and coupling of a network the research has exposed fundamental 
structures that persist over a range of conditions providing a focus for the 
design of mitigating strategies. 
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By identifying the persistent relationship between the combination of 
collaboration with price competitive behaviour in open markets and the 
observed significantly higher levels of disruption, this thesis has advanced the 
understanding of how complexity develops disruption risk in supply networks.  
As is the nature of theory development; critiques of theoretical advances 
illuminate new and previously unknown opportunities for future research. 
The research exposes three areas of interests with regard to the topic of 
disruptions as a consequence of normal operations:1) network openness, 2) 
structural aspects of the network, and 3) agent behaviours. 
8.4.1 Network Openness 
The model described in this thesis prescribed a considered but nonetheless 
specific degree of openness: the rate at which new agents could enter the 
system testing the incumbents and their relationships.  
In reality new firms are created based on often incomplete analysis of the 
existing market and the performance of the incumbents. Entry rates for new 
agents is therefore contingent on perceptions of market attractiveness. In turn 
market attractiveness is a reflection of the relationships established in the 
existing network. 
Prigogine (Prigogine, 1997) identified openness as a crucial to the maintenance 
of far-from equilibrium states. Bak (1999) confirms critical organization as a 
characteristic of far from equilibrium states and Choi et al (Choi et al., 2001a)  
highlight the ability of a network to modify its environment by having fluid 
boundaries:  
“One common way of changes in CASs occurs through altering the 
boundaries of the system. These boundaries change as a result of 
including or excluding particular agents and by adding or eliminating 
connections among agents, thereby changing the underlying patterns 
of interactions. “ 
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Despite this theoretical and conceptual anchoring of openness as a crucial 
component of complex behaviour, the operationalization of openness in supply 
networks is neglected in the extant literature.  
Future research could use the frameworks of agency to determine market 
attractiveness to potential new entrants. The new entrants would establish the 
attractiveness of the market by considering existing firms’ performance, and 
barriers to entry (e.g. regulation, investment and the power of incumbents) to 
decide whether or not to enter the market.  
If market attractiveness could be operationalized relationships between it and 
levels of disruption could be established providing a refined understanding of 
how openness relates to the levels of disruption experienced.  
8.4.2 Market structure 
The findings that market structure constraints have no influence on the levels of 
disruption experienced would benefit from exposing the mechanisms that result 
in the observations. In particular studies regarding population configurations 
and their relationship with the constraints imposed would help reveal deeper 
understanding of why market structures/conditions have no significant effect on 
the level of disruptions as a consequence of normal operations 
Research in this area could draw on population dynamics to describe the 
relationship between population characteristics and market structures.  
The model also constrained the productive capacity of agents fixing it at a level 
determined by initial conditions. The effect of productive capacity on disruption 
was controlled for through randomisation and repeated experiments.  
However it would be useful to understand the impact on disruption experience 
of relaxing capacity constraints and permitting successful agents to invest in 
extra capacity. This would test the logical argument that increasing capacity of 
successful agents attracts more customers to those agents thereby: increasing 
overall dependency on them; driving higher levels of collaboration within the 
network; and consequently developing higher levels of inertia. 
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This logical argument suggests that increasing capacity would reduce the 
frequency of disruptions but increase their magnitude resulting in higher levels 
of disruption over the network as a whole.  
Alternatively a contra argument can be developed whereby increasing capacity 
increases attractiveness with the network tending towards monopoly or 
oligopoly of supply.  
By resolving this question any research in this area would establish whether or 
not capacity constraints or the characterisation of dynamic capacity would result 
in more or less disruptions.  
8.4.3 Behaviours 
8.4.3.1 Competition and collaboration interaction 
The research found that the combined effect of collaboration and cooperation in 
open markets resulted in significantly higher levels of disruption.  The current 
model permitted agents to adopt these behaviours when conditions required 
them to do so. These conditions were described by perceptions of risk and 
underutilisation of capacity. 
The model could be alternatively configured to collect data regarding the 
proportion of the population adopting collaborative strategies and price 
competition. Conceptually the acceptance of complex systems as recursive 
suggests that the system will exhibit critically in the relationships between 
population dynamics expressing combined behaviours of collaboration together 
with price competition and the levels of disruption experienced. 
8.4.3.2 Operationalizing commitment and cooperation 
For the purposes of the model considered in this thesis’s the arbitrary setting of 
threshold levels of commitment and the calculation of commitment based on 
perceptions of supply risk have been adequate to address the research 
questions posed. 
Qualitative studies of supply risk perception and commitment have exposed 
dependencies with factors that have been reflected in the construction of the 
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model used in this research. However deeper understandings of how supply 
risk should be assessed and commitment levels established would enhance 
their operationalization in the modelling environment, allowing the model to be 
developed to evaluate alternative strategies and policies that might be 
considered as a consequence of this research. 
8.4.4 Alignment of future work with existing research agendas 
This chapter would not be complete without reference to the two dominant 
research agendas published in the extant literature. Choi et al (Choi et al., 
2001a) identified 4 broad areas of research, of which this research addresses 2: 
 
“…. identify what types of catastrophe in SNs have occurred in the 
past and what were the processes through which they occurred?” 
And  
“ SNs tend to behave in archetypal ways, depending on the macro-
level structure that is present, the incentives driving individual 
suppliers, and the rules used for interaction. Therefore, another 
question might be, what are these archetypes and how do they 
change over time?” 
 
Pathak (2007a)  provided a more defined research agenda organised into 
theoretical, methodological and technical themes. This research mainly 
addresses the theoretical the theoretical challenges identified, of the 11 
identified this research addresses 5: 
 Interfirm interactions affecting CASN topology 
 Effect of environment on CASN evolution both at individual and system 
levels 
 Decision making criteria at the firm, system, and environment levels that 
affect CASN evolution  
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 Policy design for CASN Notion of loose coupling among firms in a supply 
network 
 Coevolution of supply chain strategy and supply network structure 
 
This research set out to bridge a gap in the extant knowledge regarding how 
supply networks through their complexity and tight coupling generate 
disruptions as a consequence of normal operations. The research findings not 
only addressed the research questions directly by but also advanced the 
research agendas of other academics and as such makes the contribution to 
knowledge intended. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Programme Code 
Calculating_commitment_16a6 
Model: Calculating_commitment_16a6 
Description: this version of the model 
- intialisation 
- supplier selection 
- inventory management 
Initialisation - allocate approapriate values 
Supplier Selection - make rational choices 
Inventory Management - compiles 
Next action: to consume inventory and generate orders CHECK THIS WORKS 
CHECK ORDERMANAGEMENT 
CHECK SELECT SUPPLIERS 
CHECK HANDLING OF BADBOYS 
retailers consume stock as programmed 
?? check stock calcs 
at time step [0] SS, ALT, SigmaD, ROP calulate OK 
?? ordering - check order placed for EOQ or equivilent, when Stock+expected stock<ROP 
all OK 
??check order management works 
receiving OK 
creating replen OK 
sending nsas OK 
?? check cash flows 
cash spent on delivery (covers distribution) 
Cash received on delivery 
?? what about operating costs 
this version does away with Badboys and supplier management by executing select suppliers every tick and using quality in the supplier selection 
process 
The quality [and other behavioural values] are re-assessed every 30 days which assumes am asynchronous profile over the poulation 
Changed stock calcs lead time calc -max of suppliers not mean ==> no difference 
Name Value 
General 
Java Package Name calculating_commitment 
File Name C:\Users\Philip\Documents\Thesis\Models\Calculating_commitment 
_16a6\Calculating_commitment_16a6.original.alp 
Model Time 
Model Time Units Day 
Active Object Class: Main 
Description: Read data file 
allocate price and stock 
allocate behavioural values 
allocate market share to Retail outlets 
Name Value 
General 
Startup Code 
database.modify("DELETE FROM Results"); 
try 
{ 
//Read DataFile 
Scanner fs = new Scanner(new FileInputStream 
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Name Value 
("c:\\Users\\mn076059\\Documents\\Backup Sept 2010\\My 
docs\\cranfield\\Thesis\\Model\\ThesisFinalVersion\\AgentPopConfi 
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g.txt"),"UTF-8"); 
TotalNoOfAgents=fs.nextInt(); 
noOfRetailers=fs.nextInt(); 
noOfWholesalers=fs.nextInt(); 
noOfManufacturers=fs.nextInt(); 
RetailMarketValue=fs.nextInt(); 
}catch(Exception e) 
{ 
System.err.println(e); 
} 
// allocate Price and stock to agents 
SettingInitialConditions(); 
for(int i=0; i<(noOfRetailers 
+noOfWholesalers+noOfManufacturers); i++) 
{ 
add_actor(); 
//actor.get(i).setXY(uniform()*500, uniform ()*500); //use global std 
dev 
actor.get(i).setXY(normal(.2,.8,.5,GlobalStdDev)*500, 
normal(.2,.8,.5,GlobalStdDev)*500); 
if (i<noOfRetailers) 
{ 
actor.get(i).Retailer=1; 
actor.get(i).Price= AvgRetailPrice + uniform ((RetailMinPriceAvgRetailPrice), 
(RetailMaxPrice-AvgRetailPrice) ); //15+ 
(uniform(0,2)); //use global std dev 
actor.get(i).Price=actor.get(i).Price; 
//traceln (); 
} 
if (i>=(noOfRetailers) && i< (noOfRetailers+ noOfManufacturers)) 
{ 
actor.get(i).Manufacturer=1; 
actor.get(i).Price= AvgManufacturerPrice + 
(uniform((ManufacturerMinPriceAvgManufacturerPrice),( 
ManufacturerMaxPriceAvgManufacturerPrice)));// 
was3 
actor.get(i).Price=actor.get(i).Price; 
actor.get(i).Stock=100000;//(RetailMarketValue*14)/1.5; 
} 
if (i>=noOfRetailers+ noOfManufacturers) 
{ 
actor.get(i).Wholesaler=1; 
actor.get(i).Price=AvgWholesalePrice+ 
(uniform((WholesaleMinPriceAvgWholesalePrice),( 
WholesaleMaxPrice-AvgWholesalePrice))); 
//was8 
actor.get(i).Price=actor.get(i).Price; 
actor.get(i).Stock=100000;//RetailMarketValue*14/1.5; 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
// allocate behaviours 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
//todo: should these be a normal distribution 
//Random r= new Random (thisSeed); //this is a uniform distribution 
to give the greatest variety 
//double RandomNo=normal(.1,.5, r); 
//double RandomNo=r.nextDouble(); 
/*double RandomNo=CollaborationSeed +uniform(-.1,.1); // not 
required 
if (RandomNo<.2) // this will load the low end values 
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{ 
RandomNo=.2; 
} 
if (RandomNo>.8) 
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}*/ 
actor.get(i).Collaboration= .2 +normal(.6); 
//actor.get(i).Learning=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//actor.get(i).PricingApproach=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(i).RiskAttitude=.2 +normal(.6); 
actor.get(i).CostPrioritisation=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(i).BuyingFSValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(i).BuyingLocationValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(i).QualityValue=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//thisSeed+=1; 
} 
//================================================== 
=================================================== 
=================================== 
/*FindBiggestPriceDiffFunction(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).CalculatePriceDifferentiation(); 
} 
}*/ 
// allocate market shares 
MarketShareAllocation(); 
traceln(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
actor.get(i).CreateSelectionIndexForSuppliers(); 
} 
traceln(); 
CalculateDemandForSuppliers(); 
CalculateMinInitialCapacity(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
SetOperationalCosts(actor.get(i)); 
SetHoldingCosts(actor.get(i)); 
} 
//SettingOPerationalCosts(); 
CalculateDeliveryIndex(); 
CalculateMarginIndex(); 
traceln(); 
/*file.println ("ManufacturerPriceVariation" + " " + 
ManufacturerPriceVariation + " " + 
"ManufacturingMarginInput" + " " + ManufacturingMarginInput + " " 
+ 
"MarketDifferentiation" + " " + MarketDifferentiation + " " + 
"RetailPriceVariation" + " " + RetailPriceVariation + " " + 
"WholesalePriceVariation" + " " + WholesalePriceVariation + " " + 
WholesalerMaginInput + " ");*/ 
Advanced 
Import import java.util.Scanner; 
import java.io.*; 
import Jama.*; 
import flanagan.analysis.Regression; 
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import flanagan.analysis.RegressionFunction; 
import flanagan.math.Polynomial; 
import flanagan.io.*; 
import java.io.Serializable; 
import flanagan.complex.*; 
//import flanagan.plot.*; 
//import java.awt.*; 
import java.awt.event.*; 
import javax.swing.*; 
import javax.swing.JFrame; 
//import edu.uci.ics.jung.graph.*; 
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Additional Code //using a comparator 
public class MarketShareSortByScore implements 
Comparator<MarketShareScores>{ 
public int compare (MarketShareScores Manufacturer1, 
MarketShareScores Manufacturer2){ 
Double 
Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.TempMarketShareValue; 
Double 
Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.TempMarketShareValue; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class ActorScoresSortByPrice implements 
Comparator<ActorPrice>{ 
public int compare (ActorPrice Manufacturer1, ActorPrice 
Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.Price; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.Price; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class FSSortByFS1 implements 
Comparator<SupplierFSScore>{ 
public int compare (SupplierFSScore Manufacturer1, 
SupplierFSScore Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.SupplierFS; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.SupplierFS; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
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} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class SortRetailersByDemand implements 
Comparator<ActorDemand>{ 
public int compare (ActorDemand Manufacturer1, ActorDemand 
Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.BuyingDemand; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.BuyingDemand; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
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return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class SortWholesalersByDemand implements 
Comparator<ActorDemand>{ 
public int compare (ActorDemand Manufacturer1, ActorDemand 
Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.BuyingDemand; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.BuyingDemand; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class SortRetailSuppliersByDemand implements 
Comparator<ActorDemand>{ 
public int compare (ActorDemand Manufacturer1, ActorDemand 
Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.SupplyDemand; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.SupplyDemand; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class SortRetailSuppliersByDemandMax implements 
Comparator<ActorDemand>{ 
public int compare (ActorDemand Manufacturer1, ActorDemand 
Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.SupplyDemand; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.SupplyDemand; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
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}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class SortWholesaleSuppliersByDemand implements 
Comparator<ActorDemand>{ 
public int compare (ActorDemand Manufacturer1, ActorDemand 
Manufacturer2){ 
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Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.SupplyDemand; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.SupplyDemand; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class SortWholesaleSuppliersByDemandMax implements 
Comparator<ActorDemand>{ 
public int compare (ActorDemand Manufacturer1, ActorDemand 
Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.SupplyDemand; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.SupplyDemand; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//ActorSelectionValues 
//MyValues 
//using a comparator 
public class SortActorSelectionValuesBySD implements 
Comparator<MyValues>{ 
public int compare (MyValues Manufacturer1, MyValues 
Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.SDDemand; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.SDDemand; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class SortRetailersDS implements 
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Comparator<DeliveryStuff>{ 
public int compare (DeliveryStuff Manufacturer1, DeliveryStuff 
Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.SigmaDemand; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.SigmaDemand; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
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} 
//using a comparator 
public class SortActorsByMargin implements 
Comparator<MarginStuff>{ 
public int compare (MarginStuff Manufacturer1, MarginStuff 
Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.Margin; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.Margin; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
Auto-create Datasets true 
Recurrence 1 
Dataset Samples To Keep 100 
Parameter: MarketDifferentiation 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Default Value .2 
Editor 
Editor Control TEXT_BOX 
Parameter: RetailPriceVariation 
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Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Default Value .2 
Editor 
Editor Control TEXT_BOX 
Parameter: WholesalePriceVariation 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
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Default Value .2 
Editor 
Editor Control TEXT_BOX 
Parameter: ManufacturerPriceVariation 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Default Value .2 
Editor 
Editor Control TEXT_BOX 
Parameter: ManufacturingMarginInput 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Default Value .5 
Editor 
Editor Control TEXT_BOX 
Parameter: WholesalerMaginInput 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Default Value .3 
Editor 
Editor Control TEXT_BOX 
Dynamic Event: Createnewmanufacturer 
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General 
Show At Runtime false 
Action //int thisSeed=CollaborationSeed; 
//Random r= new Random (thisSeed); 
//double RandomNo=r.nextDouble(); 
//double RandomNo=CollaborationSeed +uniform(-.05,.05); 
double ActorType1=3; 
double 
AverageOperatingCosts=SetOPerationalCostsForNewBorns(ActorT 
ype1); 
double NewnoOfManufacturers=0; 
add_actor(); 
int k=actor.size()-1; 
actor.get(k).Manufacturer=1; 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
NewnoOfManufacturers+=1; 
} 
} 
k= actor.size()-1; 
actor.get(k).OperatingCosts= AverageOperatingCosts; 
actor.get(k).Cash=40*actor.get(k).OperatingCosts; 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(k).Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
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actor.get(k).MySizeAndType.setFillColor(blue); 
//actor.get(k).setXY(uniform()*500, uniform ()*500); 
actor.get(k).setXY(normal(.2,.8,.5,GlobalStdDev)*500, 
normal(.2,.8,.5,GlobalStdDev)*500); 
actor.get(k).Price=AvgManufacturerPrice + 
(uniform((ManufacturerMinPriceAvgManufacturerPrice),( 
ManufacturerMaxPriceAvgManufacturerPrice))); 
actor.get(k).Stock=7*RetailMarketValue/NewnoOfManufacturers; 
//thisSeed=CollaborationSeed; 
actor.get(k).JustBorn=1; 
// r= new Random (thisSeed); 
//todo: should these be a normal distribution 
//Random r= new Random (thisSeed); //this is a uniform distribution 
to give the greatest variety 
//double RandomNo=normal(.1,.5, r); 
// RandomNo=r.nextDouble(); 
//double RandomNo=CollaborationSeed +uniform(-.5,.05); 
/*if (RandomNo<.2) // this will load the low end values 
{ 
RandomNo=.2; 
} 
if (RandomNo>.8) 
{ 
RandomNo=.8; 
}*/ 
actor.get(k).Collaboration= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//actor.get(i).Learning=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//actor.get(i).PricingApproach=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).RiskAttitude=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).CostPrioritisation=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).BuyingFSValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).BuyingLocationValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).BuyingPriceValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).QualityValue=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
AverageOperatingCosts=0; 
Dynamic Event: Createnewretailer 
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General 
Show At Runtime false 
Action double ActorType1=1; 
double 
AverageOperatingCosts=SetOPerationalCostsForNewBorns(ActorT 
ype1); 
add_actor(); 
int k=actor.size()-1; 
actor.get(k).OperatingCosts= AverageOperatingCosts; 
//actor.get(k).setXY(uniform()*500, uniform ()*500); 
actor.get(k).setXY(normal(.2,.8,.5,GlobalStdDev)*500, 
normal(.2,.8,.5,GlobalStdDev)*500); 
actor.get(k).Retailer=1; 
actor.get(k).Cash=14*actor.get(k).OperatingCosts; 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(k).Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
actor.get(k).Price=AvgRetailPrice + uniform ((RetailMinPriceAvgRetailPrice), 
(RetailMaxPrice-AvgRetailPrice) ); //15+ 
(uniform(0,2)); 
actor.get(k).MySizeAndType.setFillColor(red); 
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actor.get(k).JustBorn=1; 
//int thisSeed=CollaborationSeed; 
///Random r= new Random (thisSeed); 
//todo: should these be a normal distribution 
//Random r= new Random (thisSeed); //this is a uniform distribution 
to give the greatest variety 
//double RandomNo=normal(.1,.5, r); 
//double RandomNo=r.nextDouble(); 
/*double RandomNo=CollaborationSeed +uniform(-.05,.05); 
if (RandomNo<.2) // this will load the low end values 
{ 
RandomNo=.2; 
} 
if (RandomNo>.8) 
{ 
RandomNo=.8; 
}*/ 
//actor.get(i).Collaboration= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//actor.get(i).Learning=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//actor.get(i).PricingApproach=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).RiskAttitude=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).CostPrioritisation=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).BuyingFSValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).BuyingLocationValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).BuyingPriceValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).QualityValue=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//thisSeed+=1; 
AverageOperatingCosts=0; 
Dynamic Event: Createnewwholesaler 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Action //int thisSeed=CollaborationSeed; 
//Random r= new Random (thisSeed); 
//double RandomNo=r.nextDouble(); 
//double RandomNo=CollaborationSeed +uniform(-.05,.05); 
double ActorType1=2; 
double 
AverageOperatingCosts=SetOPerationalCostsForNewBorns(ActorT 
ype1); 
double NewnoOfWholesalers=0; 
add_actor(); 
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int k=actor.size()-1; 
actor.get(k).Wholesaler=1; 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
NewnoOfWholesalers+=1; 
} 
} 
if (NewnoOfWholesalers==0) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
actor.get(k).Stock=7*RetailMarketValue/NewnoOfWholesalers; 
if (k==14) 
{ 
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traceln(); 
} 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(k).Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
actor.get(k).OperatingCosts= AverageOperatingCosts; 
actor.get(k).Cash=40*actor.get(k).OperatingCosts; 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(k).Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
actor.get(k).MySizeAndType.setFillColor(yellow); 
//actor.get(k).setXY(uniform()*500, uniform ()*500); 
actor.get(k).setXY(normal(.2,.8,.5,GlobalStdDev)*500, 
normal(.2,.8,.5,GlobalStdDev)*500); 
actor.get(k).Wholesaler=1; 
actor.get(k).Price=AvgWholesalePrice+ 
(uniform((WholesaleMinPriceAvgWholesalePrice),( 
WholesaleMaxPrice-AvgWholesalePrice))); 
//======= 
actor.get(k).JustBorn=1; 
//thisSeed=CollaborationSeed; 
// r= new Random (thisSeed); 
//todo: should these be a normal distribution 
//Random r= new Random (thisSeed); //this is a uniform distribution 
to give the greatest variety 
//double RandomNo=normal(.1,.5, r); 
//RandomNo=r.nextDouble(); 
//double RandomNo=CollaborationSeed +uniform(-.5,.05); 
/*if (RandomNo<.2) // this will load the low end values 
{ 
RandomNo=.2; 
} 
if (RandomNo>.8) 
{ 
RandomNo=.8; 
}*/ 
actor.get(k).Collaboration= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//actor.get(i).Learning=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//actor.get(i).PricingApproach=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).RiskAttitude=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).CostPrioritisation=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).BuyingFSValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).BuyingLocationValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).BuyingPriceValue= normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
actor.get(k).QualityValue=normal(.2,.8,.5,.1); 
//thisSeed+=1; 
AverageOperatingCosts=0; 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(k).Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
traceln(); 
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Function: CalculatingCommitment 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type double 
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Code 
Body return 
(pow((GlobalRisk*RelationalRisk*EuclideanDistance),.3333)); 
Arguments: 
Name Type 
GlobalRisk double 
RelationalRisk double 
EuclideanDistance double 
Function: CalculateED 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Function: CalculateCurrentNetworkRisk 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Function: MarketShareAllocation 
Description: This algorithm assumes that even the smallest difference in price will result in substantial market share difference 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //int population=10; 
ActorsRanked.clear(); 
//rank retailers according to their price 
if (actor.size()==11) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
ActorPrice thisActorPrice=new 
ActorPrice(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).Price); 
ActorsRanked.add(thisActorPrice); 
} 
} 
//sort 
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Collections.sort(ActorsRanked,new ActorScoresSortByPrice()); 
//Allocate Market share 
for (int i=0;i<ActorsRanked.size();i++) 
{ 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.TargetMarketShare=0; 
} 
double marketsharetotal=100; 
if (time()==0) 
{ 
while (marketsharetotal>0.1) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<ActorsRanked.size();i++) 
{ 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.TargetMarketShare += 
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(MarketDifferentiation*marketsharetotal)/100; 
marketsharetotal=marketsharetotal( 
MarketDifferentiation*marketsharetotal); 
//ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand= 
((ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.TargetMarketShare/100)*RetailMarketV 
alue) + (normal(0,.2)* 
//(ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.TargetMarketShare/100)*RetailMarket 
Value); 
//ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.Stock= uniform(1.5,2) 
*ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand*14; 
//ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.SigmaDemand=uniform(.03,.05)*(Actor 
sRanked.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand); 
//ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.BaseOPerationalDemand=ActorsRanke 
d.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand; 
//SetOperationalCosts(ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor); 
//ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.OperatingCosts=.2* 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.BaseOPerationalDemand * 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.Price; 
//ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.OPeratingCostsPerUnit=ActorsRanked. 
get(i).Actor.OperatingCosts/ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.BaseOPerati 
onalDemand; 
} 
traceln(); 
} 
//all market share allocated 
for (int i=0;i<ActorsRanked.size();i++) 
{ 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand=ActorsRanked.get(i).Act 
or.TargetMarketShare*RetailMarketValue; 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.SigmaDemand=uniform(.03,.05)*(Actors 
Ranked.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand); 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.Stock= uniform(1.5,2) 
*ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand*14; 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.BaseOPerationalDemand=ActorsRanked 
.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand; 
SetOperationalCosts(ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor); 
} 
//now allocate current demand, base op demand, op costs, 
} 
traceln(); 
if(time()>0) 
{ 
while (marketsharetotal>0.1) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<ActorsRanked.size();i++) 
{ 
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Actor.TargetMarketShare*RetailMarketValue; 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.SigmaDemand=uniform(.03,.05)*(Actors 
Ranked.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand); 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand= 
(normal(ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.SigmaDemand,ActorsRanked.ge 
t(i).Actor.CurrentDemand)); 
//ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.BaseOPerationalDemand=ActorsRanke 
d.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand;//!!!!!!!!!!!! 
//SetOperationalCosts(ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor);//!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
//make it normal dist 
if (ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.JustBorn>0) 
{ 
//ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.BaseOPerationalDemand=ActorsRanke 
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d.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand; 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.Stock= uniform(1.5,2) 
*ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.CurrentDemand*14; 
ActorsRanked.get(i).Actor.JustBorn=0; 
} 
if (i==10) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
Function: CalculateGlobalRisk 
Description: calculates global risk by comparing actual links to ideal 
REQUIRED 
CALCULATE ACTUAL COV AND COMAPRE TO IDEAL ==> GLOBAL RISK 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body 
//sets CurrentIdealDemand=0 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand=0; 
} 
SortRetailersByDemand(); 
SortRetailSuppliersByDemand(); 
//WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
/*for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand=0; 
} 
}*/ 
//for each retailer 
if (RetailersSortedByDemand.size()>0 && 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.size()>0 ) 
{ 
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for (int i=0;i<RetailersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
{ 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(0).SupplyDemand+=Retailers 
SortedByDemand.get(i).BuyingDemand/2; 
Collections.sort(RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortRetailSuppliersByDemand()); 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(0).SupplyDemand+=Retailers 
SortedByDemand.get(i).BuyingDemand/2; 
Collections.sort(RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortRetailSuppliersByDemand()); 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
if (RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
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{ 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.CurrentIdealDemand= 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).SupplyDemand; 
} 
} 
//now do the same for wholesalers to manufacturers 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
ActorDemand thisActorDemand=new 
ActorDemand(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand,0 ); 
WholesalersSortedByDemand.add(thisActorDemand); 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
Collections.sort(WholesalersSortedByDemand,new 
SortWholesalersByDemand()); 
traceln(); 
//add wholesale suppliers to collection 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
ActorDemand thisActorDemand=new 
ActorDemand(actor.get(i),0,actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand ); 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.add(thisActorDemand); 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
Collections.sort(WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortWholesalersByDemand()); 
traceln(); 
if (WholesalersSortedByDemand.size()>0 && 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.size()>0 ) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<WholesalersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
{ 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(0).SupplyDemand+=Who 
lesalersSortedByDemand.get(i).BuyingDemand/2; 
Collections.sort(WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
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SortWholesaleSuppliersByDemand()); 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(0).SupplyDemand+=Who 
lesalersSortedByDemand.get(i).BuyingDemand/2; 
Collections.sort(WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortWholesaleSuppliersByDemand()); 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
if (WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
{ 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.CurrentIdealDem 
and+=WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).SupplyDemand; 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
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if (time()==2) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
WholesalersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
// todo: calculate COV ==> where to put this ==> not entire network 
but partitioned according type !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
CovDataSet.reset(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 || 
actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0)) 
{ 
CovDataSet.add(actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand); 
} 
} 
if (CovDataSet.count()>0) 
{ 
COVidealRetailerSuppliers=CovDataSet.deviation()/CovDataSet.m 
ean(); 
} 
// calculate max imum value 
/*double sum=0; 
//double MaxCOV=0 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Retailer>0 ) 
{ 
sum+=actor.get(i).CurrentDemand; 
} 
} 
//count no of suppliers 
double count=0; 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Wholesaler >0 || 
actor.get(i).Manufacturer >0 )) 
{ 
count+=1; 
} 
} 
//allocate supply 
double flag=0; 
double MinRetailerDemand=CalculateMinimumRetailerDemand(); 
if (count>2) //!!!!!!!!!!!! WHAT HAPPENS IF JUST 1 SUPPLIER 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! OR 2 SUPPLIERS 
{ 
flag=1; 
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} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Wholesaler >0 || 
actor.get(i).Manufacturer >0 )) 
{ 
if (flag==1) 
{ 
//add sum-count-1 
MaxCov.add (sum-(MinRetailerDemand/2)); // INSTEAD OF 1 THIS 
SHOULD PROBABLY BE THE MNIMUM RETAILER CUSTOMER 
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DEMAND 
MaxCov.add (MinRetailerDemand/2); 
} 
else 
{ 
MaxCov.add(sum); 
} 
} 
}*/ 
//MaxCov.add(1); 
//MaxCov.add(sum-1); 
//MaxTheoreticalCOV= 
MaxGlobalRiskCalculatation();//MaxCov.deviation()/MaxCov.mean() 
; //NEEDS TO BE CORRECTED FOR THE RANGE 
MaxCov.reset(); 
Function: CalculateDemandForSuppliers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body traceln(); 
/*for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size()>0 
&& (actor.get(i).Retailer==1 || actor.get(i).Wholesaler==1)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
actor.get(i).CurrentDemand=0; 
for (int j=0;j<actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size();j++) 
{ 
actor.get(i).MySuppliers.get(j).CurrentDemand+=actor.get(i).Curren 
tDemand/actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size(); 
} 
} 
}*/ 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 || actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).CurrentDemand=0; 
} 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0) 
{ 
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{ 
if (actor.get(j).Wholesaler>0 && 
actor.get(i).MySuppliers.contains(actor.get(j))) 
{ 
actor.get(j).CurrentDemand+=actor.get(i).CurrentDemand/((double) 
actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size()); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
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{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
for (int j=0;j<actor.size();j++) 
{ 
if ( actor.get(j).MySuppliers.contains(actor.get(i))) 
{ 
actor.get(i).CurrentDemand+=actor.get(j).CurrentDemand/((double) 
actor.get(j).MySuppliers.size()); 
} 
} 
Function: AllocateDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Function: AllocateOptimalDemandToWholesalers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body 
for (int i=0;i<RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
{ 
if (RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.Wholesaler>0 && 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.Died<1) 
{ 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.CurrentIdealDemand= 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).SupplyDemand; 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
Function: AllocateOptimalDemandToManufacturers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body for (int i=0;i<RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
{ 
if (RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.Manufacturer>0 && 
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RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.Died<1) 
{ 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.CurrentIdealDemand= 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).SupplyDemand; 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
Function: SortRetailersByDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body 
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RetailersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
ActorDemand thisActorDemand=new 
ActorDemand(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).CurrentDemand,0 ); 
RetailersSortedByDemand.add(thisActorDemand); 
} 
} 
Collections.sort(RetailersSortedByDemand,new 
SortRetailersByDemand()); 
Function: SortRetailSuppliersByDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
if (time()==1) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if ((actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 || actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) && 
actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
//todo: calculate demand - by checking whether or not this actor has 
been selected, and summing the current demnd 
//sort retail suppliers by allocated demand (supply demand) 
ActorDemand thisActorDemand=new ActorDemand(actor.get(i),0, 
actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand); 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.add(thisActorDemand); 
} 
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} 
//todo: sort collection RetailersSortedByDemand 
Collections.sort(RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortRetailSuppliersByDemand()); 
traceln(); 
Function: SortWholesalersByDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body WholesalersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
ActorDemand thisActorDemand=new 
ActorDemand(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).CurrentDemand,0 ); 
WholesalersSortedByDemand.add(thisActorDemand); 
} 
} 
// need method to sort wholsalers by demand 
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Collections.sort(WholesalersSortedByDemand,new 
SortWholesalersByDemand()); 
Function: CalculateBuyingLocationValue 
Description: Calculates the delivery value/weight for retailers and wholesalers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //this needs to be a function of SD ==> the greater the SD demand 
the greate the value of BuyingLocationVlaue 
// as the SD demand can assume any value it needs to be indexed 
amongst the agents peers 
/*public Actor ThisActor; 
COULD WE ADD TYPE 
public double SDDemand; 
public double SDDemandValue; 
public double FS; 
public double FSValue; 
public double Flexibility; 
public double FlexibilityValue;*/ 
double flexibility=0; 
double MaxFlexibility=0; 
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double MaxFS=0; 
double MaxSD=0; 
ActorSelectionValues.clear(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
//do calc for Flexibility 
/*if (actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
flexibility=1/actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size(); 
} 
double FS=actor.get(i).Cash+actor.get(i).Profit;*/ 
MyValues thisMyValues= new MyValues 
(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).SigmaDemand,0,0,0,0,0); 
ActorSelectionValues.add(thisMyValues); 
} 
} 
Collections.sort(ActorSelectionValues, new 
SortActorSelectionValuesBySD ()); 
if (ActorSelectionValues.size()>0) 
{ 
MaxSD=ActorSelectionValues.get(0).SDDemand; 
traceln(); 
for (int i=0;i<ActorSelectionValues.size();i++) 
{ 
ActorSelectionValues.get(i).SDDemandValue=ActorSelectionValue 
s.get(i).SDDemand/MaxSD; 
ActorSelectionValues.get(i).ThisActor.BuyingLocationValue=ActorS 
electionValues.get(i).SDDemandValue; 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
ActorSelectionValues.clear(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
 273 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
//do calc for Flexibility 
/*if (actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
flexibility=1/actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size(); 
} 
double FS=actor.get(i).Cash+actor.get(i).Profit;*/ 
MyValues thisMyValues= new MyValues 
(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).SigmaDemand,0,0,0,0,0); 
ActorSelectionValues.add(thisMyValues); 
} 
} 
Collections.sort(ActorSelectionValues, new 
SortActorSelectionValuesBySD ()); 
if (ActorSelectionValues.size()>0) 
{ 
MaxSD=ActorSelectionValues.get(0).SDDemand; 
traceln(); 
for (int i=0;i<ActorSelectionValues.size();i++) 
{ 
ActorSelectionValues.get(i).SDDemandValue=ActorSelectionValue 
s.get(i).SDDemand/MaxSD; 
ActorSelectionValues.get(i).ThisActor.BuyingLocationValue=ActorS 
electionValues.get(i).SDDemandValue; 
} 
} 
//sort ActorSelectionValues according to FS 
//find largest and normalise ==> FS 
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//alocate values to variables at actor level 
Function: CalculateFlexibilityValue 
Description: Calculates Flexibility requirement of the buying agent based on their perception of global risk 
Requires a calculation of global risk for each type of agent 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //each agents flexibility requirement value is determined by its 
perception of supply global risk 
//ie retailers perceive the risk as being an ideal configuration of links 
to wholesalers and 
//manufacturers comapred to the actual links 
Function: CalculateActualRisk 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body // simply collect actual demand for each agent and calulate variation 
//actual risk = (COV(actual)+(unstaisfied demand/Total Demand))/2 
CovDataSet.reset(); 
//establish satisfied demand COV 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++ ) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 || 
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actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) ) 
{ 
CovDataSet.add(actor.get(i).CurrentDemand); 
} 
} 
if (CovDataSet.count()>0) 
{ 
COVActualRetailerSuppliers=CovDataSet.deviation()/CovDataSet. 
mean(); 
if (Double.isNaN(COVActualRetailerSuppliers)) 
{ 
COVActualRetailerSuppliers=0.1; 
} 
} 
//establish optimal COV for this level of demand !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
//calculate COV risk 
//calculate unsatisfied demand 
//calculate total demand 
//GlobalRetailBuyingRisk=(COVActualRetailerSuppliersCOVidealRetailerSuppliers)/( 
MaxTheoreticalCOVCOVidealRetailerSuppliers); 
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Function: CalculateCurrentDemandManufacturers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body CurrentManufacturingDemand=0; 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
CurrentManufacturingDemand+=actor.get(i).CurrentDemand; 
} 
} 
Function: SetOperationalCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //if called by an agent 
if (agent.Retailer>0) 
{ 
if (agent.CurrentDemand>0) 
{ 
agent.OperatingCosts=agent.CurrentDemand*agent.Price*.8; 
agent.BaseOPerationalDemand=agent.CurrentDemand; 
agent.Cash=14*agent.OperatingCosts; 
if (Double.isNaN(agent.Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
else 
{ 
agent.OperatingCosts=MinInitialCapacity*agent.Price*.8; 
agent.BaseOPerationalDemand=MinInitialCapacity; 
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agent.Cash=14*agent.OperatingCosts; 
if (Double.isNaN(agent.Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
} 
if (agent.Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
if (agent.CurrentDemand>0) 
{ 
agent.OperatingCosts=agent.CurrentDemand*agent.Price*.8; 
agent.BaseOPerationalDemand=agent.CurrentDemand; 
agent.Cash=30*agent.OperatingCosts; 
if (Double.isNaN(agent.Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
else 
{ 
agent.OperatingCosts=MinInitialCapacity*agent.Price*.8; 
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agent.BaseOPerationalDemand=MinInitialCapacity; 
agent.Cash=30*agent.OperatingCosts; 
if (Double.isNaN(agent.Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
} 
if (agent.Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
if (agent.CurrentDemand>0) 
{ 
agent.OperatingCosts=agent.CurrentDemand*agent.Price*.8; //was 
.4 
agent.BaseOPerationalDemand=agent.CurrentDemand; 
agent.Cash=60*agent.OperatingCosts; 
if (Double.isNaN(agent.Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
else 
{ 
agent.OperatingCosts=MinInitialCapacity*agent.Price*.8; 
agent.BaseOPerationalDemand=MinInitialCapacity; 
agent.Cash=60*agent.OperatingCosts; 
if (Double.isNaN(agent.Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
} 
//if called from main agent given by integer 
Arguments: 
Name Type 
agent Actor 
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Function: CalculateMinInitialCapacity 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body MinCapacityData.reset(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer<1 && actor.get(i).CurrentDemand>0) 
{ 
MinCapacityData.add(actor.get(i).CurrentDemand); 
} 
} 
MinInitialCapacity=MinCapacityData.min(); 
Function: CalculateMinimumRetailerDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type double 
Code 
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Body double MinDemand; 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
RetailerDemand.add(actor.get(i).CurrentDemand); 
} 
} 
MinDemand=RetailerDemand.min(); 
return MinDemand; 
Function: MaxGlobalRiskCalculatation 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body 
//sets CurrentIdealDemand=0 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand=0; 
} 
SortRetailersByDemand(); 
SortRetailSuppliersByDemandMax(); 
//WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
/*for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand=0; 
} 
}*/ 
//for each retailer 
if (RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.size()>0 && 
RetailersSortedByDemand.size()>0) 
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{ 
for (int i=0;i<RetailersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
{ 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(0).SupplyDemand+=Retailers 
SortedByDemand.get(i).BuyingDemand/2; 
Collections.sort(RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortRetailSuppliersByDemandMax()); 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(0).SupplyDemand+=Retailers 
SortedByDemand.get(i).BuyingDemand/2; 
Collections.sort(RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortRetailSuppliersByDemandMax()); 
} 
traceln(); 
for (int i=0;i<RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
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{ 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.CurrentIdealDemand= 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).SupplyDemand; 
} 
} 
//now do the same for wholesalers to manufacturers 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
ActorDemand thisActorDemand=new 
ActorDemand(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand,0 ); 
WholesalersSortedByDemand.add(thisActorDemand); 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
Collections.sort(WholesalersSortedByDemand,new 
SortWholesalersByDemand()); 
traceln(); 
//add wholesale suppliers to collection 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
ActorDemand thisActorDemand=new 
ActorDemand(actor.get(i),0,actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand ); 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.add(thisActorDemand); 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
Collections.sort(WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemandMax,new 
SortWholesalersByDemand()); 
traceln(); 
if (WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.size()>0 && 
WholesalersSortedByDemand.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<WholesalersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
{ 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(0).SupplyDemand+=Who 
lesalersSortedByDemand.get(i).BuyingDemand/2; 
Collections.sort(WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortWholesaleSuppliersByDemandMax()); 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(0).SupplyDemand+=Who 
lesalersSortedByDemand.get(i).BuyingDemand/2; 
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Collections.sort(WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortWholesaleSuppliersByDemandMax()); 
} 
traceln(); 
for (int i=0;i<WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.size();i++) 
{ 
WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).Actor.CurrentIdealDem 
and+=WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand.get(i).SupplyDemand; 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
if (time()==2) 
{ 
traceln(); 
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} 
WholesalersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
// todo: calculate COV ==> where to put this ==> not entire network 
but partitioned according type !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
CovDataSet.reset(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 || 
actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0)) 
{ 
CovDataSet.add(actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand); 
} 
} 
if (CovDataSet.count()>0) 
{ 
COVMaxRetailerSuppliers=CovDataSet.deviation()/CovDataSet.me 
an(); 
if (Double.isNaN(COVMaxRetailerSuppliers)) 
{ 
COVMaxRetailerSuppliers=0.1; 
} 
} 
// calculate max imum value 
/*double sum=0; 
//double MaxCOV=0 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Retailer>0 ) 
{ 
sum+=actor.get(i).CurrentDemand; 
} 
} 
//count no of suppliers 
double count=0; 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Wholesaler >0 || 
actor.get(i).Manufacturer >0 )) 
{ 
count+=1; 
} 
} 
//allocate supply 
double flag=0; 
double MinRetailerDemand=CalculateMinimumRetailerDemand(); 
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if (count>2) //!!!!!!!!!!!! WHAT HAPPENS IF JUST 1 SUPPLIER 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! OR 2 SUPPLIERS 
{ 
flag=1; 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Wholesaler >0 || 
actor.get(i).Manufacturer >0 )) 
{ 
if (flag==1) 
{ 
//add sum-count-1 
MaxCov.add (sum-(MinRetailerDemand/2)); // INSTEAD OF 1 THIS 
SHOULD PROBABLY BE THE MNIMUM RETAILER CUSTOMER 
DEMAND 
MaxCov.add (MinRetailerDemand/2); 
} 
else 
{ 
MaxCov.add(sum); 
} 
} 
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}*/ 
//MaxCov.add(1); 
//MaxCov.add(sum-1); 
//MaxTheoreticalCOV=MaxCov.deviation()/MaxCov.mean(); 
//MaxCov.reset(); 
//return MaxTheoreticalCOV ;//NEEDS TO BE CORRECTED FOR 
THE RANGE 
Function: SortRetailSuppliersByDemandMax 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.clear(); 
if (time()==1) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if ((actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 || actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) && 
actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
//todo: calculate demand - by checking whether or not this actor has 
been selected, and summing the current demnd 
//sort retail suppliers by allocated demand (supply demand) 
ActorDemand thisActorDemand=new ActorDemand(actor.get(i),0, 
actor.get(i).CurrentIdealDemand); 
RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand.add(thisActorDemand); 
} 
} 
//todo: sort collection RetailersSortedByDemand 
Collections.sort(RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand,new 
SortRetailSuppliersByDemandMax()); 
traceln(); 
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Function: SetHoldingCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body 
//have to start by calculating avg purchase price 
if (thisActor.Retailer>0 || thisActor.Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<thisActor.MySuppliers.size();i++) 
{ 
AvgPurchasePrice.add(thisActor.MySuppliers.get(i).Price); 
} 
} 
if (thisActor.Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
AvgPurchasePrice.add(ManufacturerPrice); // check this is linked to 
intialisation 
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} 
thisActor.AvgPurchasePrice=AvgPurchasePrice.mean(); 
if (thisActor.CurrentDemand>0) 
{ 
thisActor.HoldingCosts=thisActor.HoldingRate*thisActor.CurrentDe 
mand*thisActor.AvgPurchasePrice; 
traceln(); 
thisActor.EconomicOrderQuantity=sqrt ( (2* 
thisActor.CurrentDemand * 365 *thisActor.OrderCosts) / 
(thisActor.HoldingCosts) ); 
traceln(); 
} 
if (thisActor.CurrentDemand==0) 
{ 
thisActor.HoldingCosts=thisActor.HoldingRate*thisActor.BaseOPer 
ationalDemand*thisActor.AvgPurchasePrice; 
traceln(); 
thisActor.EconomicOrderQuantity=sqrt ( (2* 
thisActor.BaseOPerationalDemand * 365 *thisActor.OrderCosts) / 
(thisActor.HoldingCosts) ); 
traceln(); 
} 
AvgPurchasePrice.reset(); 
traceln(); 
// need to use base op demand if cd =0 
Arguments: 
Name Type 
thisActor Actor 
Function: CalculateDeliveryIndex 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body DeliveryStuffCollectionRetailer.clear(); 
DeliveryStuffCollectionWholesaler.clear(); 
DeliveryStuffCollectionManufacturer.clear(); 
double MaxSDRetailer=0; 
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double MaxSDWholesaler=0; 
double MaxSDManufacturer=0; 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Retailer>0) 
{ 
DeliveryStuff thisDeliveryStuff = new 
DeliveryStuff(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).SigmaDemand); 
DeliveryStuffCollectionRetailer.add(thisDeliveryStuff); 
} 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
DeliveryStuff thisDeliveryStuff = new 
DeliveryStuff(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).SigmaDemand); 
DeliveryStuffCollectionWholesaler.add(thisDeliveryStuff); 
} 
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} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
DeliveryStuff thisDeliveryStuff = new 
DeliveryStuff(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).SigmaDemand); 
DeliveryStuffCollectionManufacturer.add(thisDeliveryStuff); 
} 
} 
//SortRetailersDS 
Collections.sort(DeliveryStuffCollectionRetailer,new 
SortRetailersDS()); 
Collections.sort(DeliveryStuffCollectionWholesaler,new 
SortRetailersDS()); 
Collections.sort(DeliveryStuffCollectionManufacturer,new 
SortRetailersDS()); 
traceln(); 
if (DeliveryStuffCollectionRetailer.size()>0) 
{ 
MaxSDRetailer=DeliveryStuffCollectionRetailer.get(0).SigmaDema 
nd; 
} 
if (DeliveryStuffCollectionWholesaler.size()>0) 
{ 
MaxSDWholesaler=DeliveryStuffCollectionWholesaler.get(0).Sigma 
Demand; 
} 
if(DeliveryStuffCollectionManufacturer.size()>0) 
{ 
MaxSDManufacturer=DeliveryStuffCollectionManufacturer.get(0).Si 
gmaDemand; 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && 
MaxSDRetailer>0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).BuyingLocationValue=actor.get(i).SigmaDemand/MaxS 
DRetailer; 
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} 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && 
MaxSDRetailer==0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).BuyingLocationValue=0; 
} 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && 
MaxSDWholesaler>0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).BuyingLocationValue=actor.get(i).SigmaDemand/MaxS 
DWholesaler; 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && 
MaxSDWholesaler==0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).BuyingLocationValue=0; 
} 
} 
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{ 
actor.get(i).BuyingLocationValue=actor.get(i).SigmaDemand/MaxS 
DManufacturer; 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 && 
MaxSDManufacturer==0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).BuyingLocationValue=0; 
} 
} 
Function: CalculateMarginIndex 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //DailyProfitCollection1.clear(); 
if (DailyProfitCollection1.size()>0) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
//sort DailyProfitCollection into types 
// CHECK THAT ONLY ADDED IF ALIVE 
if (DailyProfitCollection1.size()>0 && time()>30) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<DailyProfitCollection1.size();i++) 
{ 
if (DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.Retailer>0) 
{ 
DailyProfitRetailer.add(DailyProfitCollection1.get(i)); 
} 
} 
//SORT 
Collections.sort(DailyProfitRetailer,new SortActorsByMargin()); 
if (DailyProfitRetailer.size()>0) 
{ 
MaxRetailerMarginVar=DailyProfitRetailer.get(0).Margin; 
 283 
} 
for (int i=0;i<DailyProfitCollection1.size();i++) 
{ 
if (DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.Retailer>0 && 
DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.Died<1 ) 
{ 
DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.BuyingPriceValue=1- 
DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).Margin/MaxRetailerMarginVar; 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
//for each in collection allocate margin value 
for (int i=0;i<DailyProfitCollection1.size();i++) 
{ 
if (DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
DailyProfitWholesaler.add(DailyProfitCollection1.get(i)); 
} 
} 
//SORT 
Collections.sort(DailyProfitWholesaler,new SortActorsByMargin()); 
if (DailyProfitWholesaler.size()>0) 
{ 
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MaxWholessalerMarginVar=DailyProfitWholesaler.get(0).Margin; 
} 
for (int i=0;i<DailyProfitCollection1.size();i++) 
{ 
if (DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.Wholesaler>0 && 
DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.Died<1) 
{ 
DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.BuyingPriceValue=1- 
DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).Margin/MaxWholessalerMarginVar; 
} 
} 
for (int i=0;i<DailyProfitCollection1.size();i++) 
{ 
if (DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
DailyProfitManufacturer.add(DailyProfitCollection1.get(i)); 
} 
} 
//SORT 
Collections.sort(DailyProfitManufacturer,new 
SortActorsByMargin()); 
if (DailyProfitManufacturer.size()>0) 
{ 
MaxManufacturerMarginVar=DailyProfitManufacturer.get(0).Margin; 
} 
for (int i=0;i<DailyProfitCollection1.size();i++) 
{ 
if (DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.Manufacturer>0 && 
DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.Died<1) 
{ 
DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).thisActor.BuyingPriceValue=1- 
DailyProfitCollection1.get(i).Margin/MaxManufacturerMarginVar; 
} 
} 
} 
else 
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{ 
CalcMarginIndexNoValues(); 
} 
Test(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
actor.get(i).DailyCosts.reset(); 
actor.get(i).DailyRevenue.reset(); 
} 
//DailyProfitCollection1.clear(); 
traceln(); 
//todo: clear DailyProfitCollection and daily profit stats collections 
Function: CalculateDailyCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body DailyProfitCollection1.clear(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
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{ 
actor.get(i).RollingDailyProfit.reset(); 
actor.get(i).DailyCosts.add 
((actor.get(i).Stock*actor.get(i).AvgPurchasePrice*actor.get(i).Holdi 
ngRate/365)+actor.get(i).OperatingCosts); 
actor.get(i).Cash-=actor.get(i).DailyCosts.sum(); 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(i).Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
actor.get(i).Cash+=actor.get(i).DailyRevenue.sum(); 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(i).Cash)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
actor.get(i).Profit=actor.get(i).DailyRevenue.sum()- 
actor.get(i).DailyCosts.sum(); 
actor.get(i).DailyProfit.add(actor.get(i).Profit); 
actor.get(i).DailyProfitVar=actor.get(i).Profit; 
actor.get(i).DailyCostVar=actor.get(i).DailyCosts.sum(); 
actor.get(i).DailyRevenueVar=actor.get(i).DailyRevenue.sum(); 
if (actor.get(i).DailyProfit.size()>30) 
{ 
for (int j= (actor.get(i).DailyProfit.size()- 
30);j<actor.get(i).DailyProfit.size();j++) 
{ 
actor.get(i).RollingDailyProfit.add(actor.get(i).DailyProfit.get(j)); 
} 
MarginStuff thisStuff =new 
MarginStuff(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).RollingDailyProfit.mean()); 
DailyProfitCollection1.add(thisStuff); 
} 
else 
{ 
MarginStuff thisStuff =new 
MarginStuff(actor.get(i),actor.get(i).Profit); 
DailyProfitCollection1.add(thisStuff); 
} 
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} 
if (DailyProfitCollection1.size()>0) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
Function: CalcMarginIndexNoValues 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body RetailerMargin.reset(); 
WholesalerMargin.reset(); 
ManufacturerMargin.reset(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0) 
{ 
RetailerMargin.add(actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue); 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
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WholesalerMargin.add(actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue); 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
ManufacturerMargin.add(actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue); 
} 
} 
} 
MaxRetailerMarginVar=RetailerMargin.max(); 
MaxWholessalerMarginVar=WholesalerMargin.max(); 
MaxManufacturerMarginVar=ManufacturerMargin.max(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue=1- 
actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue/MaxRetailerMarginVar; 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue=1- 
actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue/MaxWholessalerMarginVar; 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue=1- 
actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue/MaxManufacturerMarginVar; 
} 
} 
} 
Function: Test 
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Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body traceln(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).BuyingPriceValue==0) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
Function: SetPricingFramework 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body 
/*AvgManufacturerPrice=(1+ManufacturingMarginInput)*RawMateri 
alPrice; 
AvgWholesalePrice=(1+WholesalerMaginInput)*AvgManufacturerPr 
ice; 
AvgRetailPrice=(1+RetailerMarginInput)*AvgWholesalePrice; 
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RetailMaxPrice=AvgRetailPrice*(1+RetailPriceVariation); 
WholesaleMaxPrice=AvgWholesalePrice*(1+WholesalePriceVariati 
on); 
ManufacturerMaxPrice=AvgManufacturerPrice*(1+ManufacturerPric 
eVariation); 
RetailMinPrice=AvgRetailPrice*(1-RetailPriceVariation); 
WholesaleMinPrice=AvgWholesalePrice*(1- 
WholesalePriceVariation); 
ManufacturerMinPrice=AvgManufacturerPrice*(1- 
ManufacturerPriceVariation); 
traceln();*/ 
Function: ReallocateStock 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //count number of equivilent agents still alive 
int count=0; 
double AmountToBeAllocated=0; 
if (DeadAgent.Retailer>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
count+=1; 
} 
} 
AmountToBeAllocated=DeadAgent.Stock/count; 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
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if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
actor.get(i).Stock+=AmountToBeAllocated; 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(i).Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
//Pay for stock ?? 
} 
} 
} 
if (DeadAgent.Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
count+=1; 
} 
} 
AmountToBeAllocated=DeadAgent.Stock/count; 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
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actor.get(i).Stock+=AmountToBeAllocated; 
//Pay for stock ?? 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(i).Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
if (DeadAgent.Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
count+=1; 
} 
} 
AmountToBeAllocated=DeadAgent.Stock/count; 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
actor.get(i).Stock+=AmountToBeAllocated; 
//Pay for stock ?? 
} 
} 
} 
//reallocate stock 
Arguments: 
Name Type 
DeadAgent Actor 
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Function: CalculateBaseOperationalDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body RetailBaseOpDemand.reset(); 
ManufacturerBaseOpDemand.reset(); 
WholesaleBaseOpDemand.reset(); 
//double SumOfRetailBaseOpDemand=0; 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Retailer>0) 
{ 
RetailBaseOpDemand.add(actor.get(i).BaseOPerationalDemand); 
} 
} 
SumOfRetailBaseOpDemand=RetailBaseOpDemand.sum(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
ManufacturerBaseOpDemand.add(actor.get(i).BaseOPerationalDe 
mand); 
} 
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} 
SumOfManufacturerBaseOpDemand=ManufacturerBaseOpDeman 
d.sum(); 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
WholesaleBaseOpDemand.add(actor.get(i).BaseOPerationalDema 
nd); 
} 
} 
SumOfWholesalerBaseOpDemand=WholesaleBaseOpDemand.su 
Function: RedistributeBaseOpDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body CalculateBaseOperationalDemand(); 
double tempBOD=0; 
if ( DeadAgentType==3) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
if (DeadAgentType==1) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1 ) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).BaseOPerationalDemand==0 
||SumOfRetailBaseOpDemand==0 || AmountToBeRedistributed 
==0) 
{ 
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traceln(); 
} 
actor.get(i).BaseOPerationalDemand+=(actor.get(i).BaseOPeration 
alDemand/SumOfRetailBaseOpDemand)* 
AmountToBeRedistributed; 
} 
} 
} 
if (DeadAgentType==2) 
{ 
//redistribute stock 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).BaseOPerationalDemand==0 
||SumOfWholesalerBaseOpDemand==0 || 
AmountToBeRedistributed==0 ) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(i).Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
tempBOD=actor.get(i).BaseOPerationalDemand; 
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AmountToBeRedistributed; 
actor.get(i).Stock+=(tempBOD/SumOfWholesalerBaseOpDemand)* 
StockToBeRedistributed; 
if (Double.isNaN(actor.get(i).Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
if (DeadAgentType==3) 
{ 
//redistribute capacity and stock 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
tempBOD=actor.get(i).BaseOPerationalDemand; 
actor.get(i).BaseOPerationalDemand+=(tempBOD/SumOfManufact 
urerBaseOpDemand)* 
AmountToBeRedistributed; 
actor.get(i).Stock+=(tempBOD/SumOfManufacturerBaseOpDeman 
d)*StockToBeRedistributed; 
} 
Arguments: 
Name Type 
AmountToBeRedistributed double 
DeadAgentType int 
StockToBeRedistributed double 
Function: CreateNewAgents 
Name Value 
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General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //check to see if Retailers should be introduced 
if (time()>TimeLastRetailerIntroduced+100) 
{ 
create_Createnewretailer(uniform_discr(1,15)); 
TimeLastRetailerIntroduced=time(); 
} 
//check to see if Wholesaler should be introduced 
if (time()>TimeLastWholesalerIntroduced+150) 
{ 
create_Createnewwholesaler(uniform_discr(1,15)); 
TimeLastWholesalerIntroduced=time(); 
} 
//check to see if Manufacturer should be introduced 
if (time()>TimeLastManufacturerIntroduced+300) 
{ 
create_Createnewmanufacturer(uniform_discr(1,15)); 
TimeLastManufacturerIntroduced=time(); 
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} 
Function: SetOPerationalCostsForNewBorns 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type double 
Code 
Body //operational costs= normal distribution around the mean of the type 
//calculate the mean operational costs 
// pass they type in the call 
//Retailer=1;wholesaler=2;manufacturer=3 
//return operatingCostsinput; 
double sum=0; 
double count=0; 
double operatingCostsinput=0; 
int noOfWholesalers=0; 
int noOfManufacturers=0; 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
noOfWholesalers+=1; 
} 
} 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
noOfManufacturers+=1; 
} 
} 
if (ActorType==1) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
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count=count+1; 
sum= sum+ actor.get(i).OperatingCosts; 
} 
} 
//calculate mean retailer operating costs - do this before the actor is 
added 
operatingCostsinput=( sum/count); 
//return (operatingCostsinput); 
} 
if (ActorType==2) 
{ 
if (noOfWholesalers>0) 
{ 
//calculate mean wholesaler operating costs - do this before the 
actor is added 
for (int i =0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
count=count+1; 
sum= sum+ actor.get(i).OperatingCosts; 
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//actor.get(i).Stock=20*RetailMarketValue/noOfWholesalers; 
} 
} 
operatingCostsinput=(double)( sum/count); 
//return (operatingCostsinput); 
} 
} 
if (ActorType==2) 
{ 
if (noOfWholesalers<1) 
{ 
//calculate mean wholesaler operating costs - do this before the 
actor is added 
for (int i =0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0 ) 
{ 
count=count+1; 
sum= sum+ actor.get(i).OperatingCosts; 
//actor.get(i).Stock=20*RetailMarketValue/noOfWholesalers; 
} 
} 
operatingCostsinput=(double)( sum/count); 
//return (operatingCostsinput); 
} 
} 
if (ActorType==3) 
{ 
//calculate mean retailer operating costs - do this before the actor is 
added 
if (noOfManufacturers>0) 
{ 
for (int i =0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
count=count+1; 
sum= sum+ actor.get(i).OperatingCosts; 
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//actor.get(i).Stock=20*RetailMarketValue/this.noOfManufacturers; 
} 
} 
operatingCostsinput=(double)( sum/count); 
//return (operatingCostsinput); 
} 
} 
if (ActorType==3) 
{ 
//calculate mean retailer operating costs - do this before the actor is 
added 
if (noOfManufacturers<1) 
{ 
for (int i =0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 ) 
{ 
count=count+1; 
sum= sum+ actor.get(i).OperatingCosts; 
//actor.get(i).Stock=20*RetailMarketValue/this.noOfManufacturers; 
} 
} 
operatingCostsinput=(double)( sum/count); 
//return (operatingCostsinput); 
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Name Value 
} 
} 
traceln(); 
return (operatingCostsinput); 
Arguments: 
Name Type 
ActorType double 
Function: CalculateRetailDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body RetailDemandStats.reset(); 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
RetailDemandStats.add(actor.get(i).CurrentDemand); 
} 
} 
RetailDemand=RetailDemandStats.sum(); 
Function: CheckProductionAndConsumption 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body Production.reset(); 
Consumption.reset(); 
TotalRetailDemand.reset(); 
TotalWholesaleAvailableStock.reset(); 
TotalManufacturingAvailableStock.reset(); 
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TotalAllocatedStock.reset(); 
for (int i=0; i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 ))//|| 
actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0)) 
{ 
Production.add (actor.get(i).CurrentDemand); 
TotalAllocatedStock.add(actor.get(i).AllocatedStock); 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 ) 
{ 
TotalManufacturingAvailableStock.add(actor.get(i).AvailableStock); 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
TotalWholesaleAvailableStock.add(actor.get(i).AvailableStock); 
} 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Retailer>0) && 
actor.get(i).AvailableStock>=actor.get(i).CurrentDemand )// || 
actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0)) 
{ 
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Name Value 
Consumption.add (actor.get(i).CurrentDemand); 
TotalRetailDemand.add(actor.get(i).CurrentDemand); 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1 && (actor.get(i).Retailer>0) && 
actor.get(i).AvailableStock<actor.get(i).CurrentDemand )// || 
actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0)) 
{ 
Consumption.add (actor.get(i).AvailableStock); 
TotalRetailDemand.add(actor.get(i).CurrentDemand); 
} 
} 
TotalConsumption=Consumption.sum(); 
TotalProduction=Production.sum(); 
TotalRetaildemandValue=TotalRetailDemand.sum(); 
TotalWholesaleAvailableStockValue=TotalWholesaleAvailableStoc 
k.sum(); 
TotalManufacturingAvaialableStockValue=TotalManufacturingAvail 
ableStock.sum(); 
TotalAllocatedStockValue=TotalAllocatedStock.sum(); 
DailyOrdersReceived=DailyOrderCollection.sum(); 
DailyNSAsReceived=DailyNSACollection.sum(); 
DailyOrderCollection.reset(); 
DailyNSACollection.reset(); 
Function: CountManufacturersAlive 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body int count=0; 
for (int i =0; i<actor.size(); i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 && actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
count+=1; 
} 
} 
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if (count<1) 
{ 
create_Createnewmanufacturer(0); 
} 
Function: CollectOutputData 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body // at each time step capture any changes in relationships & capture 
number of 
//changes and magnitude of changes 
// capture time and magnitude of changes 
Function: SettingInitialConditions 
Name Value 
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Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body // take parameters and calulate average prices 
double TotalAddedValue=0; 
double RetailAddedValue=0; 
double WholesaleAddedValue=0; 
double ManufacturingAddedValue=0; 
//calculate total added value 
TotalAddedValue=AvgRetailPrice-RawMaterialPrice; 
//RetailAddedValue=TotalAddedValue*RetailerMarginInput; 
WholesaleAddedValue=TotalAddedValue*WholesalerMaginInput; 
ManufacturingAddedValue=TotalAddedValue*ManufacturingMargin 
Input; 
//set Manufacturing retail price first 
AvgManufacturerPrice=RawMaterialPrice+ManufacturingAddedVal 
ue; 
ManufacturerMaxPrice=AvgManufacturerPrice+(ManufacturerPrice 
Variation*AvgManufacturerPrice); 
ManufacturerMinPrice=AvgManufacturerPrice( 
ManufacturerPriceVariation*AvgManufacturerPrice); 
//set wholesale price 
AvgWholesalePrice=AvgManufacturerPrice+WholesaleAddedValue 
; 
WholesaleMaxPrice=AvgWholesalePrice+(WholesalePriceVariation 
*AvgWholesalePrice); 
WholesaleMinPrice=AvgWholesalePrice( 
WholesalePriceVariation*AvgWholesalePrice); 
//set retail max annd min 
RetailMaxPrice=AvgRetailPrice+(RetailPriceVariation*AvgRetailPric 
e); 
RetailMinPrice=AvgRetailPrice( 
RetailPriceVariation*AvgRetailPrice); 
//take parameters and calculate min and max prices for each tier 
Event: event 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Trigger Type timeout 
Mode occuresOnce 
Occurence Time 1 
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Action for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0) 
{ 
dataset.add(actor.get(i).TargetMarketShare,actor.get(i).Price); 
} 
} 
Event: event1 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Trigger Type timeout 
Mode cyclic 
Recurrence 1 
Page 43 of 129 
Calculating_commitment_16a6 
Name Value 
Occurence Time 0 
Action CalculateRetailDemand(); 
CalculateCurrentDemandManufacturers(); 
CalculateGlobalRisk(); 
CalculateActualRisk(); 
if (COVActualRetailerSuppliers>COVMaxRetailerSuppliers) 
{ 
COVMaxRetailerSuppliers=COVActualRetailerSuppliers; 
} 
GlobalRetailBuyingRisk=COVActualRetailerSuppliers/COVMaxRet 
ailerSuppliers; 
if (GlobalRetailBuyingRisk>1 || 
Double.isNaN(GlobalRetailBuyingRisk)) 
{ 
GlobalRetailBuyingRisk=1; 
} 
CalculateBuyingLocationValue(); 
CalculateDeliveryIndex(); 
CalculateDailyCosts(); 
CalculateMarginIndex(); 
MarketShareAllocation(); 
traceln(); 
//CreateNewAgents(); 
CheckProductionAndConsumption(); 
Variable: noOfWholesalers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: GlobalStdDev 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0.3 
Variable: RetailMarketValue 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
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Variable: noOfRetailers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
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Variable: noOfManufacturers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TotalNoOfAgents 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: COVidealRetailerSuppliers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: COVActualRetailerSuppliers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: GlobalRetailBuyingRisk 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: ManufacturerPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 3 
Variable: BadBoyRef 
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Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: CurrentManufacturingDemand 
Name Value 
General 
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Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: MinInitialCapacity 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: COVMaxRetailerSuppliers 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: MaxRetailerMarginVar 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: MaxWholessalerMarginVar 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: MaxManufacturerMarginVar 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
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Name Value 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TestCount 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: RetailMaxPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: ManufacturerMinPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: WholesaleMinPrice 
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Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: RetailMinPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: ManufacturerMaxPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Page 47 of 129 
Calculating_commitment_16a6 
Variable: WholesaleMaxPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: AvgRetailPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 15 
Variable: AvgManufacturerPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 4 
Variable: AvgWholesalePrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 8 
Variable: RawMaterialPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 2 
Variable: SumOfRetailBaseOpDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TimeLastManufacturerIntroduced 
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Name Value 
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Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TimeLastRetailerIntroduced 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TimeLastWholesalerIntroduced 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: RetailDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TotalConsumption 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TotalProduction 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: SumOfManufacturerBaseOpDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
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Name Value 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: SumOfWholesalerBaseOpDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: DailyOrdersReceived 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
 300 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: DailyNSAsReceived 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TotalRetaildemandValue 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TotalWholesaleAvailableStockValue 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TotalManufacturingAvaialableStockValue 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
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Variable: TotalAllocatedStockValue 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Replication 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type int 
Variable: ExperimentVersion 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type int 
Variable: TotalNoOfConnections 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TotalMagnitudeOfConnections 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
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Collection: ActorsRanked 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class ActorPrice 
Collection: RetailersSortedByDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
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Name Value 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class ActorDemand 
Collection: WholesalersSortedByDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class ActorDemand 
Collection: RetailSuppliersSortedByDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class ActorDemand 
Collection: WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class ActorDemand 
Collection: ActorSelectionValues 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class MyValues 
Collection: WholesaleSuppliersSortedByDemandMax 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class ActorDemand 
Collection: DeliveryStuffCollectionRetailer 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class DeliveryStuff 
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Collection: DeliveryStuffCollectionWholesaler 
Name Value 
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General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class DeliveryStuff 
Collection: DeliveryStuffCollectionManufacturer 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class DeliveryStuff 
Collection: DailyProfitCollection1 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class MarginStuff 
Collection: DailyProfitRetailer 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class MarginStuff 
Collection: DailyProfitWholesaler 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class MarginStuff 
Collection: DailyProfitManufacturer 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class MarginStuff 
Collection: Changes 
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Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class MySupplierRelationships 
Environment: environment 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Enable Steps true 
Step Duration 1 
Before Step double NoOfLiveManufacturers=0; 
double NoOfLiveWholesalers=0; 
double NoOfLiveRetailers=0; 
TotalNoOfConnections=0; 
TotalMagnitudeOfConnections=0; 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
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actor.get(i).OldMysuppliersDetails.clear(); 
actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails.clear(); 
actor.get(i).OldMysuppliersDetails1.clear(); 
actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails1.clear(); 
if (actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
TotalNoOfConnections+=actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size(); 
for (int j =0;j<actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size();j++) 
{ 
MySupplierRelationships thisRelationship= new 
MySupplierRelationships 
(actor.get(i).MySuppliers.get(j),actor.get(i),actor.get(i).CurrentDema 
nd/actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size(),0); 
TotalMagnitudeOfConnections+=actor.get(i).CurrentDemand/actor. 
get(i).MySuppliers.size(); 
actor.get(i).OldMysuppliersDetails.add(thisRelationship.Supplier.get 
Index()); 
actor.get(i).OldMysuppliersDetails1.add(thisRelationship.Supplier.g 
etIndex()); 
} 
} 
actor.get(i).CollaboratingProcess(); 
actor.get(i).CreateSelectionIndexForSuppliers(); 
} 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int j =0;j<actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size();j++) 
{ 
MySupplierRelationships thisRelationship= new 
MySupplierRelationships 
(actor.get(i).MySuppliers.get(j),actor.get(i),actor.get(i).CurrentDema 
nd/actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size(),0); 
actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails.add(thisRelationship.Supplier.g 
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Name Value 
// compare old with new 
actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails.removeAll(actor.get(i).OldMysu 
ppliersDetails1); 
actor.get(i).OldMysuppliersDetails.removeAll(actor.get(i).NewMysu 
ppliersDetails1); 
} 
} 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Retailer>0) 
{ 
NoOfLiveRetailers+=1; 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
NoOfLiveWholesalers+=1; 
} 
if (actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
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NoOfLiveManufacturers+=1; 
} 
} 
} 
/*for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails.size()>0 && time()>0 ) 
{ 
for (int j=0;j<actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails.size();j++) 
{ 
int buyerident=actor.get(i).getIndex(); 
int supplierident=actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails.get(j); 
double 
Magnitude=actor.get(i).CurrentDemand/actor.get(i).MySuppliers.siz 
e(); 
database.modify 
("INSERT INTO Results VALUES ( " + time() + "," + 
ManufacturerPriceVariation +", "+ ManufacturingMarginInput + ", "+ 
RetailPriceVariation +" , " + WholesalePriceVariation +"," + 
WholesalerMaginInput + " , "+ buyerident +" ," +supplierident + "," + 
Magnitude +") "); 
} 
} 
} 
}*/ 
for (int i=0;i<actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
if (actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails.size()>0 && time()>0 ) 
{ 
for (int j=0;j<actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails.size();j++) 
{ 
int buyerident=actor.get(i).getIndex(); 
int supplierident=actor.get(i).NewMysuppliersDetails.get(j); 
double 
Magnitude=actor.get(i).CurrentDemand/actor.get(i).MySuppliers.siz 
e(); 
file.println(ExperimentVersion +" "+ Replication + " " + time () + " " + 
ManufacturerPriceVariation + " " + ManufacturingMarginInput + " " 
+ RetailPriceVariation + " " + 
WholesalePriceVariation + " " + WholesalerMaginInput + " " + 
buyerident + " " + supplierident + " " 
+ Magnitude + " " + TotalNoOfConnections + " " + 
TotalMagnitudeOfConnections +" " + NoOfLiveRetailers + " " + 
NoOfLiveWholesalers + " " + NoOfLiveManufacturers + " "); 
} 
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Name Value 
Advanced 
Space Type CONTINUOUS 
Dynamic: Width 500 
Dynamic: Height 500 
Layout Type USER_DEF 
Network Type USER_DEF 
Actor: actor 
Name Value 
General 
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Type Actor 
Java Package Name calculating_commitment 
Replication 0 
Embedded Object Collection Type ARRAY_LIST_BASED 
Envelopes environment 
Stack Chart: chart 
Name Value 
General 
Scale Type AUTO 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Advanced 
x -370 
y -30 
Width 260 
Height 230 
Appearance 
Show Legend true 
Legend Place SOUTH 
Bars Direction UP 
Bars Relative Width 0.8 
Chart Items: 
Title Color Value 
AvgRetailPrice darkOrange AvgRetailPrice 
AvgWholesalePrice mediumSeaGreen AvgWholesalePrice 
AvgManufacturerPr 
ice 
slateBlue AvgManufacturerPrice 
Time Plot: plot1 
Name Value 
General 
Time Window 1000 
Vertical Scale AUTO 
Analysis Auto Update true 
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Name Value 
Recurrence 1 
Dataset Samples To Keep 1000 
Advanced 
x -420 
y 310 
Width 400 
Height 340 
Appearance 
Show Legend true 
Legend Place SOUTH 
Label Format MODEL_TIME_UNITS 
Plot Items: 
Title Type Dataset / Value Point Style Color Line Width Interpolation 
GlobalRetailBuying 
Risk 
value GlobalRetailBuyingRisk NONE crimson true 2 LINEAR 
Data Set: dataset 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Axis Data Freeze X Axis false 
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Dataset Samples To Keep 100 
Analysis Auto Update false 
Statistics: CovDataSet 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: MaxCov 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: MinCapacityData 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
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Name Value 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: RetailerDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: AvgPurchasePrice 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: RetailerMargin 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: WholesalerMargin 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: ManufacturerMargin 
Name Value 
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General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: WholesaleBaseOpDemand 
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Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: ManufacturerBaseOpDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: RetailBaseOpDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: RetailDemandStats 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: Production 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: Consumption 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: DailyOrderCollection 
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Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: DailyNSACollection 
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Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: TotalRetailDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: TotalWholesaleAvailableStock 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: TotalManufacturingAvailableStock 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: TotalAllocatedStock 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
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Name Value 
Recurrence 1 
Data Set: dataset1 
Name Value 
General 
Axis Data Freeze X Axis true 
Dataset Samples To Keep 100 
Analysis Auto Update false 
Embedded Object Presentation: actor_Presentation 
Text: text4 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 30 
y 282 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 14 
Bold Font Style true 
Text Risk Calculations 
Advanced 
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x 30 
y 282 
Database: database 
Name Value 
General 
DB Type EXCEL_ACCESS 
DB File Name C:/Users/mn076059/Documents/Backup Sept 2010/My 
docs/cranfield/Thesis/Results/ThesisResults.accdb 
Connection On Startup true 
Text File: file 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Text File Type FILE 
Text File Name C:/Users/mn076059/Documents/Backup Sept 2010/My 
docs/cranfield/Thesis/Results/Results.txt 
File Mode WRITE_APPEND 
Active Object Class: Actor 
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Name Value 
General 
Agent true 
Advanced 
Additional Code //using a comparator 
public class FSSortByFS1 implements 
Comparator<SupplierSelectionStuff>{ 
public int compare (SupplierSelectionStuff Manufacturer1, 
SupplierSelectionStuff Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.FSScore; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.FSScore; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class DistSortByDist implements 
Comparator<SupplierSelectionStuff>{ 
public int compare (SupplierSelectionStuff Manufacturer1, 
SupplierSelectionStuff Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.DistanceScore; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.DistanceScore; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class PriceSortByPrice implements 
Comparator<SupplierSelectionStuff>{ 
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SupplierSelectionStuff Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.PriceScore; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.PriceScore; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class SortBYUtility implements 
Comparator<SupplierSelectionStuff>{ 
public int compare (SupplierSelectionStuff Manufacturer1, 
SupplierSelectionStuff Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.SupplierUtility; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.SupplierUtility; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
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return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
//using a comparator 
public class FlexibilitySortByFlexibility implements 
Comparator<SupplierSelectionStuff>{ 
public int compare (SupplierSelectionStuff Manufacturer1, 
SupplierSelectionStuff Manufacturer2){ 
Double Manufacturer1Score=Manufacturer1.FlexibilityScore; 
Double Manufacturer2Score=Manufacturer2.FlexibilityScore; 
if (Manufacturer1Score>Manufacturer2Score){ 
return -1; 
}else if (Manufacturer1Score<Manufacturer2Score){ 
return 1; 
}else { 
return 0; 
} 
} 
} 
Auto-create Datasets true 
Recurrence 1 
Dataset Samples To Keep 100 
Agent 
Space Type CONTINUOUS 
Environment Defines Init Location true 
On Receive if (msg.getClass()==Order.class) 
{ 
Order thisOrder = (Order)msg; //cast it to the correct type 
if (thisOrder.Buyer.Retailer>0) 
{ 
get_Main().DailyOrderCollection.add(thisOrder.Quantity); 
} 
if (AvailableStock>=thisOrder.Quantity) //&& 
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averageDemand<=BaseOPerationalDemand) //check to see if 
enough stock 
{//Calculate LT 
traceln(); 
double distance= 
(getDistance(this.getX(),this.getY(),get_Main().actor.get(thisOrder.B 
uyer.getIndex()).getX(),get_Main().actor.get(thisOrder.Buyer.getInd 
ex()).getY()))*10 ; 
double LT=round( 1+( ( (distance/50) /24)+.5) );//1 day to 
process order 
//create Replenishment ==>event/class 
AllocatedStock=AllocatedStock+thisOrder.Quantity; 
AvailableStock=Stock-AllocatedStock; 
DemandForOpCosts.add(thisOrder.Quantity); 
//check to see if enough stock 
create_Replenishment(LT,thisOrder.Quantity,thisOrder.Buyer,this); 
thisOrder.Buyer.NoOfReplenishments=thisOrder.Buyer.NoOfReple 
nishments+1; 
OrdersReceived=OrdersReceived+thisOrder.Quantity; 
if (!MyExistingCustomers.contains(thisOrder.Buyer)) 
{ 
MyExistingCustomers.add(thisOrder.Buyer); 
} 
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if (!thisOrder.Buyer.MyCollaboratingSuppliers.contains(this)) 
{ 
OrderHistory1=OrderHistory1+thisOrder.Quantity; 
if (Wholesaler>0 || Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
MyProduction=MyProduction+thisOrder.Quantity; 
} 
} 
} 
else 
{ 
//send NSA 
traceln(); 
NSA thisNSA = new 
NSA(thisOrder.Buyer,thisOrder.Quantity,this,get_Main().BadBoyRef 
); 
get_Main().BadBoyRef=get_Main().BadBoyRef+1; 
send(thisNSA,thisOrder.Buyer); 
NSASent=NSASent+ thisOrder.Quantity; 
OrdersReceived=OrdersReceived+thisOrder.Quantity; 
OrderHistory.add(thisOrder.Quantity); 
OrderHistory1=OrderHistory1+thisOrder.Quantity;//++++++++++++ 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
} 
} 
if (msg.getClass()==NSA.class) 
{ 
NSA thisNSA = (NSA)msg; //cast it to the correct type 
if (Retailer>0) 
{ 
get_Main().DailyNSACollection.add(thisNSA.OrderQty); 
} 
ExpectedStock=ExpectedStock-thisNSA.OrderQty; 
NSAreceived=NSAreceived+1; 
//BadBoyClass thisBadBoyClass= new 
BadBoyClass(thisNSA.Sendor,thisNSA.BadBoyRef); 
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//BadBoys.add(thisBadBoyClass); 
NSAsReceived.add(thisNSA); 
CheckIfTooManyNSAs(thisNSA); 
//what to do about bad boys 
//create event to remove bad boy after say 90 days 
//create_CleanBadBoys(10,thisNSA.Sendor,thisNSA.BadBoyRef); 
Statechart Refs [] 
Before Step /*if (Retailer>0) 
{ 
DemandForOpCosts.add(CurrentDemand); 
} 
UpdateOperationalCosts(); 
NSASent=0; 
CalculatingHoldingCosts(); 
StockCalcs(); 
MyProduction=0; 
MyConsumption=0;*/ 
if (Manufacturer>0 && Status.isStateActive(Alive)) 
{ 
MySizeAndType.setFillColor(blue); 
} 
if (Wholesaler>0 && Status.isStateActive(Alive)) 
{ 
MySizeAndType.setFillColor(yellow); 
} 
if (Retailer>0 && Status.isStateActive(Alive)) 
{ 
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MySizeAndType.setFillColor(red); 
} 
if (Died<1) 
{ 
if (NSASent>1 && OrdersReceived>1) 
{ 
Quality=1- (NSASent/OrdersReceived); 
} 
else 
{ 
Quality=1; 
} 
MyGlobalRiskPerception(); 
CalculateQualityValue(); 
RetailerSalesCash(); 
ConsumeStock(); 
CalculateCommitment(); 
CalculateBuyerFlexibilityRequirement(); 
CalculateFSValue(); 
//Cash+=DailyRevenue.sum(); 
//Cash-=DailyVariableCosts.sum(); 
//DailyRevenue.reset(); 
//DailyVariableCosts.reset(); 
//CalculateDailyCosts(); 
//++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
++++++ 
//Changes(); 
//++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++++++++ 
if (time()==0) 
{ 
CalcInitialStock(); 
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} 
CalculatingHoldingCosts(); 
StockCalcs(); 
Ordering(); 
CalculateDailyDemand(); 
//get_Main().CalculateGlobalRisk(); 
//get_Main().CalculateDemandForSuppliers(); 
//OrganiseSupplyBaseData(this,get_Main().actor.get(5)); 
//todo: 
//Adaptation(); 
//==============================================>>>> 
>>> 
if (Double.isNaN(Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
} 
DrawConnections(); 
On Step //CalculateDailyCosts(); 
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Dynamic Event: ManufacturingRequest 
Name Value 
General 
Action Stock=Stock+Quantity; 
ExpectedStock=ExpectedStock-Quantity; 
MyConsumption=MyConsumption+Quantity; 
DailyVariableCosts.add(Quantity*Price*.2); 
VariableCosts.add(Quantity*Price*.2); 
Parameters: 
Name Type 
Quantity double 
Dynamic Event: Replenishment 
Name Value 
General 
Action 
int i = Buyer.getIndex(); 
int j= Seller.getIndex(); 
if ((i==14 || j==14) && time()==356) 
{ 
traceln(); 
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} 
/*get_Main().actor.get(i).Stock=get_Main().actor.get(i).Stock+Order 
edQuantity; 
get_Main().actor.get(i).Cash= 
get_Main().actor.get(j).Price*OrderedQuantity; 
get_Main().actor.get(j).Cash+=get_Main().actor.get(j).Price*Ordere 
dQuantity;*/ 
get_Main().actor.get(i).ExpectedStock=get_Main().actor.get(i).Expe 
ctedStock-OrderedQuantity; 
get_Main().actor.get(i).MyConsumption=get_Main().actor.get(i).My 
Consumption+OrderedQuantity; 
get_Main().actor.get(i).Stock+=OrderedQuantity; 
if (Double.isNaN(get_Main().actor.get(i).Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
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if ((i==14 || j==14) && time()==355) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
//get_Main().actor.get(j).Stock=get_Main().actor.get(j).StockOrderedQuantity; 
Stock-=OrderedQuantity; 
if (Double.isNaN(Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
if ((Stock)<0) 
{ 
int Phil=0; 
} 
/*get_Main().actor.get(j).AllocatedStock= 
get_Main().actor.get(j).AllocatedStock-OrderedQuantity; 
get_Main().actor.get(j).RevenueData.add((OrderedQuantity*get_Ma 
in().actor.get(j).Price)); 
get_Main().actor.get(j).DailyRevenue.add((OrderedQuantity*get_M 
ain().actor.get(j).Price));*/ 
AllocatedStock-=OrderedQuantity; 
RevenueData.add((OrderedQuantity*Price)); 
DailyRevenue.add((OrderedQuantity*Price)); 
get_Main().actor.get(i).PurchaseCostPerUnit=Price;//get_Main().act 
or.get(j).Price; 
get_Main().actor.get(i).DistributionCostsPerUnit = 
(getDistance(get_Main().actor.get(i).getX(),get_Main().actor.get(i).g 
etY(),this.getX(),this.getY())*10) 
*get_Main().actor.get(i).CostPerKm/OrderedQuantity; 
//traceln ("actor i Purchase cost per nit" + " " + 
get_Main().actor.get(i).PurchaseCostPerUnit); 
//traceln ("actor i distributioncosts per unit" + " " + 
get_Main().actor.get(i).DistributionCostsPerUnit); 
//adjust cash for distribution 
//get_Main().actor.get(i).Cash= 
get_Main().actor.get(i).DistributionCostsPerUnit*OrderedQuantity; 
if (DistributionCostsPerUnit>infinity) 
{ 
int p=1; 
} 
double buyerLocX=get_Main().actor.get(i).getX(); 
double BuyerLocY=get_Main().actor.get(i).getY(); 
double SellerLocX=this.getX(); //get_Main().actor.get(j).getX(); 
double SellerLocy= this.getY();// get_Main().actor.get(j).getY(); 
get_Main().actor.get(i).VariableCosts.add(OrderedQuantity*(get_M 
ain().actor.get(i).PurchaseCostPerUnit+get_Main().actor.get(i).Distri 
butionCostsPerUnit)); 
traceln("daily variable costs for i" + " " + 
OrderedQuantity*(get_Main().actor.get(i).PurchaseCostPerUnit+get 
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(i).DistributionCostsPerUnit)); 
get_Main().actor.get(i).DailyVariableCosts.add(OrderedQuantity*(g 
et_Main().actor.get(i).PurchaseCostPerUnit+get_Main().actor.get(i). 
DistributionCostsPerUnit)); 
traceln ("order quantity" + " " + OrderedQuantity); 
traceln("sum of daily variable costs" + " " + 
get_Main().actor.get(i).DailyVariableCosts.sum()); 
get_Main().actor.get(i).VariableCostPerUnit=get_Main().actor.get(i). 
PurchaseCostPerUnit+get_Main().actor.get(i).DistributionCostsPer 
Unit 
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+get_Main().actor.get(i).HoldingCostsPerUnit; 
get_Main().actor.get(i).DistributionCostsPerUnit1=get_Main().actor. 
get(i).DistributionCostsPerUnit; 
get_Main().actor.get(i).BuyPrice=get_Main().actor.get(i).PurchaseC 
ostPerUnit; 
if (Manufacturer>0)//Seller.Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
/*get_Main().actor.get(j).VariableCosts.add(OrderedQuantity*(.4*get 
_Main().actor.get(j).Price )); 
get_Main().actor.get(j).DailyVariableCosts.add(OrderedQuantity*(.4 
*get_Main().actor.get(j).Price ));*/ 
VariableCosts.add(OrderedQuantity*(.4*Price )); 
DailyVariableCosts.add(OrderedQuantity*(.4*Price )); 
} 
if ((i==14 || j==14) && time()==355 ) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
Parameters: 
Name Type 
OrderedQuantity double 
Buyer Actor 
Seller Actor 
Dynamic Event: CleanBadBoys 
Name Value 
General 
Action for (int i=0;i<BadBoys.size();i++) 
{ 
if (BadBoys.get(i).BadBoy==ActorToClean && 
BadBoys.get(i).BadBoyRef==BadBoyRef) 
{ 
BadBoys.remove(i); 
} 
} 
Parameters: 
Name Type 
ActorToClean Actor 
BadBoyRef int 
Function: CreateSelectionIndexForSuppliers 
Description: checked to see that arrays are poulated appropriately and that indexes are calculated correctly 
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concern that whether to use index or ranking, and whether inferior index is representative of poorer financial security 
NEED TO CHECK BADBOYS ARE BEING HANDLED 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body 
double NormalisingScore=0; 
double NormalisingDistance=0; 
double NormalisingPrice=0; 
double FSScore=0; 
double NormalisingFlexibility=0; 
double TotalValue=0; 
double BuyingFSWeight=0; 
double BuyingLocationWeight=0; 
double BuyingPriceWeight=0 ; 
double BuyingQualityWeight=0; 
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double BuyerCommitmentReqWeight=0; 
double BuyerFlexibilityRequirement=0; 
SupplierUtilityCollection.clear(); 
TotalValue=BuyingFSValue+BuyingLocationValue+BuyingPriceVal 
ue+BuyerFlexibilityRequirement+BuyingQualityValue; 
if (MySuppliers.isEmpty()) 
{ 
BuyerFlexibilityRequirement=0; 
BuyingPriceWeight=0; 
} 
else 
{ 
BuyerFlexibilityRequirement=(1/MySuppliers.size()); 
BuyerCommitmentReqWeight= 
((1/(MySuppliers.size())/TotalValue)); 
} 
BuyingFSWeight=BuyingFSValue/TotalValue; 
BuyingLocationWeight= BuyingLocationValue/TotalValue; 
BuyingPriceWeight= BuyingPriceValue/TotalValue; 
BuyingQualityWeight=BuyingQualityValue/TotalValue; 
traceln(); 
if (Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<get_Main().actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if(get_Main().actor.get(i).Died<1 && 
get_Main().actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
double temp=get_Main().actor.get(i).Price; 
traceln(); 
SupplierSelectionStuff thisStuff= 
OrganiseSupplyBaseData(get_Main().actor.get(i),this); 
traceln(); 
SupplierUtilityCollection.add(thisStuff); 
} 
} 
NormaliseAndRank(); 
traceln(); 
} 
traceln(); 
if (Retailer>0) 
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{ 
for (int i=0;i<get_Main().actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if(get_Main().actor.get(i).Died<1 && 
(get_Main().actor.get(i).Manufacturer>0 
|| get_Main().actor.get(i).Wholesaler>0)) 
{ 
//get supply base data, and organise for selection 
SupplierSelectionStuff thisStuff= 
OrganiseSupplyBaseData(get_Main().actor.get(i),this); 
SupplierUtilityCollection.add(thisStuff); 
} 
} 
//sort to establish normalising values 
NormaliseAndRank(); 
traceln(); 
} 
//Calculate Utility 
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for(int i =0; i<SupplierUtilityCollection.size();i++) 
{ 
double utility= 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).FSRank*BuyingFSWeight 
+ 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).DistanceRank*BuyingLocationWeight 
+ 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).PriceRank*BuyingPriceWeight 
+ 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).QualityRank*BuyingQualityWeight; 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).SupplierUtility=utility; 
for (int j=0; j<MyCollaboratingSuppliers.size(); j++) 
if 
(MyCollaboratingSuppliers.get(j)==SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).Su 
pplier) 
{ 
if (SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).SupplierUtility*1.05<.9) 
{ 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).SupplierUtility=SupplierUtilityCollectio 
n.get(i).SupplierUtility*1.05; 
} 
} 
} 
Collections.sort(SupplierUtilityCollection,new SortBYUtility()); 
traceln(); 
//================================================== 
=========== 
/*if ((this.Retailer>0 || this.Wholesaler>0) && 
(SupplierUtilityCollection.size()> (BadBoys.size())) ) 
{ 
if (BadBoys.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int j=0;j<BadBoys.size();j++) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<SupplierUtilityCollection.size();i++) 
{ 
if (BadBoys.get(j).BadBoy==SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).Supplier) 
{ 
SupplierUtilityCollection.remove(i); 
} 
} 
} 
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size()+1 
if (SupplierUtilityCollection.size()>0) 
{ 
MySuppliers.clear(); 
MySuppliers.add(SupplierUtilityCollection.get(0).Supplier); 
if (MyGlobalRiskPerceptionValue>.5 && 
SupplierUtilityCollection.size()>1) 
{ 
MySuppliers.add(SupplierUtilityCollection.get(1).Supplier); 
} 
CalculateCommitment(); 
CalculateRelationalRisk(); 
//!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
//!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
// remove badBoys 
//!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
//!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
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/*if (MySuppliers.size()>1 && 
(MyRelationshipCommitments.get(0).RelationshipRisk>.5 || 
MyGlobalRiskPerceptionValue>.5)) 
{ 
MySuppliers.add(SupplierUtilityCollection.get(1).Supplier); 
}*/ 
//} 
//Calculate risk 
//================================================== 
============ 
/*if (this.Retailer>0 || this.Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<2;i++) //todo: make this fit the purchasing strategy 
{ 
MySuppliers.add(SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).Supplier); 
} 
}*/ 
//DrawConnections(); 
} 
Function: DrawConnections 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //line.setDx(WholesalerDistanceTable.get(0).myX - getX()); 
// clear all lines 
Connection.setDx(0); 
Connection.setDy(0); 
Connection1.setDx(0); 
Connection1.setDy(0); 
if (Died<1) 
{ 
if (MySuppliers.size()>0 && CurrentDemand>0 && Died<1) 
{ 
Connection.setDx(MySuppliers.get(0).getX()-getX()); 
Connection.setDy(MySuppliers.get(0).getY()-getY()); 
//Connection.setLineWidth(1+CurrentDemand/1000); 
Connection1.setDx(0); 
Connection1.setDy(0); 
if (MySuppliers.size()>1 && CurrentDemand>0) 
{ 
Connection1.setDx(MySuppliers.get(1).getX()-getX()); 
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Connection1.setDy(MySuppliers.get(1).getY()-getY()); 
//Connection1.setLineWidth(1+CurrentDemand/1000); 
} 
} 
//Connection.SetDy(MySuppliers.get(0).getY()-getY()); 
} 
Function: OrganiseSupplyBaseData 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type SupplierSelectionStuff 
Code 
Body traceln(); 
double TotalPrice=0; 
double FlexibilityScore =0; 
double FSScore=Supplier.Cash+Supplier.Profit; 
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double distance= 
(getDistance(this.getX(),this.getY(),Supplier.getX(),Supplier.getY())) 
*10 ; 
double tempCurrentDemand=CurrentDemand; 
double tempEconomicOrderQuantity=0; 
double tempDistributionCosts=0; 
if (time()==10) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
if (MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
double SupplierDependency = 
(CurrentDemand/(double)MySuppliers.size()) 
/Supplier.CurrentDemand ; 
double BuyerDependency = 1/(double)MySuppliers.size(); 
FlexibilityScore =(SupplierDependency+BuyerDependency)/2; 
} 
else 
{ 
FlexibilityScore =0; 
} 
double QualityScore=Supplier.Quality; 
//do price to include distribution 
if (Buyer.Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
double tempSupplierPrice=Supplier.Price; 
double 
tempDistance=getDistance(Supplier.getX(),Supplier.getY(),Buyer.g 
etX(),Buyer.getY())*10; 
double tempCostPerKm=Supplier.CostPerKm; 
if (CurrentDemand==0) 
{ 
HoldingCosts=HoldingRate*BaseOPerationalDemand*AvgPurchas 
ePrice; 
tempEconomicOrderQuantity=sqrt(2*CurrentDemand*(OrderCosts/ 
HoldingCosts)); 
tempDistributionCosts=distance*CostPerKm/tempEconomicOrderQ 
uantity; 
} 
if (CurrentDemand>0) 
{ 
HoldingCosts=HoldingRate*CurrentDemand*AvgPurchasePrice; 
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} 
TotalPrice=Supplier.Price + tempDistributionCosts;//+ 
((getDistance(Supplier.getX(),Supplier.getY(),Buyer.getX(),Buyer.g 
etY())*10) 
// *Supplier.CostPerKm/Buyer.EconomicOrderQuantity); 
traceln(); 
SupplierSelectionStuff thisStuff=new SupplierSelectionStuff 
(Supplier,FSScore,distance,TotalPrice,FlexibilityScore,QualityScore 
,0,0,0,0,QualityScore,0); 
Arguments: 
Name Type 
Supplier Actor 
Buyer Actor 
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Function: NormaliseAndRank 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //sort to establish normalising values 
Collections.sort(SupplierUtilityCollection,new FSSortByFS1()); 
if (SupplierUtilityCollection.size()>0) 
{ 
double NormalisingScore=SupplierUtilityCollection.get(0).FSScore; 
Collections.sort(SupplierUtilityCollection,new DistSortByDist()); 
double 
NormalisingDistance=SupplierUtilityCollection.get(0).DistanceScore 
; 
Collections.sort(SupplierUtilityCollection,new PriceSortByPrice()); 
double 
NormalisingPrice=SupplierUtilityCollection.get(0).PriceScore; 
traceln(); 
Collections.sort(SupplierUtilityCollection,new 
FlexibilitySortByFlexibility()); 
double 
NormalisingFlexibility=SupplierUtilityCollection.get(0).FlexibilityScor 
e; 
//Rank suppliers 
for(int i =0; i<SupplierUtilityCollection.size();i++) 
{ 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).FSRank=SupplierUtilityCollection.get 
(i).FSScore/NormalisingScore; 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).DistanceRank=1/(SupplierUtilityColle 
ction.get(i).DistanceScore/NormalisingDistance); 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).PriceRank=1/(SupplierUtilityCollectio 
n.get(i).PriceScore/NormalisingPrice); 
SupplierUtilityCollection.get(i).FlexibilityRank=SupplierUtilityCollecti 
Function: CalculateCommitment 
Description: Calculates the buyer and seller committments for any given relationship 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
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Code 
Body //Commitment=cube root (GR*RR*EuDist) 
//RR=BD+SD/2 
//SupplierScore 
MyRelationshipCommitments.clear(); 
double SupplierCommitment = 0; 
double BuyerCommitment = 0; 
//todo: make sure have suppliers or customers 
if ( MySuppliers.size()>0 && Died<1) 
{ 
BuyerCommitment = 1/(double)MySuppliers.size(); 
for (int i=0;i<MySuppliers.size();i++) 
{ 
if (MySuppliers.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
SupplierCommitment= 
(CurrentDemand/(double)MySuppliers.size()) 
/MySuppliers.get(i).CurrentDemand ; 
RelationshipCommitment thisRelationship = new 
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RelationshipCommitment 
(this,MySuppliers.get(i),"Buyer","Supplier",BuyerCommitment,Suppl 
ierCommitment,0); 
MyRelationshipCommitments.add(thisRelationship); 
} 
} 
} 
if ( MyCustomers.size()>0 && Died<1) 
{ 
//sum all mycustomers demand taking into account no of suppliers 
// find this customer's demand 
for (int i=0;i<MyCustomers.size();i++) 
{ 
if (MyCustomers.get(i).Died<1) 
{ 
SupplierCommitment = 
(MyCustomers.get(i).CurrentDemand/MyCustomers.get(i).MySuppli 
ers.size())/CurrentDemand; 
BuyerCommitment= 
1/(double)MyCustomers.get(i).MySuppliers.size(); 
RelationshipCommitment thisRelationship = new 
RelationshipCommitment 
(this,MyCustomers.get(i),"Supplier","Buyer",BuyerCommitment,Sup 
plierCommitment,0); 
MyRelationshipCommitments.add(thisRelationship); 
} 
Function: CalculateRelationalRisk 
Description: Calculates the relational risk for any relationship as the difference between buyer and seller commitment 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body for (int i=0;i<MyRelationshipCommitments.size();i++) 
{ 
double RelationalRisk= abs( 
(MyRelationshipCommitments.get(i).MyCommitmentMyRelationshipCommitments. 
get(i).PartnerCommitment) ); 
MyRelationshipCommitments.get(i).RelationshipRisk=RelationalRis 
k; 
Function: CalcInitialStock 
Page 74 of 129 
Calculating_commitment_16a6 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //CurrentDemand=0; 
//find max demand 
if (Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
for (int i= 0; i <get_Main().actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (get_Main().actor.get(i).MySuppliers.contains(this)) 
{ 
CurrentDemand=CurrentDemand+(get_Main().actor.get(i).CurrentD 
emand/get_Main().actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size()); 
Stock=CurrentDemand*20; 
} 
//else 
//{ 
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//Stock=10000; 
//} 
} 
if (CurrentDemand==0) 
{ 
Stock=10000; 
} 
} 
if (Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
for (int i= 0; i <get_Main().actor.size();i++) 
{ 
if (get_Main().actor.get(i).MySuppliers.contains(this)) 
{ 
CurrentDemand=CurrentDemand+(get_Main().actor.get(i).CurrentD 
emand/get_Main().actor.get(i).MySuppliers.size()); 
Stock=CurrentDemand*20; 
} 
//else 
//{ 
//Stock=10000; 
//} 
} 
if (CurrentDemand==0) 
{ 
Stock=10000; 
} 
} 
Function: StockCalcs 
Description: Safety stock claculation 
returns 
- safety stock 
- EOQ 
- SigmaDemand (if no history) 
CHECK THAT SIGMAD CALCULATED PROPERLY FOR RETAILERS WHEN VARIATION INTRODUCED THRO MKTSHARECALC 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body 
//double ManufacturingLeadTime=0; 
//================================================== 
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Name Value 
=================================================== 
============================================ 
//calculate lead time 
//================================================== 
=================================================== 
============================================ 
if (this.Retailer>0 || this.Wholesaler>0 && MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0; i<MySuppliers.size();i++) 
{ 
// check to see if suitable 
double distance= 
(getDistance(this.getX(),this.getY(),get_Main().actor.get(i).getX(),ge 
t_Main().actor.get(i).getY()))*10 ; 
double LT=round( 2+( ( (distance/50) /24)+.5) ); 
MyStatistics.add(LT); 
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} 
// make assumption about SigmaDemand if 0 then set at 10% of 
currentidealdemand 
if (RollingDemandStats.count()<30) 
{ 
SigmaDemand=.1*CurrentDemand; //check that current demand is 
set on startup 
} 
if (RollingDemandStats.count()>30) 
{ 
SigmaDemand=RollingDemandStats.deviation(); 
} 
AverageLeadTime=MyStatistics.max(); 
SafetyStock=(1.65*SigmaDemand*sqrt(AverageLeadTime)); 
ROP=((AverageLeadTime+2)*CurrentDemand)+SafetyStock; 
//================================================== 
=================================================== 
============================================ 
//cvalculate average Price 
//================================================== 
=================================================== 
=========================================== 
//use my suppliers to establish average purchase price 
double PurchasePrice=0; 
if (MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<MySuppliers.size();i++) 
{ 
PurchasePrice+=MySuppliers.get(i).Price; 
} 
AvgPurchasePrice=PurchasePrice/MySuppliers.size(); 
} 
//================================================== 
================================== 
// Calculate inventory management functions 
//================================================== 
==================================== 
HoldingCostsPerUnit=AvgPurchasePrice*HoldingRate; 
EconomicOrderQuantity=(sqrt( (2* CurrentDemand*365 
*OrderCosts)/(HoldingCosts) )); 
if (RollingDemandStats.count()>0 && 
Retailer<1)///+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+++++++++++!!!!!!!!!!! 
{ 
SigmaDemand=RollingDemandStats.deviation(); 
//Maybe catch event where RDS.Mean =0 and dont change CD in 
this event 
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Name Value 
} 
//AverageLeadTime=MyStatistics.mean(); 
SafetyStock=(1.65*SigmaDemand*sqrt(AverageLeadTime)); 
HoldingCosts= 
MySuppliers.get(0).Price;//get_Main().ManufacturerPrice*HoldingR 
ate; 
HoldingCostsPerUnit=AvgPurchasePrice*HoldingRate; 
if (CurrentDemand==0) 
{ 
EconomicOrderQuantity=(sqrt( (2* BaseOPerationalDemand * 365 
*OrderCosts)/(HoldingCosts) )); 
} 
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else 
{ 
EconomicOrderQuantity=(sqrt( (2* CurrentDemand * 365 
*OrderCosts)/(HoldingCosts) )); 
} 
} 
//================================================== 
================================ 
//manufacturers 
//================================================== 
================================ 
//Manufacturers are different ==> lead time is fixed 
ManufacturingLeadTime=2; 
if ( Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
ManufacturingLeadTime=2; 
if (RollingDemandStats.count()>30) 
{ 
SigmaDemand=RollingDemandStats.deviation(); 
CurrentDemand=RollingDemandStats.mean(); 
} 
else 
{ 
SigmaDemand=.1*CurrentDemand; //check that current demand is 
set on startup 
} 
SafetyStock=(1.65*SigmaDemand*sqrt(ManufacturingLeadTime)); 
HoldingCosts=.2*get_Main().ManufacturerPrice*HoldingRate; 
HoldingCostsPerUnit=HoldingCosts; 
EconomicOrderQuantity=(int)(sqrt( (2* 
CurrentDemand*365*OrderCosts)/(HoldingCosts ) )); 
ROP=(ManufacturingLeadTime+2)*CurrentDemand+SafetyStock; 
} 
//================================================== 
======= 
//reset 
//================================================== 
======== 
MyStatistics.reset(); 
RollingDemandStats.reset(); // do we want to reset the stats every 
tick - what is the frequency og this calc?????????????????????? 
traceln(); 
Function: CalculatingHoldingCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
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Name Value 
Body StockHistory.add(Stock); 
if (time()>=3 && 
time()>(TimeOfLastChangeCheck+PerformanceReviewPeriod -1 ) 
) 
{ 
if (StockHistory.size()>PerformanceReviewPeriod) 
{ 
int StartHere=(StockHistory.size()-1)-PerformanceReviewPeriod; 
int FinishHere=StockHistory.size(); 
for (int i=StartHere;i<FinishHere;i++) 
{ 
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StockStats.add(StockHistory.get(i)); 
} 
AverageStock=StockStats.mean(); 
} 
} 
Function: ConsumeStock 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body if (Double.isNaN(Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
if (Retailer>0) 
{ 
if (Stock-CurrentDemand>0) 
{ 
Stock=Stock-CurrentDemand; 
} 
if (Stock-CurrentDemand<0) 
{ 
Stock=0; 
} 
} 
AvailableStock=Stock-AllocatedStock; 
if (Double.isNaN(Stock)) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
Function: Ordering 
Description: nothing obviously wrong 
Name Value 
General 
Access Type public 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //if ((Stock+ExpectedStock)<=ROP && Retailer>0 ) 
//{ 
/*traceln( "Stock = " + " " + Stock); 
traceln( "ExpectedStock = " + " " + ExpectedStock); 
traceln ("ROP = " + " " + ROP); 
}*/ 
int count=0; 
if (Died<1) 
{ 
while ((Stock+ExpectedStock-AllocatedStock)<=(ROP ) && 
count<100) 
{ 
Page 78 of 129 
Calculating_commitment_16a6 
Name Value 
if ((Retailer>0 || Wholesaler>0) && (MySuppliers.size()>0 )) 
{ 
int i=MySuppliers.size(); 
double orderSize= (EconomicOrderQuantity/MySuppliers.size()); 
for (int j=0;j<MySuppliers.size();j++) 
{ 
//create_Replenishment(2,EconomicOrderQuantity); 
Order thisOrder=new Order (orderSize,this); 
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ExpectedStock=ExpectedStock+thisOrder.Quantity; 
/*traceln("this Quantity = " + " " + thisOrder.Quantity); 
traceln ("Buyer = " + " " + thisOrder.Buyer);*/ 
//Select supplier 
send(thisOrder,MySuppliers.get(j)); 
NoOfOrdersPlaced=NoOfOrdersPlaced+1; 
} 
} 
if (Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
create_ManufacturingRequest(ManufacturingLeadTime,EconomicO 
rderQuantity); 
ExpectedStock=ExpectedStock+EconomicOrderQuantity; 
NoOfManufactReq=NoOfManufactReq+1; 
} 
count=count+1; 
} 
} 
if (count==99) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
//create an order ==> EOQ,buyer, 
//create bank of expected deliveries to avoid double ordering 
//Stock = stock+expected 
//AvailableStock=Stock-expected-allocated 
//think about no of suppliers - prioritise shortest leadtime 
Function: CheckIfTooManyNSAs 
Name Value 
General 
Show At Runtime false 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body /*Actor sender=thisNSA.Sendor; 
int count=0; 
for (int i =0;i<NSAsReceived.size();i++) 
{ 
if (NSAsReceived.get(i).Sendor==sender) 
count+=1; 
} 
if (count > Tolerance) 
{ 
//this no longer needs to be done on recept of NSA 
get_Main().BadBoyRef=get_Main().BadBoyRef+1; 
BadBoyClass thisBadBoyClass= new 
BadBoyClass(thisNSA.Sendor,thisNSA.BadBoyRef); 
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Name Value 
BadBoys.add(thisBadBoyClass); 
//AHPCalc(1); 
SelectSuppliers(); 
} 
create_CleanBadBoys(1,thisNSA.Sendor,thisNSA.BadBoyRef);*/ 
Arguments: 
Name Type 
thisNSA NSA 
Function: CalculateDailyDemand 
Name Value 
General 
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Return Type void 
Code 
Body if (Retailer>0) 
{ 
OrderHistory1=CurrentDemand; 
} 
DailyDemand1.add(OrderHistory1); 
OrderHistory1=0; 
//DailyDemandHistory.add(OrderHistory1.sum()); 
//OrderHistory.reset(); 
if (DailyDemand1.size()>30) 
{ 
for (int i=(DailyDemand1.size()-30);i<DailyDemand1.size();i++) 
{ 
RollingDemandStats.add(DailyDemand1.get(i)); 
} 
} 
Function: CalculateFSValue 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //FS requirement =retailerGlobalRisk 
Function: CalculateBuyerFlexibilityRequirement 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body // Buyer commitment requirement = (1/mysuuplier size + actual 
risk)/2 
double actualRisk=0; 
double riskModifier=0; 
if (RiskAttitude<=.5) 
{ 
riskModifier=.5-RiskAttitude; 
actualRisk=get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk( 
riskModifier*get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk); 
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Name Value 
if (actualRisk<0.2) 
{ 
actualRisk=.2; 
} 
} 
else 
{ 
riskModifier=RiskAttitude-.5; 
actualRisk=get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk( 
riskModifier*get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk); 
if (actualRisk>0.8) 
{ 
actualRisk=.8; 
} 
} 
if (MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
BuyerCommitmentRequirement=((1/MySuppliers.size())+actualRisk 
)/2; 
} 
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BuyingFSValue=actualRisk; 
Function: RetailerSalesCash 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body if (Retailer>0) 
{ 
DailyRevenue.add(CurrentDemand*Price); 
//Cash+=CurrentDemand*Price; 
} 
Function: MyGlobalRiskPerception 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //double temp=get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk; 
if (get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk+((RiskAttitude. 
5)*get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk)>1) 
{ 
MyGlobalRiskPerceptionValue=1; 
} 
if (get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk+((RiskAttitude. 
5)*get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk)<0); 
{ 
MyGlobalRiskPerceptionValue=0; 
} 
if (get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk+((RiskAttitude. 
5)*get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk)<1 
&& get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk-((RiskAttitude. 
5)*get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk)>0) 
{ 
double temp=get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk; 
MyGlobalRiskPerceptionValue=get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk; 
//+((RiskAttitude-.5)*get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk); 
} 
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Function: Adaptation 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //sell price 
//calculate average demandif (DailyDemand1.size()>30) 
TimeElapsed-=1; 
if (TimeElapsed<0) 
{ 
TimeElapsed=0; 
} 
//RollingDemandStats.reset(); 
===========================================> 
//double averageDemand=0; 
double MaxPrice=0; 
double MinPrice=0; 
if (Retailer>0) 
{ 
MaxPrice=get_Main().RetailMaxPrice; 
MinPrice=get_Main().RetailMinPrice; 
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} 
if (Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
MaxPrice=get_Main().WholesaleMaxPrice; 
MinPrice=get_Main().WholesaleMinPrice; 
} 
if (Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
MaxPrice=get_Main().ManufacturerMaxPrice; 
MinPrice=get_Main().ManufacturerMinPrice; 
} 
traceln(); 
if (Died<1) 
{ 
if (DailyDemand1.size()>30) 
{ 
for (int i=(DailyDemand1.size()-30);i<DailyDemand1.size();i++) 
{ 
RollingDemandStats.add(DailyDemand1.get(i)); 
} 
} 
averageDemand=RollingDemandStats.mean();// what to do if no 
stats//!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
if(TimeElapsed==0) 
{ 
if (averageDemand>1.2*BaseOPerationalDemand) 
{ 
TimeElapsed=10; 
//too many orders increase price - constrained by upper limit 
if ( 1.1*Price<=MaxPrice) 
{ 
Price=1.1*Price; 
} 
if ( 1.1*Price>MaxPrice) 
{ 
Price=MaxPrice; 
} 
} 
if (averageDemand<.8*BaseOPerationalDemand) 
{ 
// few orders lower price - constraned by lower limit 
TimeElapsed=10; 
if (Price*.9>=MinPrice) 
{ 
Price=.9*Price; 
} 
if (Price*.9<MinPrice) 
Page 82 of 129 
Calculating_commitment_16a6 
Name Value 
{ 
Price=MinPrice; 
} 
} 
} 
} 
//check average demand aaginst base operational demand 
//if Average demand >.9 of base operational demand then increase 
sell price 
//if <.8 of base operational demand then decrease sell price 
//constrain the above around model run parametrised tier limits 
//Cost Prioritisation (buy price) 
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//check whether average margin is as good as best 
//if not then increase cost prioritisation 
//if best do nothing 
//!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
//everybody will gravitate towards the lowest cost 
Function: CalculateQualityValue 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body // buying quality value is calculated as the average of GR and (1- 
averagesupplier quality) 
//calculate ASQ 
double ASQ=0; 
double actualRisk=0; 
double riskModifier=0; 
if (RiskAttitude<=.5) 
{ 
riskModifier=.5-RiskAttitude; 
actualRisk=get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk( 
riskModifier*get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk); 
if (actualRisk<0.2) 
{ 
actualRisk=.2; 
} 
} 
else 
{ 
riskModifier=RiskAttitude-.5; 
actualRisk=get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk( 
riskModifier*get_Main().GlobalRetailBuyingRisk); 
if (actualRisk>0.8) 
{ 
actualRisk=.8; 
} 
} 
if (MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<MySuppliers.size(); i++) 
{ 
ASQ+=MySuppliers.get(i).Quality; 
} 
BuyingQualityValue=( (1-ASQ/MySuppliers.size()) + actualRisk)/2; 
} 
Function: Changes 
Name Value 
General 
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Name Value 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body //capture changes 
//compare mySuppliersOld with Mysuppliers 
// write my suppliers to old my suppliers (this needs to include 
magnitude of relationship) 
OldMysuppliersDetails.clear(); 
NewMysuppliersDetails.clear(); 
OldMysuppliersDetails1.clear(); 
NewMysuppliersDetails1.clear(); 
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if (MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int i =0;i<MySuppliers.size();i++) 
{ 
MySupplierRelationships thisRelationship= new 
MySupplierRelationships 
(MySuppliers.get(i),this,CurrentDemand/MySuppliers.size(),0); 
OldMysuppliersDetails.add(thisRelationship.Supplier.getIndex()); 
OldMysuppliersDetails1.add(thisRelationship.Supplier.getIndex()); 
} 
} 
// make changes ++ add my supplier details to 
newmysupplierDetails 
CreateSelectionIndexForSuppliers(); 
if (MySuppliers.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int i =0;i<MySuppliers.size();i++) 
{ 
MySupplierRelationships thisRelationship= new 
MySupplierRelationships 
(MySuppliers.get(i),this,CurrentDemand/MySuppliers.size(),0); 
NewMysuppliersDetails.add(thisRelationship.Supplier.getIndex()); 
NewMysuppliersDetails1.add(thisRelationship.Supplier.getIndex()); 
} 
} 
// compare old with new 
NewMysuppliersDetails.removeAll(OldMysuppliersDetails1); 
OldMysuppliersDetails.removeAll(NewMysuppliersDetails1); 
//List result = new ArrayList(NewMysuppliersDetails); 
//result.removeAll(OldMysuppliersDetails); 
/*if (NewMysuppliersDetails.size()>0 && 
OldMysuppliersDetails.size()>0) 
{ 
for (int j=0;j<OldMysuppliersDetails.size();j++) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<NewMysuppliersDetails.size();i++) 
{ 
if (NewMysuppliersDetails.size()>0 && 
OldMysuppliersDetails.size()>0) 
{ 
if 
(OldMysuppliersDetails.get(j).Supplier==NewMysuppliersDetails.get 
(i).Supplier) 
{ 
ToBeRemovedFromNew.add(NewMysuppliersDetails.get(i).Supplie 
r.getIndex()); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
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/*if (NewMysuppliersDetails.size()>0 && time()>0 ) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<NewMysuppliersDetails.size();i++) 
{ 
int buyerident=this.getIndex(); 
int supplierident=NewMysuppliersDetails.get(i); 
double Magnitude=CurrentDemand/MySuppliers.size(); 
get_Main().file.println("time= " + " " + time () + " " + 
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"ManufacturerPriceVariation" + " " + 
get_Main().ManufacturerPriceVariation + " " + 
"ManufacturingMarginInput" + " " + 
get_Main().ManufacturingMarginInput + " " + 
"RetailPriceVariation" + " " + get_Main().RetailPriceVariation + " " + 
"WholesalePriceVariation" + " " + 
get_Main().WholesalePriceVariation + 
"WholesalerMaginInput " + get_Main().WholesalerMaginInput + " " 
+ 
"buyer " + " " + buyerident + " " + 
"Supplier " + " " + supplierident + " " + 
"Magnitude " + " " + Magnitude + " "); 
} 
}*/ 
if (NewMysuppliersDetails.size()>0 && time()>0 ) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<NewMysuppliersDetails.size();i++) 
{ 
int buyerident=this.getIndex(); 
int supplierident=NewMysuppliersDetails.get(i); 
double Magnitude=CurrentDemand/MySuppliers.size(); 
get_Main().database.modify 
("INSERT INTO Results VALUES ( " + time() + "," + 
get_Main().ManufacturerPriceVariation +", "+ 
get_Main().ManufacturingMarginInput + ", "+ 
get_Main().RetailPriceVariation +" , " 
+get_Main().WholesalePriceVariation +"," 
+get_Main().WholesalerMaginInput + " , "+ buyerident +" ," 
+supplierident + "," + Magnitude +") "); 
} 
} 
/*if (OldMysuppliersDetails.size()>0 && time()>0 ) 
{ 
for (int i=0;i<OldMysuppliersDetails.size();i++) 
{ 
int buyerident=this.getIndex(); 
int supplierident=OldMysuppliersDetails.get(i); 
double Magnitude=CurrentDemand/MySuppliers.size(); 
get_Main().file.println("time= " + " " + time () + " " + 
"buyer " + " " + buyerident + " " + 
"Supplier " + " " + supplierident + " " + 
" Magnitude " + " " + Magnitude + " "); 
} 
} 
traceln();*/ 
// write any changes to file 
Function: CollaboratingProcess 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Code 
Body MyCollaboratingSuppliers.clear(); 
//share information 
/*if (MySuppliers.size()>0) 
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Name Value 
{ 
if (Collaboration>.3 && MySuppliers.get(0).Collaboration>.3) 
{ 
MyCollaboratingSuppliers.add(MySuppliers.get(0)); //collaborate by 
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sharing demand data 
} 
}*/ 
// do something to do with tolerance and inertia 
//other benefits to collaboration ==> levels of inter-organizational 
collaboration 
// 
double BuyerDependency=0; 
double SellerDependency=0; 
double RelationalCommitment=0; 
BuyerDependency=CurrentDemand/MySuppliers.size(); 
for ( int i=0;i<MySuppliers.size();i++) 
{ 
SellerDependency=CurrentDemand/MySuppliers.get(i).CurrentDem 
and; 
RelationalCommitment=pow((BuyerDependency*SellerDependency 
*get_Main().COVActualRetailerSuppliers),0.333); 
if (RelationalCommitment>0.5) 
{ 
MyCollaboratingSuppliers.add(MySuppliers.get(i)); 
} 
Function: myFunction 
Name Value 
General 
Return Type void 
Event: event 
Name Value 
General 
Trigger Type timeout 
Mode cyclic 
Recurrence 1 
Occurence Time 0 
Action if (CurrentDemand==0 && BaseOPerationalDemand==0 && 
EconomicOrderQuantity==0) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
Variable: Wholesaler 
Name Value 
General 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Stock 
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Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Price 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Collaboration 
Name Value 
General 
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Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: CostPrioritisation 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Manufacturer 
Name Value 
General 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Retailer 
Name Value 
General 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: RiskAttitude 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Died 
Name Value 
General 
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Name Value 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: SigmaDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: OperatingCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: OPeratingCostsPerUnit 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: BaseOPerationalDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: CurrentDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
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Initial Value 0 
Variable: JustBorn 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TargetMarketShare 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
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Name Value 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Cash 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 100 + uniform(20,40) 
Variable: BuyingFSValue 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: BuyingLocationValue 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: BuyingPriceValue 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: BuyerCommitmentRequirement 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Profit 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: CurrentIdealDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Page 89 of 129 
Calculating_commitment_16a6 
Variable: AvgPurchasePrice 
Name Value 
General 
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Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: AverageLeadTime 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: SafetyStock 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: EconomicOrderQuantity 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: OrderCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 20 
Variable: HoldingCostsPerUnit 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: HoldingRate 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value .25 
Variable: AverageStock 
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Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: TimeOfLastChangeCheck 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: PerformanceReviewPeriod 
Name Value 
General 
Type int 
Initial Value 30 
Variable: AllocatedStock 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
 337 
Variable: AvailableStock 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 300 
Variable: ROP 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: ExpectedStock 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: NoOfOrdersPlaced 
Name Value 
General 
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Name Value 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: ManufacturingLeadTime 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: NoOfManufactReq 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: MyConsumption 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: BuyPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: OrderHistory1 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: PurchaseCostPerUnit 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
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Variable: VariableCostPerUnit 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
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Name Value 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: NSASent 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: DistributionCostsPerUnit 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: CostPerKm 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value .2 
Variable: MyProduction 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: DistributionCostsPerUnit1 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: NoOfReplenishments 
Name Value 
General 
Type int 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: NSAreceived 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
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Variable: OrdersReceived 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Tolerance 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
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Initial Value 10 
Variable: MyGlobalRiskPerceptionValue 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: HoldingCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: Quality 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: BuyingQualityValue 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: QualityValue 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: DailyProfitVar 
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Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: DailyCostVar 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: DailyRevenueVar 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: actortestcount 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Variable: averageDemand 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
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Variable: TimeElapsed 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value 0 
Collection: SupplierUtilityCollection 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class SupplierSelectionStuff 
Collection: MySuppliers 
Name Value 
General 
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Name Value 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Actor 
Collection: CommitmentToSuppliers 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class RelationshipCommitment 
Collection: CommitmentToCustomers 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class RelationshipCommitment 
Collection: MyCustomers 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Actor 
Collection: MyRelationshipCommitments 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class RelationshipCommitment 
Collection: StockHistory 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Double 
Collection: NSAsReceived 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class NSA 
Collection: BadBoys 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
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Name Value 
Element Class BadBoyClass 
Collection: MyExistingCustomers 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Actor 
Collection: MyCollaboratingSuppliers 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Actor 
Collection: DailyDemand1 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Double 
Collection: DailyProfit 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Double 
Collection: tEST 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class MarginStuff 
Collection: OldMysuppliersDetails 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Integer 
Collection: NewMysuppliersDetails 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Integer 
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Collection: ToBeRemovedFromNew 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Integer 
Collection: ToBeRemovedFromOld 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Integer 
Collection: OldMysuppliersDetails1 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Integer 
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Collection: NewMysuppliersDetails1 
Name Value 
General 
Collection Class java.util.ArrayList 
Element Class Integer 
Statechart Entry Point: Status 
Transition: transition 
Name Value 
General 
Trigger Type condition 
Condition Cash<10 
Action /*if (Retailer>0) 
{ 
get_Main().DeathRateRetailers +=1; 
} 
if (Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
get_Main().DeathRateWholesalers +=1; 
} 
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Name Value 
if (Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
get_Main().DeathRateManufacturers +=1; 
} 
i*/ 
int type =0; 
Died=1; 
MySuppliers.clear(); 
double temp=0; 
MySizeAndType.setFillColor(null); 
//get_Main().ReallocateStock(this); 
if (Retailer>0) 
{ 
type=1; 
} 
if (Wholesaler>0) 
{ 
type=2; 
} 
if (Manufacturer>0) 
{ 
type=3; 
} 
if (type==3 || type==2) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
if (CurrentDemand>0) 
{ 
temp=CurrentDemand; 
} 
else 
{ 
temp=1; 
} 
//count no of type still alive 
if (Manufacturer>0) 
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{ 
get_Main().CountManufacturersAlive(); 
} 
//if >0 do nothing 
//<1 
// create new manufacturer 
get_Main().RedistributeBaseOpDemand(temp,type,Stock); 
State: Alive 
State: Dead 
Name Value 
General 
Entry Action // make invisible 
//record death - done 
//modify birth rate 
ActorGraphs: actorGraphs 
Name Value 
General 
Type ActorGraphs 
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Name Value 
Java Package Name calculating_commitment 
Embedded Object Collection Type ARRAY_LIST_BASED 
Statistics: MyStatistics 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: RollingDemandStats 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: StockStats 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: DailyVariableCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: VariableCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: DailyRevenue 
Name Value 
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General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
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Name Value 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: DemandForOpCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: OrderHistory 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: RevenueData 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: DailyCosts 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Statistics: RollingDailyProfit 
Name Value 
General 
Discrete true 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Text: text 
Name Value 
General 
Public false 
Advanced 
x 220 
y 10 
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Name Value 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Bold Font Style true 
Text Behavioral Values 
Advanced 
x 220 
y 10 
Persistent false 
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Text: text1 
Name Value 
General 
Public false 
Advanced 
x 30 
y 10 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Bold Font Style true 
Text Agent State Variables 
Advanced 
x 30 
y 10 
Persistent false 
Oval: MySizeAndType 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 0 
y 0 
Radius X 10 
Radius Y 10 
Dynamic 
On Click traceln (AvailableStock); 
Line: Connection 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 0 
y 0 
dX 10 
dY 0 
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Line: Connection1 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 0 
y 0 
dX 0 
dY -10 
Text: text3 
Name Value 
General 
Public false 
Advanced 
x 220 
y 220 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 14 
Bold Font Style true 
Text Supplier Selection 
Advanced 
x 220 
y 220 
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Text: text4 
Name Value 
General 
Public false 
Advanced 
x 490 
y 220 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 14 
Bold Font Style true 
Text InventoryManagement 
Advanced 
x 490 
y 220 
Persistent false 
Text: text2 
Name Value 
Advanced 
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Name Value 
x 730 
y 220 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 14 
Bold Font Style true 
Text Ordering 
Advanced 
x 730 
y 220 
Text: text5 
Description: Flexibility ==> commtiment fit 
NEED TO CALCULATE A BUYING COMMITMENT REQUIREMENT - 
CREATE AN INDEX FOR ALL POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS BY COMPARING SUPPLIER COMMITMENT WITH BUYER REQUIRED COMMTIMENT 
Delivery ==> some function of global risk 
Finacial stability ==> index 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 970 
y 220 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 14 
Bold Font Style true 
Text Supplier Selection Criteria 
Advanced 
x 970 
y 220 
Active Object Class: ActorGraphs 
Name Value 
Advanced 
Auto-create Datasets true 
Recurrence 1 
Dataset Samples To Keep 100 
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Time Plot: plot2 
Name Value 
General 
Time Window 1000 
Vertical Scale AUTO 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Dataset Samples To Keep 1000 
Advanced 
x 70 
y 40 
Width 240 
Height 240 
Appearance 
Show Legend true 
Legend Place SOUTH 
Label Format MODEL_TIME_UNITS 
Plot Items: 
Title Type Dataset / Value Point Style Color Line Width Interpolation 
DailyCostVar value get_Actor().DailyCostVar NONE gold true 2 LINEAR 
DailyRevenueVar value get_Actor().DailyRevenueVar NONE yellowGreen true 2 LINEAR 
Time Plot: Cash 
Name Value 
General 
Time Window 1000 
Vertical Scale AUTO 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Dataset Samples To Keep 1000 
Advanced 
x 320 
y 40 
Width 800 
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Name Value 
Height 310 
Appearance 
Show Legend true 
Legend Place SOUTH 
Label Format MODEL_TIME_UNITS 
Plot Items: 
Title Type Dataset / Value Point Style Color Line Width Interpolation 
BuyingFSValue value get_Actor().BuyingFSValue NONE darkMagenta true 2 LINEAR 
BuyingLocationVal 
ue 
value get_Actor().BuyingLocationVal 
ue 
NONE orange true 2 LINEAR 
BuyingPriceValue value get_Actor().BuyingPriceValue NONE darkKhaki true 2 LINEAR 
BuyingQualityValue value get_Actor().BuyingQualityValu 
e 
NONE maroon true 2 LINEAR 
BuyerCommitment 
Requirement 
value get_Actor().BuyerCommitment 
Requirement 
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NONE mediumTurqu 
oise 
true 2 LINEAR 
Java Class: ActorPrice 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* ActorPrice 
*/ 
public class ActorPrice implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor Actor; 
public double Price; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public ActorPrice(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public ActorPrice(Actor Actor, double Price){ 
this.Actor = Actor; 
this.Price = Price; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Actor = " + Actor +" " + 
"Price = " + Price +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: MarketShareScores 
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Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* MarketShareScores 
*/ 
public class MarketShareScores implements java.io.Serializable { 
public double TempMarketShareValue; 
public Actor Ident; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public MarketShareScores(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public MarketShareScores(double TempMarketShareValue, 
Actor Ident){ 
this.TempMarketShareValue = TempMarketShareValue; 
 349 
this.Ident = Ident; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"TempMarketShareValue = " + TempMarketShareValue +" " + 
"Ident = " + Ident +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: SupplierFSScore 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* SupplierFSScore 
*/ 
public class SupplierFSScore implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor Supplier; 
public double SupplierFS; 
public double SupplierFSScore; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public SupplierFSScore(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public SupplierFSScore(Actor Supplier, double SupplierFS, 
double SupplierFSScore){ 
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Name Value 
this.Supplier = Supplier; 
this.SupplierFS = SupplierFS; 
this.SupplierFSScore = SupplierFSScore; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Supplier = " + Supplier +" " + 
"SupplierFS = " + SupplierFS +" " + 
"SupplierFSScore = " + SupplierFSScore +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: SupplierDistance 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
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* SupplierDistance 
*/ 
public class SupplierDistance implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor Supplier; 
public double distance; 
public double distanceRanking; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public SupplierDistance(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public SupplierDistance(Actor Supplier, double distance, double 
distanceRanking){ 
this.Supplier = Supplier; 
this.distance = distance; 
this.distanceRanking = distanceRanking; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Supplier = " + Supplier +" " + 
"distance = " + distance +" " + 
"distanceRanking = " + distanceRanking +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
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Java Class: SupplierPriceIndex 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* SupplierPriceIndex 
*/ 
public class SupplierPriceIndex implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor Supplier; 
public double Price; 
public double PriceIndex; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public SupplierPriceIndex(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public SupplierPriceIndex(Actor Supplier, double Price, double 
PriceIndex){ 
this.Supplier = Supplier; 
this.Price = Price; 
this.PriceIndex = PriceIndex; 
} 
@Override 
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public String toString() { 
return 
"Supplier = " + Supplier +" " + 
"Price = " + Price +" " + 
"PriceIndex = " + PriceIndex +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: SupplierSelectionStuff 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* SupplierSelectionStuff 
*/ 
public class SupplierSelectionStuff implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor Supplier; 
public double FSScore; 
public double DistanceScore; 
public double PriceScore; 
public double FlexibilityScore; 
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Name Value 
public double QualityScore; 
public double FSRank; 
public double DistanceRank; 
public double PriceRank; 
public double FlexibilityRank; 
public double QualityRank; 
public double SupplierUtility; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public SupplierSelectionStuff(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public SupplierSelectionStuff(Actor Supplier, double FSScore, 
double DistanceScore, double PriceScore, double FlexibilityScore, 
double QualityScore, 
double FSRank, double DistanceRank, double PriceRank, 
double FlexibilityRank, double QualityRank, double SupplierUtility){ 
this.Supplier = Supplier; 
this.FSScore = FSScore; 
this.DistanceScore = DistanceScore; 
this.PriceScore = PriceScore; 
this.FlexibilityScore=FlexibilityScore; 
this.QualityScore=QualityScore; 
this.FSRank = FSRank; 
this.DistanceRank = DistanceRank; 
this.PriceRank = PriceRank; 
this.FlexibilityRank=FlexibilityRank; 
this.QualityRank=QualityRank; 
this.SupplierUtility = SupplierUtility; 
} 
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@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Supplier = " + Supplier +" " + 
"FSScore = " + FSScore +" " + 
"DistanceScore = " + DistanceScore +" " + 
"PriceScore = " + PriceScore +" " + 
"FlexibilityScore = " + FlexibilityScore + " " + 
"QualityScore = " + QualityScore + " " + 
"FSRank = " + FSRank +" " + 
"DistanceRank = " + DistanceRank +" " + 
"PriceRank = " + PriceRank +" " + 
"FlexibilityRank = " + FlexibilityRank + " " + 
"QualityRank = " + QualityRank + " " + 
"SupplierUtility = " + SupplierUtility +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: ActorDemand 
Name Value 
General 
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Name Value 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* ActorDemand 
*/ 
public class ActorDemand implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor Actor; 
public double BuyingDemand; 
public double SupplyDemand; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public ActorDemand(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public ActorDemand(Actor Actor, double BuyingDemand, double 
SupplyDemand){ 
this.Actor = Actor; 
this.BuyingDemand = BuyingDemand; 
this.SupplyDemand = SupplyDemand; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Actor = " + Actor +" " + 
"BuyingDemand = " + BuyingDemand +" " + 
"SupplyDemand = " + SupplyDemand +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
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private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: RelationshipRisk 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* RelationshipRisk 
*/ 
public class RelationshipRisk implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor Supplier; 
public double BuyerDependency; 
public double SupplierDependency; 
public double FlexibilityScore; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public RelationshipRisk(){ 
} 
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/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public RelationshipRisk(Actor Supplier, double 
BuyerDependency, double SupplierDependency, double 
FlexibilityScore){ 
this.Supplier = Supplier; 
this.BuyerDependency = BuyerDependency; 
this.SupplierDependency = SupplierDependency; 
this.FlexibilityScore = FlexibilityScore; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Supplier = " + Supplier +" " + 
"BuyerDependency = " + BuyerDependency +" " + 
"SupplierDependency = " + SupplierDependency +" " + 
"FlexibilityScore = " + FlexibilityScore + " "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: RelationshipCommitment 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* RelationshipCommitment 
*/ 
public class RelationshipCommitment implements 
java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor MyIdentity; 
public Actor PartnerIdentity; 
public String MyRole; 
public String PartnerRole; 
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public double MyCommitment; 
public double PartnerCommitment; 
public double RelationshipRisk; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public RelationshipCommitment(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public RelationshipCommitment(Actor MyIdentity, Actor 
PartnerIdentity, String MyRole, String PartnerRole, double 
MyCommitment, double PartnerCommitment, double 
RelationshipRisk ){ 
this.MyIdentity = MyIdentity; 
this.PartnerIdentity = PartnerIdentity; 
this.MyRole = MyRole; 
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Name Value 
this.PartnerRole = PartnerRole; 
this.MyCommitment = MyCommitment; 
this.PartnerCommitment=PartnerCommitment; 
this.RelationshipRisk = RelationshipRisk; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"MyIdentity = " + MyIdentity +" " + 
"PartnerIdentity = " + PartnerIdentity +" " + 
"MyRole = " + MyRole +" " + 
"PartnerRole = " + PartnerRole +" " + 
"MyCommitment = " + MyCommitment + " " + 
"PartnerCommitment = " + PartnerCommitment + " " + 
"RelationshipRisk = " + RelationshipRisk + " "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: Order 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* Order 
*/ 
public class Order implements java.io.Serializable { 
double Quantity; 
Actor Buyer; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public Order(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
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public Order(double Quantity, Actor Buyer){ 
this.Quantity = Quantity; 
this.Buyer = Buyer; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Quantity = " + Quantity +" " + 
"Buyer = " + Buyer +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
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Java Class: NSA 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* NSA 
*/ 
public class NSA implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor Destination; 
public double OrderQty; 
public Actor Sendor; 
public int BadBoyRef; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public NSA(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public NSA(Actor Destination, double OrderQty, Actor Sendor, int 
BadBoyRef){ 
this.Destination = Destination; 
this.OrderQty = OrderQty; 
this.Sendor = Sendor; 
this.BadBoyRef=BadBoyRef; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Destination = " + Destination +" " + 
"OrderQty = " + OrderQty +" " + 
"Sendor = " + Sendor +" " + 
"BadBoyRef = " + BadBoyRef +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: BadBoyClass 
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Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* BadBoyClass 
*/ 
public class BadBoyClass implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor BadBoy; 
public int BadBoyRef; 
/** 
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* Default constructor 
*/ 
public BadBoyClass(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public BadBoyClass(Actor BadBoy, int BadBoyRef){ 
this.BadBoy = BadBoy; 
this.BadBoyRef = BadBoyRef; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"BadBoy = " + BadBoy +" " + 
"BadBoyRef = " + BadBoyRef +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: MyValues 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* MyValues 
*/ 
public class MyValues implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor ThisActor; 
public double SDDemand; 
public double SDDemandValue; 
public double FS; 
public double FSValue; 
public double Flexibility; 
public double FlexibilityValue; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public MyValues(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public MyValues(Actor ThisActor, double SDDemand, double 
SDDemandValue, double FS, double FSValue, double Flexibility, 
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double FlexibilityValue){ 
this.ThisActor = ThisActor; 
this.SDDemand = SDDemand; 
this.SDDemandValue = SDDemandValue; 
this.FS = FS; 
this.FSValue = FSValue; 
this.Flexibility = Flexibility; 
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this.FlexibilityValue = FlexibilityValue; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"ThisActor = " + ThisActor +" " + 
"SDDemand = " + SDDemand +" " + 
"SDDemandValue = " + SDDemandValue +" " + 
"FS = " + FS +" " + 
"FSValue = " + FSValue +" " + 
"Flexibility = " + Flexibility +" " + 
"FlexibilityValue = " + FlexibilityValue +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: MySupplierDetails 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* MySupplierDetails 
*/ 
public class MySupplierDetails implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor Supplier; 
public Actor StartDate; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public MySupplierDetails(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public MySupplierDetails(Actor Supplier, Actor StartDate){ 
this.Supplier = Supplier; 
this.StartDate = StartDate; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Supplier = " + Supplier +" " + 
"StartDate = " + StartDate +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
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private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: DeliveryStuff 
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Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* DeliveryStuff 
*/ 
public class DeliveryStuff implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor thisActor; 
public double SigmaDemand; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public DeliveryStuff(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public DeliveryStuff(Actor thisActor, double SigmaDemand){ 
this.thisActor = thisActor; 
this.SigmaDemand = SigmaDemand; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"thisActor = " + thisActor +" " + 
"SigmaDemand = " + SigmaDemand +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: MarginStuff 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* MarginStuff 
*/ 
public class MarginStuff implements java.io.Serializable { 
public Actor thisActor; 
public double Margin; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public MarginStuff(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public MarginStuff(Actor thisActor, double Margin){ 
this.thisActor = thisActor; 
this.Margin = Margin; 
} 
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Name Value 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"thisActor = " + thisActor +" " + 
"Margin = " + Margin +" "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
Java Class: MySupplierRelationships 
Name Value 
General 
Java Class Type JAVA_CLASS 
Text /** 
* MySupplierRelationships 
*/ 
public class MySupplierRelationships implements 
java.io.Serializable { 
Actor Supplier; 
Actor Buyer; 
double Magnitude; 
int ToBeRemoved; 
/** 
* Default constructor 
*/ 
public MySupplierRelationships(){ 
} 
/** 
* Constructor initializing the fields 
*/ 
public MySupplierRelationships(Actor Supplier, Actor Buyer , 
double Magnitude, int ToBeRemoved){ 
this.Supplier = Supplier; 
this.Buyer = Buyer; 
this.Magnitude = Magnitude; 
this.ToBeRemoved=ToBeRemoved; 
} 
@Override 
public String toString() { 
return 
"Supplier = " + Supplier +" " + 
"Buyer = " + Buyer +" " + 
"Magnitude = " + Magnitude +" " + 
"ToBeRemoved = " + ToBeRemoved + " "; 
} 
/** 
* This number is here for model snapshot storing purpose<br> 
* It needs to be changed when this class gets changed 
*/ 
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
} 
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Simulation Experiment: Simulation 
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Name Value 
General 
Active Object Class Main 
Random Number Generation Type fixedSeed 
Seed Value 3245 
Advanced 
Maximum Available Memory 64 
Differention Equations Method EULER 
Mixed Equations Method RK45_NEWTON 
Algebraic Equations Method MODIFIED_NEWTON 
Absolute Accuracy 1.0E-5 
Time Accuracy 1.0E-5 
Relative Accuracy 1.0E-5 
Fixed Time Step 0.0010 
Presentation Top Group Persistent true 
Model Time 
Stop Option Stop at specified time 
Initial Time 0.0 
Final Time 1000.0 
Presentation 
CPU Time Balance ratio_1_2 
Execution Mode realTimeScaled 
Real Time Scale 1.0 
Window 
Title Calculating_commitment : Simulation 
Real Time Of Simulation false 
Text: text 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 40 
y 30 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name Serif 
Font Size 28 
Bold Font Style true 
Text Calculating_commitment 
Advanced 
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Name Value 
x 40 
y 30 
Text: text1 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 40 
y 63 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name Serif 
Font Size 16 
Italic Font Style true 
Text Experiment setup page 
Advanced 
x 40 
y 63 
Button: button 
Name Value 
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General 
Label Text Run the model and switch to Main view 
Action if ( getState() == IDLE ) 
run(); 
getPresentation().setPresentable( getEngine().getRoot() ); 
Advanced 
Font Name Dialog 
Font Size 11 
x 40 
y 120 
Width 330 
Height 30 
Dynamic 
Dynamic: Label getState() == IDLE ? 
"Run the model and switch to Main view" : 
"Switch to Main view" 
Parameter Variation Experiment: ParametersVariation 
Name Value 
General 
Active Object Class Main 
Random Number Generation Type randomSeed 
Use Freeform Parameters false 
Number Of Runs 10 
Advanced 
Maximum Available Memory 64 
Before Simulation Run variable=getCurrentReplication(); 
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Name Value 
root.Replication=getCurrentReplication(); 
if (root.Replication>0) 
{ 
traceln(); 
} 
root.ExperimentVersion=getCurrentIteration(); 
After Simulation Run //variable=getCurrentReplication(); 
//root.Replication=getCurrentReplication(); 
After Iteration Code //variable=getCurrentReplication(); 
Differention Equations Method EULER 
Mixed Equations Method RK45_NEWTON 
Algebraic Equations Method MODIFIED_NEWTON 
Absolute Accuracy 1.0E-5 
Time Accuracy 1.0E-5 
Relative Accuracy 1.0E-5 
Fixed Time Step 0.0010 
Model Time 
Stop Option Stop at specified time 
Initial Time 0.0 
Final Time 1000.0 
Presentation 
CPU Time Balance ratio_1_2 
Window 
Title Calculating_commitment_16a2 : ParametersVariation 
Model Time false 
Experiment Progress true 
Parameter Variation Experiment Parameters: 
Value 
Parameter Type Min Max Step 
MarketDifferentiatio 
n 
 362 
FIXED 
RetailPriceVariatio 
n 
RANGE .05 .2 .15 
WholesalePriceVari 
ation 
RANGE .05 .2 .15 
ManufacturerPrice 
Variation 
RANGE .05 .2 .15 
ManufacturingMarg 
inInput 
RANGE .35 .5 .15 
WholesalerMaginIn 
put 
RANGE .15 .3 .15 
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Variable: variable 
Name Value 
General 
Type double 
Initial Value getCurrentReplication() 
Time Plot: plot 
Name Value 
General 
Time Window 1000 
Vertical Scale AUTO 
Analysis Auto Update true 
Recurrence 1 
Dataset Samples To Keep 1000 
Advanced 
x 350 
y 190 
Width 410 
Height 250 
Appearance 
Show Legend true 
Legend Place SOUTH 
Label Format MODEL_TIME_UNITS 
Plot Items: 
Title Type Dataset / Value Point Style Color Line Width Interpolation 
Replication value getCurrentReplication() NONE darkMagenta true 2 LINEAR 
Itteration value getCurrentIteration() NONE orange true 2 LINEAR 
Dataset Title 2 value variable NONE darkKhaki true 2 LINEAR 
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Text: text 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 10 
y 10 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name Serif 
Font Size 28 
Bold Font Style true 
Text Calculating_commitment_16a2 : ParametersVariation 
Advanced 
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x 10 
y 10 
Text: text1 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 10 
y 50 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name Serif 
Font Size 16 
Italic Font Style true 
Text Parameter Variation Experiment 
Advanced 
x 10 
y 50 
Text: text2 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 130 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text Iteration: 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 130 
Text: text3 
Name Value 
Page 123 of 129 
Calculating_commitment_16a6 
Name Value 
General 
Color darkSlateBlue 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 130 
General 
Alignment RIGHT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text ? 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 130 
Dynamic 
Dynamic: Visible getCurrentIteration() > 0 
Dynamic: Text format(getCurrentIteration()) 
Line: line 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 10 
y 150 
dX 240 
dY 0 
Text: text4 
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Name Value 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 160 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Bold Font Style true 
Text Parameters 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 160 
Text: text5 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 190 
General 
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Name Value 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text MarketDifferentiation 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 190 
Text: text6 
Name Value 
General 
Color darkSlateBlue 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 190 
General 
Alignment RIGHT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text ? 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 190 
Dynamic 
Dynamic: Visible getCurrentIteration() > 0 
Dynamic: Text format( MarketDifferentiation ) 
Text: text7 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 210 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text RetailPriceVariation 
Advanced 
x 20 
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y 210 
Text: text8 
Name Value 
General 
Color darkSlateBlue 
Advanced 
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Name Value 
x 240 
y 210 
General 
Alignment RIGHT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text ? 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 210 
Dynamic 
Dynamic: Visible getCurrentIteration() > 0 
Dynamic: Text format( RetailPriceVariation ) 
Text: text9 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 230 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text WholesalePriceVariation 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 230 
Text: text10 
Name Value 
General 
Color darkSlateBlue 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 230 
General 
Alignment RIGHT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text ? 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 230 
Dynamic 
Dynamic: Visible getCurrentIteration() > 0 
Dynamic: Text format( WholesalePriceVariation ) 
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Text: text11 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 20 
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y 250 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text ManufacturerPriceVariation 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 250 
Text: text12 
Name Value 
General 
Color darkSlateBlue 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 250 
General 
Alignment RIGHT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text ? 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 250 
Dynamic 
Dynamic: Visible getCurrentIteration() > 0 
Dynamic: Text format( ManufacturerPriceVariation ) 
Text: text13 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 270 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text ManufacturingMarginInput 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 270 
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Text: text14 
Name Value 
General 
Color darkSlateBlue 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 270 
General 
Alignment RIGHT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text ? 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 270 
Dynamic 
Dynamic: Visible getCurrentIteration() > 0 
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Dynamic: Text format( ManufacturingMarginInput ) 
Text: text15 
Name Value 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 290 
General 
Alignment LEFT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text WholesalerMaginInput 
Advanced 
x 20 
y 290 
Text: text16 
Name Value 
General 
Color darkSlateBlue 
Advanced 
x 240 
y 290 
General 
Alignment RIGHT 
Font Name SansSerif 
Font Size 12 
Text ? 
Advanced 
x 240 
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Name Value 
y 290 
Dynamic 
Dynamic: Visible getCurrentIteration() > 0 
Dynamic: Text format( WholesalerMaginInput ) 
Button: button 
Name Value 
General 
Label Text Run Experiment 
Dynamic: Enable getState() == IDLE 
Action run(); 
Advanced 
Font Name Dialog 
Font Size 11 
x 10 
y 80 
Width 180 
Height 30 
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Appendix B Curve estimations 
 
Dependent Variable: CoM
Scenario 1 R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1
1 Exponential .990 13758.756 1 134 .000 1857.599 .000
2 Exponential .961 4251.116 1 174 .000 1894.140 -.001
3 Exponential .979 2938.888 1 64 .000 1995.762 .000
4 Exponential .502 609.867 1 606 .000 2313.594 .000
5 Exponential .890 6820.357 1 845 0.000 1770.868 .000
1 Exponential .980 2125.609 1 43 .000 189.691 .000
2 Exponential .970 418.517 1 13 .000 174.083 .000
3 Exponential .962 356.169 1 14 .000 228.452 .000
4 Exponential .799 123.322 1 31 .000 144.013 .000
5 Exponential .490 58.616 1 61 .000 181.430 .000
1 Exponential .985 1399.710 1 22 .000 2189.300 -.001
2 Exponential .888 5663.228 1 713 0.000 2265.521 -.001
3 Exponential .924 1414.076 1 117 .000 1967.101 .000
4 Exponential .966 1241.052 1 44 .000 1908.574 -.001
5 Exponential .750 2359.293 1 787 .000 1681.985 .000
1 Exponential .942 547.324 1 34 .000 119.101 .000
2 Exponential .880 314.215 1 43 .000 111.196 .000
3 Exponential .958 525.394 1 23 .000 171.399 -.001
4 Exponential .871 107.743 1 16 .000 112.755 .000
5 Exponential .776 72.694 1 21 .000 82.642 .000
1 Exponential .981 307.795 1 6 .000 447.282 -4.278E-05
2 Exponential .497 414.439 1 419 .000 268.079 .000
3 Exponential .687 13.192 1 6 .011 412.563 -.001
4 Exponential 1.000 1 0 458.830 -7.459E-05
5 Exponential .806 28.997 1 7 .001 435.933 .000
1 Exponential .252 218.544 1 649 .000 1024.918 -.001
2 Exponential .749 992.762 1 332 .000 1595.768 .000
3 Exponential .402 155.748 1 232 .000 743.965 .000
4 Exponential .865 531.065 1 83 .000 1252.775 .000
5 Exponential .488 10.471 1 11 .008 313.709 .000
1 Exponential .829 141.052 1 29 .000 96.092 -.001
2 Exponential .949 148.816 1 8 .000 88.545 -.001
4 Exponential .897 8.728 1 1 .208 1290.575 -.001
5 Exponential .731 87.071 1 32 .000 61.766 .000
1 Exponential .822 268.225 1 58 .000 897.444 -.001
3 Exponential .689 1394.545 1 630 .000 915.387 -.001
4 Exponential .854 105.457 1 18 .000 453.480 -.001
5 Exponential .885 23.182 1 3 .017 3702.326 -.002
1 Exponential .862 1094.868 1 176 .000 602.191 .000
3 Exponential .953 8299.597 1 408 .000 417.377 .000
4 Exponential .940 423.827 1 27 .000 567.453 .000
5 Exponential .963 259.733 1 10 .000 564.945 .000
1 Exponential .872 837.565 1 123 .000 203.405 .000
2 Exponential .931 841.209 1 62 .000 297.766 .000
3 Exponential 1.000 1 0 317.859 .000
4 Exponential .929 1443.917 1 111 .000 299.992 .000
5 Exponential .999 2252.948 1 3 .000 188.055 .000
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Appendix C Example of full results 
 
 
of German and US supply management professionals", International Journal of 
Technology Policy and Management, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 401.  
 
Experiment Replication Time SumOfMagnitude Count_GT_Mag
1 1 1 8429.484738 341
1 1 2 11794.00873 246
1 1 3 3908.972767 605
1 1 4 3499.576807 677
1 1 6 3605.458374 659
1 1 8 3723.743601 636
1 1 16 3651.430862 650
1 1 18 3699.014547 641
1 1 21 3620.532344 657
1 1 26 601.3713014 1575
1 1 32 276.0000000 1631
1 1 33 10549.08849 278
1 1 38 1954.548704 918
1 1 40 1894.339292 935
1 1 41 1894.339292 935
1 1 42 1930.595529 923
1 1 47 1995.942201 906
1 1 48 1821.084147 961
1 1 50 2473.706084 802
1 1 56 4812.374662 488
1 1 57 10092.90931 297
1 1 63 10122.38084 295
1 1 76 2732.851542 779
1 1 78 3049.010149 743
1 1 79 2933.576779 759
